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Abstract 
Studies on development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR) across the world have 
revealed a range of negative outcomes for resettlers’ livelihoods. DIDR studies have faced 
conceptual challenges and limited understanding of the post resettlement and livelihood 
reconstruction process. Previous studies have tended to overlook the full range of impacts that 
resettlement projects have on the ability of displaced persons to maintain their livelihoods and have 
tended to focus on short-term livelihood strategies rather than improve future livelihoods. In 
addition, the key DIDR frameworks fail to understand the complexities inherent in the resettlement 
process which is often contextualised in different economic, political, social and cultural settings 
(De Wet, 2006).  
This research seeks to understand the livelihood reconstruction processes for four ethnic groups 
including Kinh group (ethnic Vietnamese) and three other minority groups (Bahnar, Jarai and Ro 
Ngao groups) who were directly affected by the construction of the Yali Falls Dam in the Central 
Highlands of Vietnam from the late 1990s. In doing so, this research proposes an adapted 
framework for understanding, monitoring and enhancing livelihood resilience of resettled people in 
Vietnam. This research is addressed through three major research questions: 1. How has the Yali 
Falls Dam resettlement project affected the resettled ethnic groups’ livelihoods? 2. How and why do 
the subsequent livelihood strategies and outcomes differ among the ethnic groups? and 3. What key 
modifications to the existing DIDR frameworks could be made to improve resettlement program 
planning and implementation?  
This research employed both quantitative and qualitative methods to answer these research 
questions and gain insights into the resettlement complex. Methods included structured household 
interviews with 397 resettled households from the four ethnic groups, and in-depth interviews with 
19 key informants from the local authorities in the district and communes, as well as with resettled 
people. In addition, participant observations and photos were also taken to complement the data and 
analysis. 
The research reveals the following key findings. First, impacts of the Yali Falls resettlement project 
were unevenly distributed among the four resettled ethnic groups. The three ethnic minority groups, 
who had traditionally led predominantly subsistence lifestyles have suffered high rates of poverty, 
food insecurity and debt. However, the Kinh group have been able to recover and develop their 
livelihoods after the resettlement. Second, a range of formal and informal coping livelihood 
strategies have emerged and been applied by the different ethnic groups. The ethnic minority groups 
(Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao) have tended to apply more informal and unsustainable coping 
strategies, while the Kinh group have improved their livelihoods with the majority of households 
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employing development strategies. The differentiation in livelihood strategies is driven by several 
key factors including land rights and land holding changes, social differentiation and social 
networks involved in the resettlement process. Third, examination of the resettlement process and 
its outcomes through the lenses of the DIDR frameworks and the sustainable livelihoods framework 
reveals several strengths and weaknesses of the existing frameworks which are explored. This study 
found that the four stage framework (Scudder and Colson, 1982) does not hold true for Vietnam’s 
resettlement projects. The risk and livelihoods reconstruction framework (IRR) (Cernea, 1997) 
showed its strengths in predicting impoverishment risk outcomes of the Yali resettlement project 
and other projects in Vietnam. However, it has limitations in terms of providing an understanding of 
the process for and driving factors behind livelihood strategies. The case of Yali also provided 
additional risks such as power inequities among the resettled people, financial risk and education 
disruption which are missing in the IRR framework. This research also found the routine and 
dissonant culture framework (Downing and Garcia-Downing, 2009) is illustrative in explaining the 
religious conversion of the Jarai group from an animist group into Catholic, Buddhist, and 
Protestant religions. 
This research makes several key contributions to the DIDR and livelihoods research fields. It has 
shown how to apply an adapted livelihood framework with a focus on livelihood capitals to 
understand the impacts of a resettlement project. It has revealed several driving factors involved in 
the complexities of the resettlement process which are embedded in historical and social settings. 
This research has also proposed an adapted framework for understanding, monitoring and 
enhancing livelihood resilience of the resettled people in Vietnam based on the data and an 
understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of the key DIDR frameworks. The adapted 
framework with a focus on livelihood capitals, consideration of social differentiation and usage of a 
process-based approach not only provides a comprehensive understanding of the resettlement 
process but also suggests interventions to improve the resettled people’s livelihood resilience in the 
long-term. 
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CHAPTER I. 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Brief historical overview of large dams 
There are over 50,000 large dams in the world today (Berga et al., 2006). These dams provide a 
range of benefits: electricity generation, irrigation water for agriculture, urban water supply, flood 
control, and tourism opportunities. Large dams supply 20 percent of global electricity and provide 
irrigation water for 15 percent of global food production (Scudder, 2005a). Despite this, large dams 
also present a series of complex challenges and negative impacts.  
Prior to the 1970s, large dams were regarded as successful and relatively uncontroversial. In this 
initial period large dams were seen as nation building and symbolic of development and progress. 
For example, in the United States, building of a large dam was an employment-creating response to 
the Great Depression (Billington et al., 2005) and population growth during the 1930s (Biswas and 
Tortajada, 2001). Similarly, several large dams were built in the Soviet Union following Stalin’s 5-
year industrialisation plans in the 1930s and Plan of Transformation of Nature during the late 1940s 
(McCully, 1996). By the 1970s, dam building had reached a peak in Europe, Northern America 
(Biswas and Tortajada, 2001, WCD, 2000a) and Australia (Bahadori et al., 2013). 
The big dam era in developing countries commenced in the de-colonisation period of the 1950s. By 
the 1960s and 1970s concerns were being raised about the environmental and social impacts of 
these dams. After gaining independence from former colonial control (post 1950s), many countries 
in Asia and Africa embarked on large-scale infrastructural development works which included the 
construction of large dams. As was the case for developed economies earlier on, these dams were 
viewed as a symbol of nation building and pride (Biswas and Tortajada, 2001). However, the 
environmental and social impacts of dams in the tropics did not go unnoticed and received attention 
in the 1970s (Stanley and Alpers, 1975). Examples included siltation decrease in the Nile River 
Delta due to the construction of the Aswan Dam in Egypt (Biswas, 1978), and a host of social and 
human health problems, including water-borne diseases and displacement of large numbers of 
people due to the Volta Dam in Ghana, Kariba Dam in Zambia and Zimbabwe (Scudder, 1973b).    
Since the 1980s, large dam developments have often been controversial due to their social, 
environmental and economic costs (Goldsmith and Hildyard, 1985, WB, 1996, McCully, 1996). 
Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) started linking the social and environmental costs related 
to health, socio-economics and human rights (Scudder, 2005b) and an international anti-dam 
movement emerged and played an important role in forcing the development of World Bank 
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policies on resettlement, environmental assessment, the rights of indigenous people and information 
disclosure (McCully, 1996). Given the recognition of unacceptable environmental and social 
impacts, the World Commission on Dams (WCD) was formally established in 1998 to conduct a 
global review of dam effectiveness. Their report emphasised the unacceptable social and 
environmental costs related to dam development. For instance, large dams have caused 
fragmentation of 46% of the world large river’s basins, extinction, threatening and endangerment of 
20% of the world’s fresh fish species and displacement of 40-80 million people worldwide (WCD, 
2000a). In addition, a movement towards dam decommission and demolition in Canada and the US 
was taking place in the 1990s to restore fisheries and ecosystems and avoid consequences related to 
the safety of ageing dams (WCD, 2000a). In contrast, the rate of dam development in developing 
countries, especially in the Mekong region (Grumbine et al., 2012) and in Africa (Bosshard, 2010) 
has been increasing to date. By 2010, about 220 dams in 50 countries had been funded and built by 
Chinese companies following China’s ‘going out’ strategies (Bosshard, 2010). 
The large dam controversy still continues around the unequal distribution of cost and benefits 
among society with more focus on resettlement of the displaced people due to dam construction. 
Altinbilek et al. (2012), in the Global Assessment on Large Dam Impacts, urged that the debate 
should be refocused to fulfil the objectives and meet the needs of societies in developing countries 
and ensure that those who may suffer the costs of implementing dams (e.g. the people who must be 
resettled) are made the direct beneficiaries of the projects. This was not found to be the case. 
Moreover, it is widely accepted that dam-induced resettlement is one of the most critical and 
complex issues related to dam building projects (Biswas and Tortajada, 2001, Altinbilek et al., 
2012, DiFrancesco, 2007). The following section will discuss the critical issue of resettlement 
resulting from dam construction.        
1.2. Key challenges relating to dam-induced displacement and resettlement 
There are three key challenges in dealing with new dams which involve three linked problem areas 
namely the continuing negative outcomes of resettlement, limited understanding of livelihood 
reestablishment, and lack of a conceptual framework.  
First, throughout the world, resettled people have faced difficulties in recovering their livelihoods 
and achieving positive outcomes in the long-term. The World Bank’s review on its project 
involving involuntary resettlement from 1986 to 1993 (WB, 1996) and the survey on 50 large dam 
projects around the world (Scudder, 2005b, Scudder, 2005a) concluded that the outcomes for most 
resettled people do not include improved livelihoods in the long term.  
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Second, our understanding of post-resettlement and livelihood reconstruction phases remains 
limited. In fact, indigenous people, tribal people and ethnic minorities make up a large proportion of 
the total resettled people who lose their livelihoods for dam construction (Colchester, 2000, 
McCully, 1996). These people are more vulnerable to cultural, social and livelihood risks among 
the displaced population and suffer more from the negative effects of displacement (WCD, 2000a). 
Further, a number of authors have pointed out that our understanding of post-resettlement, including 
behaviour responses, coping strategies and reconstruction is very limited (McDowell and Morrell, 
2010, Scudder, 2012, Bui et al., 2013, Bui and Schreinemachers, 2011).  
Previous studies (Bui and Schreinemachers, 2011, Dao, 2012, Nguyen et al., 2016) have tended to 
focus on impacts and responses of the resettled people after the resettlement in a short timeframe 
and have therefore failed to capture the whole range of livelihood capitals of the resettled people. 
This is an oversight given that different forms of capitals are important to society and development. 
For instance, social capital is an essential complement to natural, physical, and human capitals 
(Ostrom, 2000) and its various forms can either promote or constrain individuals and groups in 
managing resources (Compton and Beeton, 2012). Moving beyond the financial, physical, human 
and social capitals, Luthans et al. (2004) and Beeton and Lynch (2012) emphasised the importance 
of positive psychological capital in effecting change and driving individual and group success. The 
range of capitals should be taken into consideration in understanding the impacts of resettlement 
projects.         
Thirdly, research on development-induced displacement and resettlement (DIDR), including that 
caused by dam building projects, faces conceptual challenges. Three key frameworks on DIDR, 
namely the four stage framework (Scudder and Colson, 1982), the risk and livelihoods 
reconstruction framework (Cernea, 1997), and the routine and dissonant culture framework 
(Downing and Garcia-Downing, 2009), were developed to conceptualise and generalise the 
resettlement process and outcomes. However, the resettlement process is contextualised in different 
economic, political, social and cultural settings. Thus, the frameworks have shown both strengths 
and weaknesses in dealing with resettlement.  
Literature on DIDR is also divided into two broad categories based on the approach adopted. 
Dwivedi (2002) named “optimistic managerial” and “pessimistic movement” as the two approaches. 
The first approach views displacement as an inevitable outcome of development and focuses on the 
consequences (Dwivedi, 2002). This is represented by Cernea’s (1997) framework which is based 
on the argument that risks can be controlled through providing adequate inputs such as national 
legal frameworks and policies, political will, funding, pre-resettlement research, careful 
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implementation, and monitoring. In contrast, the second approach considers displacement as the 
evidence of development’s inevitable uneven and unfair distribution of costs and benefits (Dwivedi, 
2002). By asking “Why does forced resettlement so often go wrong?”, De Wet (2006) criticised the 
first approach as providing “inadequate inputs” to deal with complexities that are inherent in the 
resettlement process. De Wet (2006) claimed that it requires a more comprehensive, locally-based 
and open-ended approach to deal with such complexities. Such an approach would begin to grapple 
with cultural, social, environmental, economic, institutional and political factors that are taking 
place in the context of imposed space change and local level responses and initiatives (De Wet, 
2006 p.190). De Wet (2006) also called for further studies to understand the complexities inherent 
in the resettlement process to develop sound policy.  
1.3. Mekong River and the Yali project 
The Mekong River is the longest river in South East Asia and the tenth largest river in the world; 
arising in China and flowing through Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam (Grumbine et al., 
2012). The Mekong river basin is ranked as the second most diverse river basin after the Amazon, 
and it plays a crucial role for about 65 million people who are directly engaged in fisheries and 
agriculture (Gemenne et al., 2013).  
Dam development is justified by the states in the Mekong region as means of modernisation, 
industrialisation and bringing development to ethnic minority people in the uplands (Dao, 2012). At 
present, the Mekong River is under pressure from dam development in its mainstream and 
tributaries. It is reported that 120 dam projects are either projected, under construction or operating 
on lower Mekong tributaries. In addition, 12 dams are proposed to be constructed in the mainstream 
of the Mekong and predicted to displace more than 100,000 people and place 2.1 million people at 
risk due to negative impacts on fisheries and change in river geomorphology and ecology 
(Grumbine et al., 2012). Furthermore, Gemenne et al. (2013) warned that while the direct impact of 
dams in terms of resettling a large number of people in the region has not been sufficiently solved, 
the new problem of dam-induced migration is likely to take place due to the dams impacts on the 
ecosystems and livelihoods of millions of people downstream. The lower Mekong countries 
including Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam consider that the social and political 
economy of resettlement related to hydropower is one of the most serious strategic trans-boundary 
issues facing development in the area (ICEM, 2010). Therefore, monitoring past resettlement 
projects to understand the long-term issues and provide lessons for both new and old projects in the 
region is very important.   
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The Yali Hydropower Dam is the first dam out of six large dams which were constructed and 
operated along the Krong Poko River, a main tributary of the Se San River, in the Central 
Highlands of Vietnam (see Figure 1.1). The Se San River is one of the largest tributaries of the 
Mekong River (Hirsch, 2006). The annual discharges of the Se San, Srepok and Sekong Rivers in 
the Central Highlands make up to 20% of the annual flow of the Mekong River (Piman et al., 2012). 
This River originates from the North of the Central Highlands and flows through the Ratanakiri and 
Stungcheng provinces of Cambodia before entering the Mekong River. The Yali Hydropower Dam 
is the third largest dam in Vietnam with a dam height of 69m above sea level and a reservoir of 
6,450 ha, was built and completed in 1999 to produce 720 megawatt (MW) of hydroelectricity. 
More than 6,700 people from four ethnic groups including Kinh (ethnic Vietnamese 40%), Jarai 
(35%), Ro Ngao (19%) and Bahnar (6%) were forcibly moved due to flooding of the reservoir (Dao 
et al., 2001). 
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Figure 1.1: Map of Yali Hydropower Dam in Krong Poko River in Lower Mekong Basin 
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Previous studies (Dao et al., 2001, Hung et al., 2004, Trung, 2013) have clearly shown limited 
participation of the resettlers in resettlement planning, problems of inappropriate resettlement 
planning and immediate consequences on the resettlers in the resettlement site of the Yali 
Hydropower Dam. For instance, they report inappropriate design of houses, lack of cultivation land, 
and water shortages. In addition, the resettlers in this and other resettlement sites in Vietnam have 
been facing common consequences of poverty, food security, social conflict, natural resource use 
conflict, and soil degradation (CODE, 2010, CODE, 2011). However, the previous studies overlook 
the influence of ethnicity factors on the long-term consequences for livelihoods, adaptive responses 
and the process of building adaptive capacity and working towards positive outcomes. 
In general, the dam-induced resettlement projects around the world and in Vietnam have faced 
several practical and conceptual challenges. The most critical issues are how to ensure the affected 
communities, especially ethnic groups, benefit from the dam development. This research is 
organised using a thesis derived from a study of failures to date. The thesis is: 
The impact of large dams on human communities could be positive if the investment 
mix associated with the dams included investments beyond infrastructure and finance 
to human, social and natural capital so that resettled populations experienced 
enhanced well-being and an increased economic contribution to the national economy. 
To explore the above, this research aims to understand the dynamics and complexities of the Yali 
Hydropower’s resettlement site by exploring how four resettled ethnic groups build capacity, and 
sustain their livelihoods in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. By doing that, it would provide 
policy implications for improving resettlement in Vietnam. 
The following specific questions are used to guide the literature review before developing the 
study’s research question: 
International 
1. What are the lessons from the previous forced resettlement projects for large scale dams and 
water infrastructure in the world, particularly those located in developing economies? 
2. Do other situations relating to other environmental displacement phenomena of forced 
displacement or resettlement provide additional insights into improving adaptation and 
resilience in those communities affected? 
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Specific to Vietnam 
3. How has resettlement policy in Vietnam evolved over time in recent decades? 
4. What are the reported program failures, current trends and lessons learned in the 
resettlement projects in Vietnam? What are the emerging issues and risks? What are the 
links between them, and finally, has there been any learning in Vietnam from Asian and 
international experiences? 
The above questions will be used to define the scope for the literature review in the next chapter and 
justify the research question from the literature. The identified literature gaps define the limited 
understanding of experience of resettled people over the long-term in the context of ethnic diversity. 
This question is then addressed by three research questions justified by the conclusion of the 
literature review Sections 2.4, 2.5, and 2.7: 
1. How has the Yali Falls Dam resettlement project affected the resettled ethnic groups’ 
livelihoods?; 
2. How and why do the subsequent livelihood strategies and outcomes differ among the ethnic 
groups? and;  
3. What are the key modifications to the existing development-induced displacement 
resettlement (DIDR) frameworks that could improve resettlement program planning and 
implementation?  
1.4. Terminology 
Before exploring dam impacts, the history of dam-induced resettlement studies and dam-induced 
resettlement projects, it is essential to clarify terminology for this research since the field covers 
several disciplines in which terminology is sometimes used in confusing and contradictory ways. 
This section will discuss related generic and specific terms in order to use the terms as precisely and 
as consistently as possible. 
1.4.1. Forced migration 
The International Association for the Study of Forced Migration1defined forced migration as the 
general term that refers to the movements of refugees and internally displaced people (people 
                                               
1 http://www.efms.uni-bamberg.de/iasfm/mission.htm 
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displaced by conflicts) as well as people displaced by natural or environmental disasters, chemical 
or nuclear disasters, famine, or development projects. 
Dam-induced resettlement is a type of forced/involuntary migration. It is involuntary since people 
are compelled by development plans to move from their familiar environment to an unfamiliar one 
(Scudder, 2005a, P19). Moreover, any choice to remain in their original place is removed due to 
inundation of settled land (Muggah, 2003).    
1.4.2. Displacement 
Displacement is defined by WCD (2000a) as both physical displacement and livelihood 
displacement (or livelihood deprivation). Physical displacement refers to moving people from their 
original place. Livelihood displacement includes deprivation of people of their means of production 
and dislocates them from their existing socio-cultural milieu (WCD, 2000a P. 102-103). 
To clarify displacement, it is important to understand its core features which make it different from 
migration. First, it is involuntary since people’s choices are limited and involves a higher degree of 
risks which they face in the new place compared to their original place (Muggah, 2003). Second, 
displacement is often simply interpreted by policy makers and practitioners as physical movement 
of individuals, households and communities (Muggah, 2008). However, displacement should be 
defined in a broader term that encompasses the challenges of sense of place and ‘home’, which go 
beyond just the physicality. Hirsch et al. (1992), WB (1996), WCD (2000a) also refer to the fact 
that displacement of production means the removal of those things necessary for people’s 
livelihoods such as land, forest and water resources. In addition, Terminski (2013) highlighted that 
the term is mostly used in the context related to deprivation of access to existing land and resources, 
unaccompanied by adequate support mechanisms for the affected people.  
Dam development not only causes human relocation but also partial or total losses of people’s 
livelihoods. For the sake of this research, the term of displacement is defined in a broader view, 
including both physical relocation and livelihood displacement.  
1.4.3. Resettlement 
The World Bank definition of resettlement covers all direct social and economic losses resulting 
from land taking and restriction of access, together with the relevant compensatory and remedy 
measures. Resettlement includes (a) acquisition of land and physical structures on the land; (b) 
physical relocation; and (c) economic rehabilitation of displaced persons, to improve (or at least 
restore) incomes and living standards (WB, 2004: P 5). 
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WB (1996) and WCD (2000a) defined resettlement as the two phase process of relocating people 
from their original place to other sites and re-establishing their livelihoods. Thus, the phase of 
livelihood re-establishment makes it different from displacement. Moreover, McDowell and Morrell 
(2010) emphasised that resettlement aims to provide “development” and improvement but 
displacement does not. 
There is no consensus on the boundary between displacement and resettlement. Displacement is 
considered to end when resettlement starts taking place by planners in the development project 
(Muggah, 2008). However, it is easy to find cases where sense of place continues even when 
resettlement works have been implemented. 
There is not a specific word in the Vietnamese language that directly translates to ‘displacement’. 
Relocation and resettlement are the commonly used terms that have relevant equivalents in 
Vietnamese. Therefore, the term “dam-induced resettlement” will be used in this study. 
1.5. Thesis structure 
The study is organised by the thesis and research question reported above and addressed in the 
subsequent chapters in the manner outlined in this section of the dissertation. This question 
structure is set out in Figure 1.2. Chapter I introduces the key challenges of DIDR and the guiding 
thesis of this research. The thesis research questions for literature reviews and principal research 
questions which are addressed by this research are introduced. Chapter II provides a review of 
global case studies on dam-induced resettlement and the Vietnamese experience to address the 
literature research questions and define research gaps and principal research questions for this 
research. Chapter III shows how the principal research questions are addressed through explaining 
the development of the research process, justifies the research paradigm employed, clarifies the case 
study approach used, and explains the employment of mixed methods used in the case study. Each 
research question and related research findings are addressed and discussed in Chapter IV, Chapter 
V and Chapter VI. Chapter VII discusses how the thesis is resolved. It finally discusses the 
theoretical contribution of the study and policy implications of this research. The chapter concludes 
with the research limitations, and proposes future research.  
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Figure 1.2: Thesis structure and the schematic relationship between the thesis, research 
questions and chapter organisation 
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CHAPTER II. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter aims to understand the state of knowledge related to dam-induced resettlement. It does 
this by providing firstly an overview of challenges and trends of dam impact assessment, secondly a 
brief history of the changing discourse around dam-induced resettlement, and finally provides a 
justification for the choice of the case studies used in this study of dam-induced resettlement 
projects in the world and in Vietnam together with institutions’ responses to development-induced 
resettlement. These steps identify gaps for further research that are relevant in both the international 
context and Vietnam. This leads to the justification of the research questions for this study that 
address its focusing thesis. 
The thesis established the scope of the study and the literature reviewed leading to the research 
questions. The review’s primary focus is on large dams, the flooded area of which was populated 
and following the construction of dams has resulted in forced migration. The principal purpose for 
most of these dams is to benefit populations beyond the dam area or catchment. For example, 
hydro-electrification, agriculture and water supply. The inevitable consequences of this are that the 
principal beneficiaries of the dams are different components of the populations from the populations 
displaced by the dams. It is also axiomatic that the benefit cost assessment used to justify the dams 
is heavily weighted toward the principal beneficiaries, not the displaced populations.  
2.2. Impacts of large dams 
Hydropower dams have economic, environmental and social impacts which have been extensively 
discussed over the last decades (WCD, 2000a). The list of potential impacts of dams is very large 
and depends on the scale and scope of inquiry. Given the scope of this study, it is important to 
understand commonality of impacts, key challenges and trends regarding dam impact assessment 
based on both insights from the available literature and reviews of dam case studies. 
According to Beck et al. (2012), many common negative environmental impacts of dams can be 
found in different regions of the world. For instance, forest loss, fish loss, greenhouse gas emission, 
river bank erosion, sedimentation of reservoir and water pollution were documented in the case 
studies of Tucurui Dam in Brazil (Fearnside, 1999, Fearnside, 1997, Fearnside, 2001), Kariba Dam 
in Zambia and Zimbabwe (WCD, 2000b, Tumbare, 2008, Sanyanga, 1995, Petit et al., 2001, 
Magadza, 2006, Guy, 1981, Colson, 1971), the Three Gorges Dam in China (Zhang and Lou, 2011, 
Tullos, 2009, Sleigh and Jackson, 1998, Nakayama and Shankman, 2013, McManus et al., 2010, 
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Gray et al., 2012, Chen et al., 2013), Nam Thuen 2 Dam in Lao PDR (Scudder, 2003, Ryder, 2004, 
Lawrence, 2009, Erlanger et al., 2008).In addition, human health problems, such as malaria are 
reported in the case of Tucurui in Brazil (Fearnside, 1999). It is claimed that sexually transmitted 
diseases, including HIV, are an indirect impact in the case of Kariba (Cliggett et al., 2007) and 
Lesotho Dam (Tilt et al., 2009), in Africa and the Tucurui dam in Brazil (Fearnside, 1999). 
The impacts can be characterised on a spatial scale including dam impacts taking place upstream, 
downstream, and in the reservoir (Beck et al., 2012). In fact, few studies have been conducted to 
look at downstream and inter-boundary impacts within nations and between nations. Wyatt and 
Baird (2007) discovered a substantial impacts of the Yali Dam in Vietnam on local people’s 
livelihoods and public health downstream in Cambodia. Institutional and political usually 
constraints hinder the addressing of trans-boundary impacts of dams and effective negotiations 
between the two countries are difficult. Harris (2007) makes a cogent critique of EIA not taking 
sufficient consideration of upstream and downstream impacts of major projects.  
Temporal scale impacts occurring during construction, immediately after dam construction, and 
post-project or in the longer term should also be considered. Biswas and Tortajada (2011) are 
critical of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) because although many are done, they are 
generally of low quality and rarely if ever assess long term impacts of dams after five to 15 years. 
Similarly, by reviewing social impacts of dams in the world, Tilt et al. (2009) and Fujikura and 
Nakayama (2012) found that social impact assessments (SIAs) mainly monitor the initial years of 
resettlement and ignore longer term outcomes. Thus, long term impacts on the people resettled by 
dams, especially the second generation are not able to be evaluated because of the short-term frame 
used for SIAs.  
Although contrasting views on dam impacts exist, ensuring the affected people benefit from the 
dam project remains challenging. Indicative of the contrasting views on the ‘success’ of large dams 
are the different assessments of Aswan High Dam in Egypt and Bhakra-Nangal Project in India. 
These two projects are considered by WCD, in its assessment of 125 case studies around the world, 
as the worst dams on local criteria (WCD, 2000a) while they are assessed as the best dams in the 
world on national criteria (Rangachari, 2012, Biswas and Tortajada, 2012). The variable assessment 
clearly demonstrates that the relative weighting that is placed on different criteria for success is 
important. However, it is clear that the majority of resettled people have been impoverished 
according to the results of a survey of 50 large dams by Scudder (2012). Thus, Biswas (2012) urges 
refocusing of debate to ensure the affected people benefit from the dam projects. Although the 
benefits have been defined the distribution of benefits to the different populations is not evaluated.  
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The recent trend shows some initial efforts in improving the understanding of linkages between dam 
development, environmental degradation and livelihoods of affected people, especially 
marginalised groups. A few researchers have made an effort to analyse the impacts of dams on 
different ecosystem services and the linkages between ecological changes and human wellbeing 
through an ecosystem service approach. Kittinger et al. (2009) found evidence of four main 
categories of social and ecological interactions resulting from the Three Gorges Dam including 
toxicological impacts, shifting in the dynamics of infectious diseases, natural hazards, and social 
health and they elucidate both social and ecological drivers affecting the linkages. Beck et al. 
(2012) indicated that environmental protection and maintaining affected people’s livelihoods are 
challenging different countries in different developmental stages. Examples include the United 
States, China, as a country in transition, and developing countries in South East Asia. Baker (2012) 
and Gemenne et al. (2013) made an analysis of the cumulative effects of dams on food security and 
livelihoods and developed dam-induced migration scenarios in the Mekong region.    
In general, environmental protection and livelihood impacts due to dam construction have been the 
key challenges of both developed and developing countries. Regarding the area of dam impact 
assessment, there is a need to improve our understanding of the complexity of dam impacts and 
their implications on wellbeing of the affected people. The following section focuses on the chronic 
problem of impoverishment of large numbers of people.        
2.3. Brief global history of changing discourses around dam-induced resettlement 
2.3.1. Before 1970s—Dams as a symbol of human achievement and progress, economic potential 
and power 
The construction of large dams was largely unchallenged as a means of achieving development and 
economic progress between the 1930s and the 1970s (Orr, 2001). Indeed, it was in many ways a 
symbol of human achievement and progress during this period. 
The large dam era started in the 1930s and successfully developed in the United States between 
1932 and 1960. During this period, building large dams was an action responding to the years of the 
Great Depression and was justified as job creation, creating financial security for farmers tending 
irrigated lands and providing stable water supply for cities in the United States (Billington et al., 
2005). Technical success was proved in the cases of the Hoover and the Grand Coulee dams which 
were recognised as two out of seven civil engineering wonders of the United States in 1964 
(Billington et al., 2005).   
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Given the success of dam building technology the United States, it was exported to developing 
countries through its institutions such as the Bureau of Reclamation, the United States Army Corps 
of Engineers, and the Tennessee Valley Authority. For example, the United States Bureau of 
Reclamation and the United States Army Corps of Engineers provided technical and financial 
support to members of the Mekong Committee including Thailand, Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic (PDR), South Vietnam, and Cambodia to promote economic growth of the region in 1958 
and several dams were built in Thailand to prevent Communist expansion into the region during the 
Cold War (Middleton et al., 2009).   
The Soviet Union completed its first large dam named Dneprostroi in 1932 as part of the five year 
plan and subsequently developed a series of dams after the Second World War as part of the “Great 
Stalin Plan for Transformation of Nature” (McCully, 1996). Similar to the United States, the Soviet 
Union supported developing countries, including Vietnam, in building large dams during the Cold 
War (Middleton et al., 2009).  
After achieving independence since 1950, many countries in Asia and Africa embarked on their 
development programs that included construction of large dams such as the Aswan Dam in Egypt 
and Sudan, the Volta Dam in Ghana, the Kariba Dam in Zambia and Zimbabwe and the Kainji Dam 
in Nigeria. At the same time in Asia, dams such as the Bhakra and Hirakud Dams were built in 
India. The Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlan Nehru, called dams the “new temples of modern 
India”. At the same time the President of Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser, viewed Aswan as a symbol 
of post-colonial development shedding Egypt’s colonial past (Biswas and Tortajada, 2001).  
Studies of development-induced resettlement had already emerged since the 1950s in the context of 
the dams in African countries (Scudder, 1973, Terminski, 2013). The anthropological studies on 
DIDR aimed to provide socio-economic baseline data to support planners and developers and 
contribute to anthropological theories. Brokensha (1963) discussed the contribution of 
anthropological research to Volta hydropower’s resettlement project, supporting the planners and 
administrators in resettlement during 1962 and 1963. Brokensha (1963) highlighted the advantages 
of anthropological research in terms of administrative aspects by the systematic collection of social 
facts about communities; predicting possible results of various actions; and understanding social 
factors such as land tenure rights, traditional culture and social structure. In addition, he also 
emphasised the advantages of conducting a study of the Volta dam which could make a direct 
contribution to theory. To better understand the local community in Egyptian Nubia, Fernea (1963) 
pioneered the use of an ethnological survey. The aim of this survey was to provide an accurate 
picture of contemporary Egyptian Nubia society and culture before construction of the Aswan High 
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Dam and provide Egyptian authorities with information to support their planning, resettlement and 
socio-economic development efforts. Different anthropologists, mostly from the United States, were 
responsible for conducting baseline studies such as Nubian migrants working in the city, Nubian 
culture, special problems of Nubian life, and land resources in different language speaking areas. 
Subsequently there was a shift from socio-economic baseline studies to multi-disciplinary 
approaches. Scudder (1968) urged a multidisciplinary approach to resettlement studies before and 
after dam construction. By looking at responses regarding traditional culture of the Central African 
Gwembe Tonga displaced by Kariba dam construction, Scudder concluded that we know too little 
about characteristics of people undergoing relocation and the implications of these characteristics 
for development. In addition, Chambers and other scholars (Gaitskell, 1959 cited in Chambers, R. 
1969) argued that resettlement studies paid too much attention to successes and failures related to 
dimensions of land, climate, settlers, and agricultural process instead of looking at the relationships 
between settlers and development agencies. Chambers (1969) urged a change in the focus to fill the 
gap.  
Scudder (1973b) stressed the several factors related to resettlement planning, including (1) timing 
and finance, (2) resettlement schemes as systems; (3) new systems of production associated with 
reallocation; and (4) the relationship between resettlers and hosts. For the first factor, Scudder 
presented examples of the Kariba Dam with the delay in conducting a survey to identify potential 
resettlement areas and the Aswan Dam with the delay in doing asocial survey which made 
executing appropriate resettlement difficult. Regarding the relationship between resettlers and hosts, 
the case of Kariba Dam has caused land conflicts for the12 years since the resettlers expanded their 
field to the hosts’ territory. Concerning the third factor on rehabilitation, Takes (1973) emphasised 
the need for rehabilitation of livelihoods for displaced people to be included as an integral part of 
dam resettlement projects with three components; compensation for the loss of properties, provision 
of adequate new means of living and participation in the benefits brought by the dams. With regard 
to livelihood development, aside from the provision of adequate land, it is also important to assist 
resettlers to switch to other professions. Good examples were shown in the cases of the Volta in 
Ghana, the Kariba in Zambia and Zimbabwe, and the Nam Pong in Thailand where considerable 
numbers of relocated people took to commercial fishing as their new livelihood. On the other hand, 
others preferred migration to towns to work as shop keepers, taxi drivers, and other wage earners. 
Thus, planners should take into account the individual wishes in advance to develop appropriate 
measures. Takes (1973) also recommended that the organisation and administration of the 
resettlement activities should be established well in advance through coordination among relevant 
departments and agencies and putting the project under sole responsibility of a special resettlement 
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authority to deal with the various aspects involved. Moreover, long-term evaluation of the socio-
economic impacts of projects should be assessed by an impartial agency.  
To deal with the complexity of resettlement planning, Scudder (1973a) made initial efforts to 
include socio-cultural systems within a theoretical model. Scudder used the key concept of stress 
and hypothesised reservoir relocation as psychological, physiological and socio-cultural stressors. It 
was the first attempt at formulating a predictive model with both theoretical and policy 
implications.     
Besides the anthropological studies, biologists such as White (1969) and Hira (1969)started studies 
on biological phenomena related to tropical artificial lakes with focuses on the issues of weed 
infestation and transmission of chistosomiasis2 in Lake Kariba, Lake Volta, Lake Kaijin, Lake 
Nasser, and Lake Jebel Auliya. 
Overall, the assumption of benefits produced by large dams was dominant and the catalyst of dams 
increasing in the early to mid-20th Century in the United States and Europe their spread to the 
developing countries. The emergence of development-induced resettlement studies using 
anthropological studies in providing baseline data was found in this period. In addition, social and 
environmental impacts started to be recognised in this period.  
2.3.2. 1980s-1990s—Dam controversy and anti-dam movement 
Construction of large dams became an increasingly controversial issue, particularly after 1985 
(Biswas, 2012, Dixon et al., 1989). According to Altinbilek et al. (2012), there were two extreme 
views regarding the benefits and costs posed by dams and limited interaction among the two camps 
from the 1980s to the year 2000.  
The dam controversy and the anti-dam movement emerged as the result of growing awareness on 
the social and environmental impacts of dams during this period. In 1984, Edward Goldsmith and 
Nicholas Hildyard, environmentalists, published a book titled “The Social and Environmental 
Effects of Large Dams” which was the first book gathering arguments against large dams and which 
launched the international anti-dam movement (Goldsmith and Hildyard, 1985, McCully, 1996). 
Patrick McCully’s book entitled “Silenced Rivers: The Ecology and Politics of Large Dams” was 
published in 1996 and was also a challenge to dam proponents. In addition, the International River 
Network (IRN) was established in 1987 and its publication became a forum for anti-dam activists 
                                               
2“Schistosomiasis, also known as bilharziasis or snailfever, is a primarily tropical parasitic disease caused by the larvae ofone or more of five types of flatwo
rms or blood flukes known as schistosomes. The name bilharziasis comes from TheodorBilharz, a German pathologist, who identified the worms in 1851” 
(Source: http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/) 
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around the world (McCully, 1996). The anti-dam activists effectively conducted several campaigns 
against the World Bank funded projects and forced development of various new World Bank 
policies on resettlement, environmental assessment, indigenous people and information disclosure 
(McCully, 1996).  
Resettlement and displacement of indigenous and tribal people and other marginalised ethnic 
minorities are among the key problems of dam impacts discussed in the two books. In 1994, the 
activist groups sent the Manibeli Declaration to the World Bank concerning conditions for funding 
large dam projects regarding resettlement issues and requesting an independent review of all World 
Bank funded large dams. The review of World Bank financed large dam projects from 1986-1993 
was conducted four months after receiving the Declaration (McCully, 1996). The findings of the 
bank review indicated that the projects were not successful in terms of re-establishing resettlers at a 
better or equal living standard and that showed unsatisfactory performance on a large scale (World 
Bank, 1994 Pg 114).     
During this period, two pioneering frameworks were developed. These frameworks were Scudder 
and Colson’s (1982) four stage framework and Cernea’s (1997) Risk Impoverishment and 
Reconstruction Framework for Resettling Displaced People. The first framework was developed 
based on Scudder and Colson’s work experiences in the dams in Africa in attempting to achieve a 
successful resettlement process related to dam development. Scudder and Colson (1982) developed 
a four-stage framework for ensuring a successful resettlement process following a dam development 
project. This framework deals with the behavioural tendencies of those affected over four stages of 
resettlement planning: 
▪ Stage 1 (planning and recruitment phase): Planning for resettlement prior to physical 
removal;  
▪ Stage 2 (transition phase): Coping with the initial drop in living standards and psychological 
wellbeing that tends to follow removal;  
▪ Stage 3 (development phase): Initiation of economic development and community formation 
activities that are necessary to improve living standards of first-generation resettlers;  
▪ Stage 4 (handing over phase): Handing over a sustainable resettlement process to the second 
generation of resettlers and to non-project authority institutions. 
Authors have indicated that the second (‘transition’) phase can take from five to ten years 
depending on specific conditions (Scudder 2005a, Scudder et al. 2005). In reality, however, it has 
been rare for a project to reach the third (‘development’) stage (Asthana, 1996, Scudder, 2005b, 
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Scudder, 2005a). Hence, it is important to understand the resettlers’ experience in transition as well 
as the handing over to the second generation phase. Future studies need to concentrate on the 
second phase including re-establishing and improving livelihoods and rebuilding long term capacity 
and strategies, rather than the first phase of relocation and immediate responses.  
The second framework was developed based on the core concept of risk. Through empirical 
findings and clear patterns of the World Bank review, Cernea (1997) demonstrated major 
impoverishment risks in displacement such as landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, 
marginalisation, food security, increased morbidity and mortality, loss of access to common 
property and services, and social disarticulation. This framework aimed to avoid the related risks by 
its four main functions including diagnostic function (explanatory and cognitive), predictive 
function (warning and planning functions), problem solution function (guiding and measuring 
resettlement), research functions (formulating and testing hypothesis) (Cernea, 1997, Cernea and 
McDowell, 2000).  
In general, the opponents of large dams started campaigns challenging the proponents to justify the 
costs of dams. Displacement and resettlement of indigenous and ethnic minority groups became a 
significant issue which opponents demanded be given more attention. Research on dam-induced 
resettlement was progressing in terms of developing theoretical models to enhance resettlement 
planning processes in order to prevent impoverishment. However, positive outcomes for most 
displaced people have not been achieved to date. 
2.3.3. Post 2000—Dam controversy continues with the publication of World Commission on Dams 
report: Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making; and a growing body of 
literature on dam-induced displacement and resettlement 
This period has experienced a growing body of literature on dam-induced resettlement. During this 
period, there has been a division between two approaches to dam-induced resettlement (Dwivedi, 
1999) and continuing impoverishment of displacement (Scudder, 2005, McDonald-Wilmsen and 
Webber, 2010). Consequently, new frameworks for considering dams are emerging. This is 
illustrated by the significant body of publications in the area (Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: Growing body of literature on dam-induced resettlement in early 2000 
Total number  
of publications  
before 2004   
Number of 
publications since 
2000 - 2004 
Source 
101 40 Selected bibliography on dam-induced resettlement by 
Sanchez in Robinson (2003) 
82 26 Research guide on dam-induced resettlement by 
Stanley (2004) 
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Several key publications dealing with dam-induced resettlement were published during this period. 
In 2000, the World Commission on Dams issued its report, Dams and Development: A New 
Framework for Decision–Making, which (WCD, 2000a) reported that 40-80 million people 
worldwide were displaced due to large dam construction and many of them have not been resettled 
or received adequate compensation. WCD made links between the risk model of Cernea (1997) and 
human rights (McDonald-Wilmsen and Webber, 2010, Dwivedi, 2002) and proposed an approach 
of recognising rights and assessing risks to support planning and decision making on dams and 
development based on five key values: 
- Equity;  
- Efficiency; 
- Participatory decision making; 
- Sustainability; and 
- Accountability.  
However, the WCD report was strongly criticised as being biased. For instance, Navalawala (2001) 
suggested that the WCD ignored a number of key issues of developing countries such as demand for 
water, food and electricity when several projects were stopped. Navalawala (2001) further criticised 
the publication as being based on a small sample size and including only old dams (20-30 years old) 
and that its recommendations were impractical. Furthermore, Altinbilek et al. (2012) stated that all 
the large developing countries including Brazil, China, Ethiopia, India, Lao PDR, Nepal, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Turkey, and Vietnam unanimously agreed that the WCD report was 
biased, and could not be accepted. Nevertheless, Moore et al. (2010) on the other hand claimed that 
the WCD recommendations around negotiated decision making were working in practice and that it 
is necessary to renew multi-stakeholder dialogue at multiple levels to build mutual understanding, 
information sharing and norm-setting.  
In 2005, Scudder (2005b) and Scudder (2005a) conducted A Comparative Survey of Dam-induced 
Resettlement in 50 Cases funded by the World Bank. This survey examined outcomes for the 
majority of the resettled people in 50 cases which differed from those used by the World 
Commission of Dams (WCD, 2000a). In addition, they used both the four-stage framework and the 
risk impoverishment model (Section 2.3.2). The results of these studies indicated that living 
standards of displaced people of only three out of 44 cases, where data was adequate, were 
improved and that livelihoods of five cases appeared to have been restored. Most resettled people 
were further impoverished following the criteria of risks in Cernea’s model. The problems of 
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displacement of poor or indigenous people were also confirmed as the most important issue during 
the Conference on Global Perspective on Large Dams at Yale University in 2006 (DiFrancesco, 
2007). Moore et al. (2010) found, through all the papers submitted to Special Issues of Water 
Alternatives titled “The World Commission on Dams + 10: Revisiting the Large Dam” that one of 
the emerging issues is the negative consequences of dams on the environment and livelihoods of 
dam-affected communities. In 2012, Altinbilek et al. (2012) urged that the debate should be 
refocused to fulfil the objectives, and meet society’s development needs and ensure that those who 
may pay the social costs of implementing dams (e.g. the people who have to be resettled) are made 
the direct beneficiaries of the projects. 
Literature on dam-induced resettlement can be divided into two broad categories based on the 
approach adopted, Dwivedi (1999) named “optimistic managerial” and “pessimistic movement” as 
the two approaches. The first approach viewed displacement as an inevitable outcome of 
development and focused on the consequences (Dwivedi, 2002). This is represented by Cernea’s 
model of risk. In contrast, the second approach considers displacement as the evidence of 
development’s inevitable uneven and unfair distribution of costs and benefits (Dwivedi, 2002).  
The “optimistic managerial” approach was criticised by De Wet (2006) because it is over-optimistic 
to expect that providing adequate inputs such as national legal frameworks and policies, political 
commitment, funding, pre-displacement research, careful implementation, and monitoring can 
control and mitigate risks. Therefore, De Wet called for a more comprehensive and open-ended 
approach to deal with the complexity inherent in the resettlement process which is a result of 
interaction among a range of different factors that operate differently depending on context. These 
factors are cultural, social, environmental, economic, institutional and political. All are operating in 
the context of local levels of responses and the characteristics of the initiatives (De Wet, 2006 
p.190). On the other hand, given the limited adoption of the WCD’s recommendations and the 
unsatisfactory outcomes of resettlement, McDonald-Wilmsen and Webber (2010) suggest that there 
are lessons to be learned from other fields of resettlement. They cite studies including refugee 
studies and studies on adaptation to environmental change. All emphasise the concepts of resilience 
and vulnerability and the goals of full integration and building social networks in the long term 
instead of focusing on the minimum standard of restoring income and improving living standard. 
This highlights the tension between two approaches to dam induced resettlement and the need to 
solve the challenge of improving livelihoods of millions of people affected by dams, especially the 
indigenous and ethnic minority people, throughout the world by broadening the research agenda and 
improving the standard of dam-induced resettlement. This also requires that dam planning and 
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associated benefits and cost evaluation must consider people who may be displaced as a basic part 
of the project, not as an externality that requires amelioration.    
2.4. Global case studies on dam-induced resettlement 
This section reviews the resettlement projects of dams over the world to assess key issues and 
identify gaps related to dam-induced resettlement for further research. Because the potential list of 
projects and literature is vast, this review has only been able to focus on a subset of cases, listed in 
Table 2.2. 
The selection of case studies on dam-induced resettlement projects for review is based on the 
following criteria: the dam is large, there is a large number of displaced people, the site represents 
an important geographical area, temporal information is available and the dam is funded by both 
international banks and government. 
Table 2.2: Global case studies for review 
Dam Geographical 
representation 
Time Number of 
people 
displaced (‘000) 
Installed 
capacity 
(MW) 
Funding 
institutions 
Height of 
dam (m) 
Reservoir 
(km2) 
Sources 
Kariba 
Dam 
Ghana 
Africa 
1957 - 
1959 
57 
 
1,080  WB 128m 5,400  Scudder 
(2005c) 
Tucurui 
Dam 
Brazil 
South America 
1984 35 4,000  USAID 70 m 2,635  Fearnside 
(1999) 
Three 
Gorges 
Project 
China 
East Asia 
1993 - 
2009 
1,300 22,500  Chinese 
Government 
181 m 1,045  Kittinger et 
al. (2009) 
Nam 
Thuen 
2 Dam 
Laos 
South East 
Asia 
2004 - 
2009 
6.2 1,070  WB 39 m 450  Lawrence 
(2009) 
 
2.4.1. Case study 1—Kariba Dam in Zambia and Zimbabwe (1957-1959) 
2.4.1.1. Introduction 
Kariba, built on the main stream of the Zambezi river, is one of the few large dams that is shared by 
two countries (Zambia and Zimbabwe) (Reynolds et al., 1999). The construction of the large dam 
began in 1956, closed in 1958 and was fully completed in 1963 with the single main purpose of 
providing hydro-electricity to meet the high demand of the Copperbelt’s mining multinational firms 
(Balon, 1978). 
Kariba dam is considered as a most important case study due to its being the first large dam 
financed by the World Bank and the first dam that resulted in the displacement of a large number of 
people from one ethnic group the Gwembe Tonga. It is also located in the tropics and sub-tropics 
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(Scudder, 2005c). According to Altinbilek et al. (2012) it is the best case study of resettlement 
impacts. This case study on resettlement has been well studied and documented by longitudinal 
research from the 1940s until now.  
2.4.1.2. Displacement 
Many shortcomings related to the process were studied and documented. The relocation of the 
Gwembe Tonga was considered as forced and badly planned (Scudder, 2005c, Tumbare, 2008). 
Colson (1971) wrote that the Gwembe Tonga had no role in the decision making process related to 
the dam construction. Moreover, Magadza (2006) mentioned that the people were just told they had 
to move instead of being educated about the project. Police authorities used firearms to deal with 
those who resisted the resettlement. For the land provision issue, the underestimation of people 
being uprooted for construction (from 40,000 to 57,000, mainly Gwembe Tonga) led to insufficient 
land for resettlers at their new location. WCD (2000b) reported that resettlement of the Gwembe 
Tonga into wildlife habitat caused conflicts between humans and wildlife. Consequently, 64 and 
127 elephants were killed in 1956 and 1964, respectively.  
Other aspects of displacement of the Gwembe Tonga were also highlighted. Colson (1971) and 
Siamwiza (2009) described how the Gwembe Tonga were transformed from river people whose 
livelihoods of fishing, planting two crops and drawing waters, to upland people living in a totally 
different environment with drier and arid land, further away from the Zambezi River. For example, 
6,000 people from several villages were resettled 100 miles downstream to a resettlement site called 
Lusitu to live with different ethnic groups in a different ecological setting (Cliggett, 2001). In 
addition, their property rights were also lost through legislative changes. Siamwiza (2009) 
considered that the decision of the Zambian government in 1964 to nationalise the resources of 
Kariba lake was the first phase of systematically excluding them from their resources. In addition to 
that, the Land Act issued by the government in 1995 allowed for the conversion of lands from 
customary tenure to statutory leasehold which further displaced the people.      
2.4.1.3. Resettlement 
Scudder and Colson (1982) reported the multi-dimensional stresses of resettlement in terms of 
physiological, psychological, and socio-cultural aspects in the first years after the move. 
Physiological stresses included the effect of moderate and severe protein energy malnutrition of 
school aged children during the time of relocation, 1957-1958 (Gillett and Tobias, 2002). Moreover, 
Colson (1971) indicated that there had been a significant increase in morbidity and mortality rates 
in the two years after the move. In the case of the Lusitu area, one of the resettlement sites, 80 
people died of sleeping sickness and most of them were children. It is believed that land scarcity 
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combined with the high density of population in the site, inadequate supplies of water, hunger, and 
displacement from the old homes made the children vulnerable to the disease. Scudder and Colson 
(1982) also found psychological stress of the relocation in terms of losing a sense of home, religious 
simplism and anxiety about an uncertain future. With regard to social and cultural stress, Colson 
(1971) described that moving inland caused the loss of indigenous knowledge related to the 
Zambezi River and the loss of leadership at a community level.       
The results of ethnographic studies over the last 50 years show several important findings related to 
resource scarcity, adaptive capacity of the Gwembe Tonga and complexity of the relationships 
between ecosystems and humans (Crooks et al., 2008, Cliggett et al., 2010, Cliggett et al., 2007, 
Cliggett, 2001). A study by Cliggett (2001) found that the resources scarcity did not necessarily 
limit the ability of the Gwembe Tonga to survive. For example, when faced with resource scarcity, 
they shifted to alternative foods, decreased their domestic group size, or limited sharing with 
outsiders. In addition, looking at the recurrent pattern of adaptive responses, Cligget et.al (2007) 
and Cligget et.al (2010) discovered three main strategies of the Gwembe Tonga including migration 
and mobility, diversification of economic activities, and resource exploitation in response to the 
climatic, social, political, and relationship-to-land uncertainties over the half century after the 
relocation, in which, migration and mobility played an important part in contributing to problems 
with their livelihoods and adaptation strategies. Following the announcement of the Zambian 
government in 1979 of a policy to allow settlement and use of the uninhabited regions in the buffer-
zones around Kafue National Park (in the Central and Southern Provinces of Zambia), a large 
number of Gwembe Tonga left their resettlement areas in the Gwembe Valley with its 
environmental and social constraints in the 1980s to voluntarily colonise this region. In addition, 
they diversified their economic activities and drew on their past experiences and utilised new 
agriculture and food production techniques. For example, they used drought-tolerant seed varieties, 
social networks, practised intensive garden intercropping, applied new techniques of farming that 
produced new crops for cash, piloted new small businesses, and developed new institutions of 
resource management. However, it has been noted that class differentiation and access to social 
networks, NGOs and government programs have led to inequity in getting benefits from the process 
of resettlement (Cliggett et al., 2010).   
The literature cited above demonstrates the strengths of employing multi-methods of investigating 
resettlement and displacement through the integration of ethnography with anthropometric and 
satellite imagery analytical methods to study migration outcomes. Cliggett and Crooks (2007) and 
Crooks et al. (2008) use the nutritional status of the migrant children of Gwembe Tonga and their 
growth as indicators for examining wellbeing and success of the voluntary migration to the frontier 
25 
 
farming region. The results indicated that the migrant children’s growth, the second generation of 
voluntary resettlers, in the farming frontier region in 2004 was better than the statistics from the 
period of pre-resettlement (1957-1978) and post resettlement (1993) and were higher when 
compared to their counterparts in the resettlement sites. Moreover, by using the remote imagery 
methods (Cliggett et al., 2007, Cliggett et al., 2010) found consistency between the improvements 
and moving of the Gwembe Tonga closer to the Kafue National Park border during the 1980s this 
was reflected by extensive forest clearing between 1986 and 2000.  
In general, this case study clearly shows the different dimensions of stresses faced by resettled 
people. Moreover, it highlights the importance of understanding multi-dimensional stresses, 
adaptive capacity of the resettled people, their strategies and influencing factors when studying 
resettlement processes and outcomes as well as emphasising the importance of long term insight 
gained from historical studies. In essence, multiple methods are essential to understand the 
complexity of forced resettlement. 
2.4.2. Case study 2—Tucurui Dam in Brazil (1984) 
2.4.2.1. Introduction 
Tucurui Dam was built on the Tocantins River, a tributary of the Amazon River, in 1984. Tucurui 
dam is the fourth largest dam in the world flooding an area of 2,850 km2 including part of the 
Parakana Indian Reserve. The dam has relocated 20,000-30,000 people (Oliver-Smith, 2010). Two 
thirds of the power generated by this project was sold at cheap subsidised prices to Japanese 
aluminium companies based in Barcarena and Sao Luis (Fearnside, 1999). 
There are relatively few peer reviewed publications in English on this case study. A few of these 
publications assess the specific issues of social impacts (Fearnside, 1999), environmental impacts 
(Fearnside, 2001), greenhouse gas emission of the Tucuruí Hydropower Complex, Brazil 
(Fearnside, 1997). Also a case study prepared as an input for the WCD (LaRovere and Mendes, 
2000) and one on the environmental conflicts, protests and resistance of the affected people (Oliver-
Smith, 2010). The case study of the Tucurui Hydropower Complex was conducted to submit to the 
WCD in 2000. However, it was reported that limited time made it impossible to collect adequate 
data on the affected people’s opinions. What data that is available is reported below. 
2.4.2.2. Displacement 
The estimated total number of displaced people varies between sources. According to the electoral 
authority in northern Brazil (Eletronorte) (1984), 32,871 people were displaced, in addition to the 
indigenous people. Using the 1,750 families mentioned in the project design, LaRovere and Mendes 
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(2000) estimated the number as between 25,000 and 35,000. Subsequently Oliver-Smith (2010) 
claimed that 20,000-30,000 people were displaced for construction of the dam.  
2.4.2.3. Resettlement 
This case is considered by some as an example of inadequate resettlement planning (Biery-
Hamilton, 1987). Due to the predictive and modelling errors the final water level of the reservoir 
flooded the first resettlement sites, thus forcing 3,700 people to relocate for a second time 
(Fearnside, 1999). Moreover, it was calculated that 1,500 families remained homeless in 1985, for a 
year after the dam was complete. An additional criticism is that many people were excluded from 
the resettlement program altogether (Fearnside, 1999). For instance, only the Parakana people were 
resettled since they were physically relocated while the other indigenous group downstream losing 
land for dam construction was not considered for resettlement benefits (WCD, 2000). In this case, 
the project’s definition of affected people referred only to the people who were physically relocated 
by the area of inundation. Regarding compensation, Fearnside (1999) wrote that Eletronorte 
provided limited assistance and that it was mostly in the form of one off cash payments. Thus, the 
people had nothing after some months due to the small amount of compensation, repeated delays in 
making payment, and the fact that many of the people lacked experience in dealing with finances. In 
addition, the resettlement process was criticised as taking place late in the process with limited or 
no consideration for the livelihood patterns of the relocated households (Fearnside, 1999).  
The affected people from both upstream and downstream have faced environmental and health 
problems. Many displaced people to the upstream of the dam faced a mosquito plague in the ideal 
spawning habitats created by the inundated areas (Oliver-Smith, 2010). For about 40,000 people in 
the downstream areas, their traditional subsistence strategies based on the river and fishery were 
totally disrupted (Magee, 1989). A decline of about 60% in catch and a dramatic decline in the 
number of fishermen were reported (Fearnside, 1999). In addition, the dam resulted in water 
pollution which led to waterborne diseases and health problems including serious vaginal infections 
in women, gastrointestinal ailments, particularly among children, and skin rashes in the general 
population (Oliver-Smith, 2010). 
During 1987, given the severe social and environmental impacts, the Tucurui River peasants allied 
with the Catholic Church and the Rural Workers Union to protest and demand solutions for the 
problems from Eletronorte and the Brazilian government (LaRovere and Mendes, 2000).    
This case study describes many social and environmental problems caused by the dam construction 
and resettlement planning which became the focus of protests and resistance of the affected people 
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(Oliver-Smith, 2010). It also emphasised the importance of considering the impacts on both the 
upstream and downstream people and the rights of indigenous people. However, those studies 
focused on the dam impacts and resettlement planning issues and lacked follow-up studies on the 
social and livelihood changes as well as adaptation problems of the indigenous people.  
2.4.3. Case study 3—Three Gorges Dam Project in China (1993-2009) 
2.4.3.1. Introduction 
The Three Gorges Project (TGP), the world’s largest hydroelectric power project, began in 1993 
and was completed in 2009 (Xu et al., 2013). This project is located in the Yangzi (Yangtze) River 
which is the third largest river in the world with a length of 6,380 km (Li, 1990). With a height of 
185 m and a storage capacity of 39.3 billion m3, Three Gorges Dam (TGD) covers 1,080 km2 in the 
Yangtze River catchment (Zhang and Lou, 2011). The flooded area includes two sections of 
Chongqing (80% of flooded area and displaced) and Hubei (20%) (Tan, 2007) in which, 31,000 ha 
of farm land, 1,300 villages, 140 towns and 13 cities have been flooded by the dam (Alberts et al., 
2004). Filling of the reservoir occurred over three stages beginning at 135 m (above sea level) in 
2003, 156 m in 2006, and 175 m in 2009 (Gao et al., 2010).  
The project is intended to achieve three goals: flood mitigation for the densely populated areas of 
the Yangtze’s middle and lower reaches; electricity generation to promote industrialisation in 
Central South and East China; and permitting vessels to navigate treacherous shoals and shallows 
between Chongqing and Yichang (Li, 1990). 
2.4.3.2. Displacement 
TGP is the largest human displacement project by a hydropower dam to date. Estimates of displaced 
people vary from 725,500 people by Li Bo Ning in 1991 (Dai et al., 1998), to 1.35 million people 
displaced between 1993-2007 (Xu et al., 2013).  
Three types of resettlement were initiated by the Chinese authorities, near-resettlement, voluntary 
scattered distant resettlement, and government organised distant resettlement (GODR). These were 
applied in the case of TGP, in which, 1.2 million were displaced and resettled in the reservoir area 
by the first type, 24,214 people voluntarily moved to 27 provinces through the second type and 
190,000 people were moved out of their home counties to resettle in 11 provinces (about 1,000-
2,000 km away from their homeland) by the third type.       
Carrying capacity of the environment in the reservoir (especially land resource) became the key 
concern with the massive human relocation of TGP (Xu et al., 2013). The main problem was 
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overestimation of the environmental capacity of the Three Gorges Reservoir Area (TGRA). The 
resettlement feasibility study by a Canadian and Chinese joint venture concluded that “there was 
ample virgin land in the Reservoir Area which could be opened up to compensate for the farmlands 
to be submerged, and that there was much potential to develop industry and services” (Yuefang 
et.al, 2003: P430). The initial resettlement plan was mainly near-resettlement which was based on 
the conclusions of this study (Heming and Rees, 2000). However, the resettlement of people to 
nearby areas faced challenges due to the already high population density of TGRA (twice the 
national average) and inadequate areas of suitable land as well as of the fact that most of the 
remaining areas were steep sloping lands (Yuefang et al., 2003). In addition, the failure of industry 
development programs with the closure of many enterprises for creating jobs and attracting the 
resettlers caused joblessness in many of the resettlers in the near-resettlement type (Tan and Hugo, 
2011). On the other hand, there were also problems with compensation standards and mechanisms. 
Jackson and Sleigh (2001) predicted that the inadequate property rights, the limited power and 
capacity of peasants and the absence of a land market in the China context would cause inadequate 
compensation to resettlers. In reality, IRN (2003), Yuefang et al. (2003) and Wilmsen et al. (2011b) 
found that the difference between the compensation and the real cost of constructing or buying a 
new house created an additional financial burden on the resettlers, especially the poor, and forced 
them to reduce investment in agricultural production activities (IRN, 2003).  
According to Tan and Hugo (2011), the Chinese government made adjustments to the resettlement 
policies during 2000 with a shift from near-resettlement to government organised distant 
resettlement (GODR) in order to reduce the emerging environmental pressures within the 
immediate catchment.  
2.4.3.3. Resettlement 
The scale and complexity of resettlement has caused different environmental and social 
consequences of resettlement which were not predicted by researchers and policy makers. The study 
by Yuefang et al. (2003) and Tan and Yao (2006) make a good contribution to filling this gap. Their 
studies clearly indicated that the increase in the number of resettled people in the near-resettlement 
lead to accelerated exploitation of sloping land and deforestation for collecting timber, firewood and 
other forest products. Consequently, greater soil erosion and dramatic sediment yield downhill in 
the reservoir have been observed. It is reported that the forest cover has reduced from about 50% in 
the 1950s to 10% or even 5 % in the Yangtze area and that soil erosion has been taking place in 
over 90% of the total Three Gorges area at a rate of more than 4,000 t/km2/year (Shi & Yang, 1989 
in Tan and Yao, 2006). The voluntary scattered distant resettlement also faced many stresses. The 
resettlers moved to the receiving areas with insufficient and infertile land and lack of infrastructure 
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and technical supports for restoring their production system. Thus, conflicts between the resettlers 
and the local authorities and host groups were observed (Tan and Hugo, 2011). 
Resettlement of TGP also provided a lesson in the problems of ignoring ethnic issues in 
resettlement. Given the land scarcity in the TGRA and the government’s goal of controlling border 
regions, Han Chinese were encouraged to resettle in remote provinces such as Xinjiang and Inner 
Mongolia inhabited by ethnic minorities (Colchester, 2000). This led to severe tensions after the 
resettlement. Eight policemen were killed and the city had to be placed under curfew (ibid). In May 
1999, senior Chinese Government officials admitted that ‘initial attempts to resettle displaced 
people in provinces like Xinjiang, Hainan, Hunan and Henan had been a failure (ibid). 
Given the complexity of TGP, Tan (2008b) suggests that combining Scudder and Colson’s (1982) 
four stage framework for achieving a successful resettlement process and Cernea’s (1997) risk and 
reconstruction framework for resettling displaced people could be improved by incorporating 
several important issues for further investigation including socio-economic, environmental 
assessment framework, indices for assessment, addressing both gender and age impacts, and 
development issues of poverty and vulnerabilities. For example, by using the lens of gender as a 
risk factor for defining resettlement outcomes of TGP, Tan (2007) and Tan (2008a) found that 
participation of women resettlers was limited in the decision making process of displacement. In 
addition, resettlement had impacted on the employment patterns of both the resettled and non-
resettled women with a decline in the annual number of working days. Women resettlers became 
more impoverished than men in the initial stages of resettlement. The resettlement planning and 
government policies failed to address gender aspects.         
Studies of TGP resettlement in recent years have changed their focus to look at strategies and 
outcomes of the resettlement project. Padovani (2009) discovered many adaptation problems in the 
resettled households from Yunang and Wanzhou districts of Chongqing municipally located at the 
head of the reservoir to the urban coastal area of the Shanghai region. They faced difficulties of land 
shortage with low quality, few job opportunities, and language barriers. Thus, they have been 
further impoverished and have faced discrimination by the local authorities and urban dwellers. 
Padovani (2009) also found that no department or agency is responsible for post-resettlement issues. 
In addition, the local authorities’ staffs were seeing relocation as an administrative task, without the 
responsibility of rehabilitation which is a complex process.  
On the other hand, Wilmsen et al. (2011b) applied the approach of McDowell (2002) “Forced 
Displacement, Sustainable Livelihoods and Impoverishment Risks” in their study on TGP. They 
further added the factor of political economy of resettlement to the approach and compared 
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livelihood outcomes of two resettlement sites named Ba Dong and Zigui counties in the Hubei 
section of the TGRA before and after the resettlement in terms of income, sufficient number of 
working days, poverty reduction, livelihood adaptation, vulnerability and resilience, and improved 
food security. The authors showed that most resettled people have not shared the benefits of the 
project and their livelihood outcomes are poorer than they were before the resettlement and large 
number of the resettlers became members of an urban working proletariat. In addition, the income 
from off-farm activities was not able to compensate for the farm income. Thus, the people have 
been more vulnerable to further shocks than before the resettlement.  
In a review of Chinese policy on resettlement, Wilmsen (2011) found strengths and weaknesses of 
Chinese policies on dam-induced resettlement by using WCD’s strategic direction as a lens for 
analysis. First, the government has recently treated resettlement projects as development projects 
and the affected people should get benefit from hydropower projects. Second, the long-term costs of 
poorly implemented resettlement have been acknowledged. Third, benefit-sharing activities to 
promote direct benefits to the vulnerable resettlers have been employed. For instance, a post 
relocation fund was established to support resettlers for 20 years, and an additional social security 
fund for rural farmers who lost land to the hydropower project and became urban dwellers. 
However, the weakness of the policies was that they paid little consideration to the needs, 
production systems, lifestyles as well as customs of ethnic minorities and the interests of women 
who were displaced by dams. In addition, it is unclear who would be eligible for the social security 
fund and how short-term and long-term needs would be addressed. The author urged the 
development of policies for resettling ethnic minorities who are vulnerable to risks of displacement 
and the monitoring and evaluation of the resettlement process beyond the project cycle.      
In general, resettlement and environmental capacity (especially of land resources) have been 
considered as vital long term issues since the initial feasibility study of TGP in the mid-1980s, 
throughout the building of the dam and up until the present (Xu et al., 2013). The diversity of 
resettlement types resulted in a range of different environmental and social consequences. In 
addition, the diversity of factors influencing the success and failure of resettlement programs has 
been a key challenge for understanding the process. Thus, Tan (2008b) recommends further studies 
to assess the sustainable development in the reservoir area to understand the consequences of 
different resettlement approaches for different groups of people in different resettlement settings 
and their reconstruction experiences addressing both gender and age perspectives.     
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2.4.4. Case study—Nam Theun 2 Dam in Laos (2004-2009) 
2.4.4.1. Introduction 
With a generation capacity of 1,070 MW, Nam Theun 2 is the largest hydropower project in the 
development history of Lao PDR. This 1.45 billion USD project was commenced in 2004 and 
completed in 2009 to export 95% of total electricity to Thailand (Scudder, 2003). Being located in 
the Theun River, the fourth largest tributary of the Mekong River, this trans-basin dam diverts 
waters from the Theun River to the Xe Bang Fai River and floods an area of 450 km2 in the Nakai 
Plateau in Central Laos (Imhof and Lawrence, 2005).  
This project was justified by its capacity to generate foreign currency from the export of electricity 
and to contribute to poverty reduction as well as environmental protection in Laos. In addition, it 
was expected to be a model for future hydropower development in the region according to WB and 
ADB (McDowell, 2008). However, this project is the most controversial hydropower project in 
Laos due to concerns about its environmental and social impacts and the Laos PDR’s low capacity, 
poor public financial management and weak governance (Lawrence, 2009). 
2.4.4.2. Displacement 
A diversity of people have been displaced by the Nam Theun dam. Souksavath and Nakayama 
(2013) wrote that 6,738 people from 17 villages and 1,298 households, mainly from six ethno-
linguistic groups, were moved to make way for the Nam Theun 2 dam construction. In addition, 
more than 120,000 villagers in the downstream were predicted to be affected by the increase of 
water flow, leading to fishery loss, erosion, flooding and sedimentation (Lawrence, 2009).  A key 
concern of Imhof and Lawrence (2005) was the impact of the project on the fisheries both upstream 
and downstream of the Theun and Xe Bang Fai Rivers. Although most of the displaced people had a 
preference to resettle with members of their home villages, the main resettlement strategy that was 
implemented, due to limited land resources in the resettlement sites, was consolidation with other 
villages (Souksavath and Nakayama, 2013). In addition to this undesirable outcome 17 villages 
were moved before making any compensation payment and completing resettlement plans. 
Relocation was delayed due to slow construction and many villagers had to stay in temporary 
houses for two rainy-seasons before resettlement (Lawrence, 2009).  
According to McDowell et al. (2013), it was the first hydropower project in the world having a 
downstream development program. Thus, some consideration was given to likely impacts on the 
people in the downstream regions and forest land was allocated to some communities. An area of 
18,026 ha of forest land was allocated to 17 villages (1,071 ha per village) which is a safety net of 
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the communities in terms of providing non-timber forest products for daily household consumption, 
timber for repairing houses, and timber to be sold for income.       
2.4.4.3. Resettlement 
There have been a few strongly articulated criticisms of resettlement planning. The analysis of the 
International River Network conducted by Imhof and Lawrence (2005) showed that the project 
violates six out of the seven strategic priorities for dam decision making of WCD. For example, no 
negotiated agreement with the affected villagers in the upstream and downstream about the project 
impacts, proposed compensation and mitigation measures was made at the local level. At the 
national level, local civil society was absent in the consultation process. The consultation process 
with the participation of the government staff and international organisations was conducted after 
making the decision to approve the project. On the other hand, the proposed livelihood program was 
also criticised as not feasible and unsustainable since it would make the displaced more reliant on 
fertilisers and would promote cash crops with unclear markets. Blake (2005) also questioned the 
feasibility of the aquaculture and livestock raising program for replacing losses of captured fishes 
from the rivers and riverbank gardens which was not based on experiences from other projects in 
the region including the Theun-Hinboun Dam in Laos and the Pak Mun Dam in Thailand. In 
addition, the program which aimed to recover the resettlers’ livelihoods within five years of the dam 
operation was considered impossible given the lack of capacity, political will, resources and 
mechanism for involving poor villagers. 
The implementation of the downstream development programs has also faced challenges. 
According to Lawrence (2009), the Downstream Program was behind schedule and had insufficient 
budget to restore livelihoods as required by the Concession Agreement. It was also reported that out 
of a total of 16 million USD, the consultant fees cost one million USD while the compensation cost 
was about 200 USD per affected person. There appears to have been no follow up study into the 
livelihood changes of the downstream people. 
The long term strategies of different ethnic groups have not been understood. In reality, a survey 
conducted by Souksavath and Nakayama (2013) in four resettled villages four years after 
resettlement found the interesting result that the average annual income of the households in all 
villages was higher compared to the level in the old villages and also when compared to the poverty 
line of Laos. Nevertheless, the study failed to show the detailed livelihood strategies of the six 
different ethnic groups and the income contribution from various sources. In fact, according to 
McDowell et al. (2014) the household income could be increased by the illegal logging of rosewood 
and other forest products and by compensation payments. In addition, it should be noted that 
33 
 
decline of living standards was observed after the improvement during the first three years in the 
pilot resettlement village named Ban Nong Boua (McDowell, 2008). It is likely that understanding 
of social and natural resource dynamics of the resettlement sites is still limited. 
In general, restoration of livelihood of the affected people within five years appears incomplete. 
McDowell et al. (2013) reported that livelihood restoration had not been achieved to date. In 
addition, Souksavath and Nakayama (2013) found land shortage and unemployment in the 
resettlement site was a particular challenge to the sustainability of livelihoods. Thus, Souksvath and 
Nakayama (2013) proposed recommendation of rezoning the allocated forest land to agricultural 
land for rice cultivation given that their production base was largely degraded after the resettlement. 
2.4.5. Conclusions 
Several lessons on dam-induced resettlement from the case studies can be found which answer the 
literature research questions 1 and 2 (see Table 2.3 and Figure 1.1). 
Table 2.3: Research questions addressed by the review on the global case studies 
Research questions Comments 
1. What are the lessons from the previous forced 
resettlement projects (from large scale dams 
and water infrastructure) in the world, 
particularly those with developing economies? 
This question is addressed in the review of global 
case studies on-dam induced resettlement in 
Section 2.4. But it is clear that our understanding of 
the livelihood reconstruction process and related 
factors such as ethnicity in those projects is limited. 
2. Do other situations relating to other 
environmental displacement phenomena of 
forced displacement or resettlement provide 
additional insights into improving adaptation and 
resilience in those communities affected? 
This question is addressed by McDonald-Wilmsen 
and Webber (2010) who suggest that the dam-
induced resettlement studies and policies should 
learn the concepts of resilience and vulnerability 
and the goals of full-integration and building social 
networks in the long term.   
The Kariba Dam case emphasised the importance of understanding the adaptive capacity of the 
resettled people, their strategies and influencing factors and outcomes as well as emphasising the 
importance of long term insight, and multiple methods in studying dam-induced resettlement.  
The Tucurui case demonstrates the environmental conflict and health impacts due to dam 
construction and resettlement and the ignorance of the rights of indigenous people. 
The Three Gorges Dam case shows the consequences of different resettlement types and adaptation 
problems of the resettlers. It highlights the importance of understanding diversity of factors defining 
resettlement processes and outcomes such as political economy, land tenure, gender, ethnicity, job 
opportunities, and languages. In addition, it emphasises the need to treat each resettlement project 
as a development with its own unique characteristics.    
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The Nam Theun 2 Dam case highlights the common challenges of restoring and improving 
livelihoods of the resettled ethnic groups.     
Based on the four case studies above, many common problems with compensation and resettlement 
planning such as low compensation price, short supply of land, and financial shortage for livelihood 
development programs, limited participation, lack of compliance with environmental and social 
protection and the consequences of the resettlement planning were highlighted.   
It is clear that the resettlers’ livelihoods have not been sustainable in the long-term and are 
vulnerable to different risks depending on the case. In addition, their rights have not been protected. 
Therefore, understanding adaptation strategies and outcomes of different resettled groups and 
factors affecting the strategies and outcomes by considering long-term insights of relationships 
between livelihoods, social and natural resource dynamics of resettlement sites is really needed. It is 
crucial to consider ethnicity, gender and age factors which are often ignored in research and policy 
such as happened in the cases of Three Gorges Dam and Nam Theun 2 Dam.   
2.5. The experience to date of dam development in Vietnam 
Having addressed the International literature research questions, this section addresses the specifics 
of dams and resettlement in Vietnam (Figure 1.1). 
Given the high annual rainfall of 1,940 mm, the extensive hydrological systems of more than 1372 
rivers with lengths above 10 km and 13 large river systems, as well as three quarters of the territory 
being mountainous region, Vietnam is one of the 14 countries with the highest potential for 
hydropower development in the world. The country now has a total number of 51 large hydro-
power plants and more than 340 small hydropower dams (Tu, 2013).   
The country experienced a remarkable increase in hydropower dam projects and the largest 
displacement of people in the history of Vietnam during the 1990s–2000s. According to the 
Consultancy and Development Institute (CODE, 2011), about 22 construction projects of large 
dams were completed from 1995 to 2009 in the uplands of Vietnam. Consequently, 80,000 ha of 
land were flooded and more than 40,000 households (approximately 194,000 people) were relocated 
during the period. Hydropower dam development also causes deforestation. Trung et al. (2011) 
pointed out that each MW of electricity production costs the loss of about 1.6 ha of forest. More 
importantly, most of the resettled people are from ethnic minority groups whose livelihoods and 
culture rely closely on river, land and forest resources.    
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Vietnam is also facing challenges that reflect those highlighted in the case studies above. It is 
possible that resettlement has suffered from similar failures to those found in other locations, but 
literature on the topic is currently relatively limited and thus is not definitive. The recent review on 
the situation of resettlement and resettlers on the resettlement sites of 21 hydropower dams in 21 
provinces in the northern, central and Central Highlands regions by the Ministry of Agricultural and 
Rural Development (MARD, 2013) confirmed that the poverty rate in the resettlement sites is high 
(36.6%) and average income is also low (200-250 USD/person/year). However, the shortcoming is 
that there is no comparison of income before and after the dam. MARD (2014) urged the 
government and related ministries to develop and issue policies and mechanisms for sustainable 
development of resettlers in the post resettlement period.      
The following section discusses policies, participation, compensation, impacts and livelihood 
strategies and outcomes related to dam-induced resettlement in Vietnam and highlights that further 
research is needed to improve policy and practice in this area that affects large numbers of people 
and significant resources. This leads to the formulation of the research questions of this study. 
2.5.1. Resettlement policy evolution 
Resettlement policies of Vietnam have evolved in different development stages in its history.  
After the Vietnam War in 1975, the Fourth Congress of Vietnam Communist Party developed its 
first five year development plan (1976-1980) which stated that development of the energy sector 
including electricity and coal and increasing electricity productivity to five billion kWh must be a 
special mission for that term. Under the plan, the first large dam of Vietnam, Hoa Binh, was 
constructed in 1979 to produce 1,920 MW. Even with technical and financial support from the 
Soviet Union, it took 15 years to complete the project in the difficult period of subsidiary economy. 
During that time, the resettlement policy was in its infancy. In the case of the Hoa Binh Dam, 
Vietnamese and Russian experts had limited experience with resettlement concepts (Dao, 2010). 
Under the five year plan (1976-1980), a national program on migration and developing new 
economic zones with the target of moving four million people (mostly Kinh—the majority 
Vietnamese) from the Red River Delta in the north to the south, including the Central Highlands, 
was implemented to develop agriculture and forestry, re-distribute human and natural resources, 
reduce population pressure in the Red River Delta, and to enhance national defence and security. 
About six million people migrated to the south between 1975 and 2000 (Do, 2002). However, a few 
policies on economic zone development were developed during this time. For example, the 
Decision No. 272/CP in 1977 of the Prime Minister Issuing Policy for Cooperatives Expanding 
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Forestry and Agricultural Land and Developing Economic Zone regulated basic financial support 
through the cooperatives in the sending and receiving places to organise things relevant to the 
move, such as transportation, housing and food.     
Since 1986 when the Sixth Congress of Vietnam Communist Party decided to implement Doi Moi 
(the economic reform policy) following the so called ‘market with socialist orientation economy’, 
Vietnam’s economy began to develop. The Seventh Congress of the Vietnam Communist Party 
(1991-1995) endorsed a strategy on industrialisation and modernisation for this term. Many 
economic projects requiring land acquisition including hydropower dams were implemented in the 
1990s and 2000s. Based on the strategy, Yali Hydropower (the second largest dam of Vietnam) and 
several other dams were planned and built in this period with the goal of reaching 30 billion 
kilowatt hour (KWh) of electricity in 2000. Therefore, several policies on compensation and 
resettlement have been developed since 1990. Key policies and their main contents are briefly 
presented in Table 2.4.  
Table 2.4: Related policies on resettlement in the Vietnam government 
Year Policies Key issues 
1994 Decree No. 90/1994/CP 
on Compensation for Land 
Acquisition 
This Decree just focused on the compensation aspect by 
providing a price framework for land and property loss. 
1998 Decree No. 22/1998/ND-CP 
on Compensation for Land 
Acquisition for purposes of national 
security, national interest, public 
interest 
Besides providing the price framework, 
It is required that any project with land acquisition must 
develop a resettlement site plan.  
It is also required to provide supports such as rice support 
for one year and training fee for changing job and to give 
priority to hiring people from the affected community to work 
in the project (if possible).  
2004 Decree No. 197/2004/ND-CP 
on Compensation, Supports, 
Resettlement for Land Acquisition 
 
This is supplementary of the Decree No. 22.  
Additional contents in the Article 26 about production 
support: Depending on the specific context, the provincial 
committee develops specific solutions and supports such as 
providing seed, livestock, agricultural and forestry extension 
and creates some new jobs in the new resettlement site, 
especially for women. 
2007 Decree No. 84/2007/ND-CP 
on Additional regulations on Issuing 
Land Use Certificate, Land 
Acquisition, Land Use Rights, 
Procedures for Compensation, 
Supports, Resettlement for Land 
Acquisition and Solving Land 
Disputes 
This is supplementary to the Decree No. 197. 
Additional contents in Chapter V—Procedure for 
compensation and resettlement in ten steps.  
2009 Decree No. 69/2009/ND-CP 
on Additional Regulations on Land 
Use, Land Price Framework, Land 
Acquisition, Supports and 
Resettlement 
This is supplementary to the Decree No. 84. 
Additional contents in the Article 34: Land development 
fund—Provincial committee can use 30-50% of total turnover 
from leasing land, selling land, land tax to build resettlement 
site, to support training for changing job.   
2010 Decision No. 34/2010/QD-TTg on 
Compensation, Support, 
Resettlement in Irrigation and 
Hydropower Development Projects 
Additional contents in Article 11: provide the resettlers 50% 
of total investment for Acacia plantation from 5-7 years and 
less than 2 ha/household.  
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Researchers have often considered two periods for reviewing resettlement related policies in 
Vietnam. These two periods are before and after reforming the Land Law in 1993 (No. 24-L/CTN) 
and issuing the Environmental Protection Law in 1993 (No. 29-L/CTN) by the parliament. 
According to CODE (2010), the consequences of the resettlement projects of the Thac Ba 
Hydropower Dam from 1968 and 1973 and the Hoa Binh Dam from 1979 to 1994 and the 
influences of international institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank and 
the World Commission on Dams are factors affecting government policy development after 1993. 
Several positive changes have been observed by researchers. CODE (2010) and Ty et al. (2013) 
found a remarkable shift in the land law regarding the responsibility and rights of land owners. 
Before 1993, land acquisition for national development projects was based on the notion that land is 
national property and under state management. Thus, moving people was conducted without any 
concerns about compensating them for their losses and helping them to recover their livelihoods and 
incomes. The Land Law in 1993 (No. 24-L/CTN) defines a price framework for calculating land 
compensation. Moreover, the revised Land Law in 2003 (No. 13/2003/QH11) defines the rights to 
compensation with a principle associated with this change in Article 42: that displaced households 
ought to be resettled in new resettlement sites with living standard being at least equal to or better 
than what they had vacated. Dao (2010) observed in her policy review several positive changes that 
the WB supported the Vietnam government to make in 1997 in developing a national policy of 
resettlement with compensation and resettlement standards for affected people. The other 
significant change is the support of the Vietnamese government to WCD’s activities in 2000 and the 
development of the government’s decrees such as Decree No. 197/ND-CP in 2004 and Decree No. 
34/ND-CP in 2010 providing foundations for compensation and resettlement related to hydropower 
dams and irrigation projects. Dao (2010) highlighted that compensation for both directly and 
indirectly affected people and support for production and changing jobs are the main contents in the 
new decrees. 
Although government policies have been evolving in recent decades there have been many gaps 
between policy and practice. There have been specific examples with the Environmental Protection 
Law. Dao (2010) and Ha (2011) reported the case of the Son La Dam which was started two years 
before the approval of the relevant EIA. Ty et al. (2013) discovered that compensation paid for land 
for hydropower projects was often very low compared to the market price due to the local 
government and investor alliance which favoured investor benefits and made decisions on price 
without negotiation with the affected parties. According to CODE (2011), even in the decree 
defining compensation for indirectly affected people and support for the receiving places and host 
groups, no specific guidelines and regulations have been issued.       
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The government policies focused on land acquisition, compensation and short-term support issues 
rather than the issues of recovering the resettlers’ livelihoods. The previous studies in Vietnam 
show the changes in compensation and support policies and the shortcomings related to the 
implementation of compensation. It is necessary to study further aspects of livelihood recovery in 
the programs and policies as well as integration among different government programs and policies 
for resettlement sites. This is because the people not only receive support from the resettlement 
program but also from other related government programs in their new areas. Examples of 
alternative support include the Poverty Reduction Program of the Government (30a/2008/NQ-CP), 
Program No. 134—Supporting Ethnic Minority People Facing Land Shortage (134/2004/QĐ-TTg). 
A complicating factor with these directives is, according to CODE (2011), up to eight ministries are 
responsible for moving and resettling people. The Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development 
(MARD) is the leading institution managing moving and resettling people for hydropower and 
irrigation projects in the whole country. Given the high numbers of institutions involved, it is not 
clear which one is responsible for restoring and sustaining the livelihoods of resettlers in the long 
run. Thus, further research should look into the institutional aspects in more detail.  
2.5.2. Participation in decision making processes and resettlement planning 
The report on Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision Making, WCD (2000a) 
mentioned that:  
“Public acceptance of key decisions is essential for equitable and sustainable water and 
energy resources development. Acceptance emerges from recognising rights, addressing 
risks, and safeguarding the entitlements of all groups of affected people, particularly 
indigenous and tribal peoples, women and other vulnerable groups. Decision making 
processes and mechanisms are used that enable informed participation by all groups of 
people, and result in the demonstrable acceptance of key decisions. Where projects affect 
indigenous and tribal peoples, such processes are guided by their free, prior and informed 
consent (FPIC)”. 
The findings from case studies on hydropower dam projects before 2000 have shown that 
participation was non-existent. For instance, the Hoa Binh Dam caused displacement of 58,000 
people from five ethnic groups in the Northern Mountains (Hirsch et al., 1992). Unfortunately, the 
people were just simply ordered to move out in order to build a dam that was considered in the 
national interest with very low compensation and unorganised resettlement programs (Dao, 2010). 
The problem related to participation aspects was reflected in another case study on the Yali 
Hydropower Dam of 720 MW which was constructed in 1999 with the resettlement of 6,782 people 
from four ethnic groups in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. Trung (2013) found that the planning 
of the compensation process was conducted in a top-down manner with limited participation of 
related stakeholders and information sharing, in which the resettlers just followed the house designs 
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with many shortcomings provided by the compensation and resettlement management board. The 
ethnic minority groups were particularly marginalised by the process, while the Kinh (majority 
Vietnamese) generally benefited from the process.    
Some positive changes in participation were observed in early 2000 with the construction of the 
largest dam in South East Asia in 2005 (the Son La hydropower project with a capacity of 2,400 
MW). Following this case, Dao (2010) wrote that it was the first time that the government listened 
to the alternative and even opposing opinions from scientists and academics from the Vietnamese 
Union of Science and Technology Association (VUSTA). The government agreed to the option of a 
lower water level of the dam, at 215 m instead of the originally planned 265 m level in order to 
reduce the number of people displaced by 30,000. Dao (2010) also pointed out that a resettlement 
and rehabilitation program was provided in advance and resettled people could have a voice in 
changing housing policy.  
In fact, the findings of the case studies claimed that it had been a challenge to have meaningful 
participation in the country due to many factors. According to Ha (2011), the revised Law on 
Environmental Protection in 2005 played an important role in facilitating participation of local 
people in hydropower resettlement projects. But the author discovered a key point that there has 
often been a disconnection between the global and national norms and the socio-economic and 
traditional practices of local communities. A good example of local participation of Thai people in 
the Northern Mountains of Vietnam practising their Sen Ban (annual worship ceremony for health 
and peace) was provided. These people were moved because of the Son La Dam.  
“Before the ceremony the entire village selected one person to be in charge and lead the 
annual worship ceremony. This person was chosen from one of the first families who 
created the village. In addition, this selected person had to discuss how he wanted to 
organize the ceremony with the Tao ban (headman) and the Thau ke (elderly council) and 
obtain consensus at the meeting, Chau viec (messenger) of the village was responsible for 
delivering information to every single family. This information included the time and 
procedure for the ceremony, how it was organized and the responsibility of each family. The 
whole village works together in preparing for the activity. People believe that since every 
family participated before and during the ceremony, they all would receive support from 
superior force” 
(Tran, 2011: P49) 
Tran (2011) highlighted that the interaction among several factors such as education level, 
language, knowledge and value systems, political will and capacity of government staff have caused 
the complex processes influencing the outcomes of participation in resettlement programs. 
Furthermore, Pham (2013) defined the gaps between the international and Vietnamese policy 
frameworks in the case of FPIC by providing an example of the government’s Decision 
40 
 
34/2010/QD-TTg for a clearer framework for compensation, support and resettlement policies. This 
decision, according to Pham (2013), is similar to FPIC but it lacks specific guidelines for successive 
phases of land acquisition, such as planning, land recovery, compensation, displacement, 
resettlement, and livelihood restoration. 
The studies on participation aspects have shown some limitations. First, the influence of the role of 
the cultures of different ethnic groups in the participation have not been systematically studied 
(Tran, 2011). The Thai ethnic minority people resettled by the Son La Dam in the Northern 
Mountain region are only one example. With the ethnic diversity and high rate of ethnic people 
resettled throughout the country, it is important to understand their culture and the relevance of this 
to participatory processes. Second, the role and lessons of civil society in re-establishing and 
improving local livelihoods have not been studied to date. Ty et al. (2013) suggested that unless the 
roles of NGOs and community based organisations in the compensation and resettlement process 
are strengthened, FPIC principles will not be meaningfully employed. In fact, international NGOs 
such as Oxfam, World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF) and national NGOs such as CODE, 
WARECODE (Centre for Water Conservation and Development), VRN (Vietnam River Network), 
and social organisations such as women’s unions and farmers’ unions have been active in 
advocating and initiating community development projects for resettlement sites. Their successful 
and challenges and local initiatives should be studied to find out sound mechanisms for facilitating 
participation from related stakeholders. Third, power relations among the ethnic groups and their 
history in the region have been ignored in the analysis. Improvement of understanding on these 
issues would identify entry points for empowering the local communities and solving unexpected 
conflicts and achieving more successful outcomes of resettlement.           
2.5.3. Compensation 
The compensation issues have been studied and documented by researchers in Vietnam. In general, 
the resettled land holders often receive compensation including housing, land, cash for moving and 
loss of properties and crops, subsidy for stabilising, support for production and support for changing 
jobs and job training. The compensation will depend on the specific context of each resettlement 
project in different areas. In practice, many problems have been observed on the ground.   
With regard to the housing issues, studies on compensation and resettlement issues of Yali and 
Pleikrong hydropower projects in the Central Highland by Dao et al. (2001) and Hung et al. (2004) 
and A Vuong hydropower project in Quang Nam Province by Hoang (2011) and Ban Ve projects in 
Nghe An Province by Vo (2011) found that the resettlers had no voices and rights on changing 
house design or quality. They had to receive houses without kitchens and with smaller areas 
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compared to their old houses. According to Dao (2010), the situation was changed in the Son La 
project in 2005 with the acceptance of local people’s requests to change house design policy. The 
resettled people could move their old house to rebuild it in the new place to keep their traditional 
culture. But it was different on a case by case basis depending on the provincial people’s committee 
where the project is located.  
The land compensation problem is quite common for most of the resettlement sites in the country. 
The principle written in the government’s Decree 197/2004/ND-CP is that resettlers would receive 
an area equal to the area of land lost in the resettlement site. In the case where there is no land for 
compensation, they can receive cash compensation with the price defined by the time of land 
acquisition. The findings from practice are unfortunately different from the stated policy. The 
results of surveys on four resettlement projects in Vietnam by CODE (2011) showed that 
compensation varied among the projects. For instance, each resettler of the Yali and Pleikrong 
projects received 1,000 m2 and 400 m2 of residential and garden land, respectively. The average 
compensation cost for each household varied between projects (500 million VND for each 
household in the Son La project, 450 million VND in the Tuyen Quang and 200 million VND in 
Ban Ve). Another issue was that other assets such as access to natural resources and common 
property were not compensated for and the land budget was not prepared before moving people nor 
did it considered the population growth rate. According to the opinions of the resettled people in the 
survey, the land area of both residential and cultivation land in the new resettlement site was 
considered as being of much lower quality and quantity than their original place.   
Cash compensation was frequently perceived to be too low compared to the market price and there 
was the issue of long delays between the time of defining a price for the acquisition of land and the 
time of paying compensation (Dao et al., 2001). Thus, the compensation amount was inadequate for 
displaced people to purchase reasonable land. The second issue was about estimation of material 
loss for compensation. Since it was not being properly conducted, it led to losses for the local 
people and a high number of appeal cases. The last issue was about unwise expenditure of 
compensation cash by the resettlers who were mainly ethnic minority people who were not 
accustomed to dealing with cash. Most of the money was often spent on unproductive assets such as 
TVs, motorbikes, luxury mobile phones, alcohol, and drugs (Hoang, 2011).               
The other important parts of the compensation package included support food, livelihood 
rehabilitation, training and a program to help with changing jobs during the first few years in the 
new areas. For the food support, article 20 of Decree No. 69/2009/ND-CP states that those 
households losing 30-70% of cultivation land would get six months (in the case of not moving) and 
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12 months (in the case of having to move) of rice support; those households losing more than 70% 
of cultivation land would get rice support from 12 months (in the case of not moving) to 24 months 
of rice support (in the case of having to move); households being moved to the most remote and 
poorest areas would receive 36 months of rice support (30kg/person/per month). The resettled in 
most of the case studies said the duration and amount of rice support was not enough for them. 
Besides that, resettled people also received support for production and changing jobs such as 
learning about different varieties and breeds of stock suited to their new environment, money for 
fertilisers and forestry and agricultural extension training. Nevertheless, the support was often 
ineffective. Similarly, training support for changing jobs for resettlers in the resettlement sites was 
also available. However, it was often implemented in the first years by paying cash. Moreover, it 
was difficult to change occupations in the short-term and find suitable jobs in the resettler areas 
which were often in the mountainous regions (CODE, 2011).                   
The above studies have not addressed issues of institutional and financial capacities for post 
displacement reconstruction. According to Cernea (2007), the issues on financing the resettlement 
have been ignored by international researchers. Cernea (2007) criticised governments which were 
often in favour of compensation options for DIDR and pointed out that the recent experiences in 
other nations indicated that different financial mechanisms beyond compensation could better 
support resettlers reconstructing and improving their livelihoods in the long term. Thus, there is an 
urgent need to conduct further studies on developing financial mechanisms for post displacement 
and understanding institutional constraints for channelling benefits to the resettlers for the 
development.  
2.5.4. Impacts of dam-induced resettlement 
About 11,000 billion VND (550 million USD) were spent on 21 hydropowers’ displacement and 
resettlement projects—6,898 billion VND for loss compensation, 3,792 billion VND for the support 
of resettlement and 605 billion VND for the support of production (MARD, 2014). The short-term 
compensation and support mentioned above had not enabled the resettled households to recover 
their livelihoods. Instead, they had had many undesirable consequences and unexpected outcomes.  
The first consequence was the outbreak of disputes over land use, water conflicts and deforestation. 
Previous studies such as CODE (2011), Ha and Tranh (2011) and Trung (2013) have clearly shown 
the land shortage and water shortage faced by different resettlement sites from the Northern to 
Central Highlands of Vietnam. Land use disputes between the ethnic minority people and the Kinh 
people and State forest enterprises over forest land in the new place were observed in the Yali and 
Pleikrong projects in the Central Highlands (Trung, 2013). The land shortage issue led to the 
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deforestation and exclusion of the resettled people from forest resources. For example, 1,618 ha of 
forest were destroyed for construction of the Pleikrong hydropower dam and resettlement site 
(Hieu, 2011) and no forest cover was found in two communes in the area around resettlement sites 
of the Yali Dam (Trung, 2013).     
The other problems of resettlement sites are greater poverty and impoverishment. The results of a 
case study on the Yali hydropower project by Trung (2013) indicated that most of the poor people 
in the resettlement site came from ethnic minorities and there was a large income gap between 
resettled Kinh people and the minority. On the other hand, social disputes among the host and 
resettlement groups due to mixed resettlement were found in the Ban Ve project (Vo, 2011) and the 
Tuyen Quang project (Chu et al., 2011). Therefore, the local government had to establish new 
separate communes for the resettled people.  
Given the preference of land for land or cash compensation by the government and limited land 
resources in the resettlement sites, the resettled farmers faced unemployment issues. Trung (2013) 
and CODE (2011) mentioned that resettlement plans often overlooked employment opportunities 
for resettlers. Only a minority of people were able to obtain employment in industrial areas where 
opportunities existed.  
Downstream impacts on people and the impacts on their environment have been largely neglected 
in Vietnam. The only previous studies on Yali Falls Dam (Baird and Mean, 2005, Wyatt and Baird, 
2007, Polimeni et al., 2014) were conducted to examine trans-boundary impacts on the downstream 
people in the Cambodian side in the first years after the dam became operational. Their results 
showed 39 deaths by drowning and losses of property, livestock and crops due to the unusual 
flooding events in 1996. In addition, the dam construction caused a reduction of 30-60% of fish 
resources in the Se San River in Cambodia which is a source of food for at least 50,000 people from 
nine ethnic groups living in Ratanakiri province in Cambodia.  
The previous studies tended to concentrate on the immediate impacts on the people in the first 
generation of resettlers. However, the issues of long term impacts on the next generations among 
vulnerable groups such as female headed households, children, ethnic minorities and downstream 
people and their adaptive strategies have been lacking in those studies. It should be noted that one 
of the distinct characteristics of the resettlement projects in Vietnam is that they involved a high 
proportion of ethnic minority people (for many projects it can be more than 90% of total resettlers). 
Thus, future study should fill the gaps.      
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2.5.5. Livelihoods strategies and outcomes 
Given the challenges facing resettlers, some researchers such as (Bui and Schreinemachers, 2011, 
Dao, 2012, Bui et al., 2013) have made initial efforts in understanding the livelihood strategies and 
outcomes of resettled communities. Those studies were related to the biggest hydropower project in 
South East Asia;—Son La Hydropower Dam project in the northwest mountains of Vietnam, which 
caused the displacement of about 90,000 people from five ethnic minorities.  
Dao (2012) studied the politics around dam development in Vietnam, the influences of state 
development on reconfiguration of natural and social landscape and the personal effects of the 
resettled people including Thai and La Ha ethnic groups in two resettled communes. The research 
showed that the resettlers employed diversification and achieved uneven outcomes among 
households’ due to several factors including access to land, capital and labour capitals, social 
connection and networks, market access and the ways of spending compensation and savings. As a 
result, class stratification was observed in the communes. In terms of the ethnicity factor, the 
findings indicated that Thai people were faster than the La Ha in getting better land and settling 
down. Thus, the number of rich and middle-class Thai households was higher. However, the author 
wrote that it was not possible to reach a firm conclusion that ethnicity is always a key factor in 
differentiation as the evidence from the research was limited.  
Bui et al. (2013) explored the livelihood outcomes and adaptation strategies of both resettled and 
host household groups by employing quantitative research. They concluded that the main strategy 
was intensification of agriculture using inputs for cultivation. The data indicated a significant 
increase in the inputs for livestock and crop production resulting in an increase in output. In 
addition, food security was improved due to compensation from the government.  
The two studies discussed in the previous paragraphs have made a considerable contribution to 
understanding the livelihood strategies influencing factors and outcomes of the resettled people in 
the northwest mountains of Vietnam. However, there are some limitations. First, they concentrated 
on the decision making on dam building, displacement process and immediate strategies and 
outcomes. Both studies examined the strategies and outcomes less than two years after the 
resettlement. During this period, the resettled people still lived on the compensation and their 
production system was not fully developed. Thus, it could be difficult to observe the ethnicity factor 
playing a role in the differentiation process as mentioned in the study of Dao (2012). Second, 
factors including ethnicity, culture, gender, and age have not been taken into consideration in the 
study of the local livelihoods. For instance, out of five ethnic groups moved by the Son La Dam 
only one group named Black Tai from 56 resettled households was studied by (Bui et al., 2013). 
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Third, neither study considered other active policies and programs in the area which could 
contribute to livelihood and personal outcomes of the resettlers. Fourth, the downstream people 
whose livelihoods are dependent on the river were not covered in the studies.  
2.5.6. Conclusion 
Resettlement policy in Vietnam has been evolving over recent decades. However, the policies have 
been compensation and short-term oriented and lacking livelihood restoration and improvement 
components post-resettlement. Furthermore, there has been a gap between policy and 
implementation. Many compensation problems were studied and documented. However, financial 
and institutional capacities for post-resettlement have not been studied and addressed to sustain the 
livelihoods of the affected people. 
Many resettled people have lived under the poverty line and faced difficulty in restoring livelihoods 
after the resettlement. Therefore, they have been vulnerable to the common risks identified in the 
Cernea’s IRR framework such as landlessness, joblessness, lack of food security, marginalisation, 
loss of access to forest and conflict with the host community. However, changes in social 
articulation such as social structure, kinship, mutual help, and networks have not been studied and 
understood.     
The previous studies tended to pay much attention to immediate impacts and the first generation of 
resettlers in the upstream areas. However, information on the long-term impacts on the resettlers 
and the next generations among ethnic minorities and downstream people and their adaptive 
strategies have been lacking in those studies. Therefore, improving the understanding in these areas 
would support the development of resettlement policies to sustain the resettlers’ livelihoods in the 
future.  
In general, to some extent, the literature research questions three and four have been addressed by 
the review of Vietnamese experiences on dam-induced resettlement. However, there have been 
several gaps which require further research (see Table 2.5).  
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Table 2.5: Research questions addressed by the review of Vietnamese experiences 
Research questions Comments 
3. How has resettlement policy in Vietnam 
evolved over time in recent decades? 
This question is partially addressed in the review in 
Section 2.5. It provides an understanding in the 
policy context. However, little is known about the 
aspect of livelihood restoration in the long term and 
institutions for post-resettlement issues in the 
policies. It will be further looked at in Chapter III.  
4. What are the current trends and common 
risks and positive lessons found in the 
resettlement projects in Vietnam? What are the 
emerging issues or other risks? What is the link, 
or has there been any learning in Vietnam from 
Asia and international experiences? 
The review in Section 2.5 clearly shows that the 
resettlers in Vietnam share the risks which are 
commonly found in other case studies in the world. 
However, emerging issues such as long-term 
impacts of resettlement projects such as social 
disarticulation, livelihood strategies of different 
ethnic groups need further research. It will be 
further looked at in Chapter III.   
2.6. Institutional responses to dam-induced resettlement 
The World Bank (WB) is a pioneering institution in developing and enforcing international regimes 
of DIDR (Scudder, 2005b). According to Muggah (2008) and Mathur (2011), the WB was the first 
institution to develop a policy on involuntary resettlement which they referred to as Operational 
Manual Statement (OMS 2.33) in 1980 and Operations Policy Note (OPN 10.98) in 1986. In 1990, 
the World Bank’s Operational Directive (OD 4.30) on Involuntary Resettlement was formulated by 
integrating OMS 2.33 and OPN 10.98. The policies of the WB were then adopted by several other 
institutions including the United Nations (UN), the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Inter-
American Development Bank (IADB), the African Development Bank (AfDB), the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OCED), and the International Finance Corporation 
(IFC). 
Table 2.6 shows how the institutions’ policies share a common objective and principles in terms of 
providing preventive and protective solutions. Their preventive principle is that of avoiding and 
minimising involuntary resettlement when it is possible. For the issue of protection, policies rule 
that the displaced, especially vulnerable groups such as ethnic, women, and children should be 
protected and included in the resettlement process. If it is unavoidable a resettlement plan must be 
developed to rehabilitate and improve the resettlers’ livelihoods to meet the objective of ensuring 
that resettlers benefit from resettlement projects.  
In practice, many scholars such as Scudder (2005a, 2012), Mathur (2011) have confirmed that the 
outcomes of resettlement projects and the related policies have been far from meeting expectations, 
with more failures than successes due to several reasons. The first reason is that the standards of the 
policies are limited. McDonald-Wilmsen and Webber (2010) criticised that the revised WB’s OP 
4.12 and ABD’s safeguard policy statement are weaker compared to OD 4.30 since the resettlement 
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programs are not defined as development programs, which can violate human rights. The second 
reason is related to compliance with the policies. According to Goodland (2010) the WB often 
relaxes their standards and even violates social and environmental safeguard policies to help the 
borrowing states get a loan easily. This point is clearly reflected in the case studies mentioned 
above. Third, WCD (2000a) and Muggah (2008) pointed out the ignorance of the states and the 
failures of international regimes regarding shaping states’ behaviours. Based on an ADB review in 
2002, it is clear that the resettlement policies of many countries including India, Indonesia, 
Vietnam, Laos, Pakistan, the Maldives, Bhutan and Nepal are still compensation oriented. 
Moreover, many developing countries have not developed national legislations and policies dealing 
with DIDR (Mathur, 2011). 
The unacceptable impacts of dams during the 1990s led to the establishment of the World 
Commission on Dams (WCD) in May 1998 by the WB and the International Union for 
Conservation of Nature (IUCN) (Altinbilek et al., 2012). In 2000, the WCD issued a report with 
guidelines, good practices, standards and recommendations for dam development based on the risk 
and rights approach. The rights of affected people including vulnerable groups, their entitlement for 
benefits from the projects and the requirements for monitoring the long-term impacts of dams, 
especially the key social and environmental impacts are highlighted in their strategic priorities. 
Nevertheless, the report has been rejected by the WB and many states including the big resettlement 
countries such as China and India (Goodland, 2010, McDonald-Wilmsen and Webber, 2010) and 
has not worked in the Mekong region (Hirsch, 2010). 
In general, the objectives of shaping states’ behaviour relating to involuntary resettlement through 
international regimes and improving the affected people’s livelihoods have been difficult to achieve 
to date.  
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Table 2.6: The common objectives, principles and challenges of the international regimes for dam-induced resettlement 
International policies  Objectives Principles Gaps 
Operative Directive (OD 4.30) on Involuntary Resettlement of WB in 1980, 
1990  
Convention No. 169: Indigenous and tribal peoples - Free Prior Informed 
Consent (FPIC) – ILO in 1989 
Guideline on Aid Agencies on Involuntary Displacement and Resettlement 
in Development Project of OECD in 1991 
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement  - UN in 1998 
Operational Manual (OP 4.12) - Involuntary Resettlement of WB in 2001 
Involuntary Resettlement Policy of AfDB in 2003 
Involuntary resettlement source book: Planning and Implementation 
Development Project of WB in 2004 
Hand book on resettlement: A Guide to Good Practice of ADB in 1998 
Safe guard policy of ADB in 2009 
Basic Principles and Guidelines on 
Development-based Evictions and Displacement of UN in 2007 
Performance Standards for Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement 
of International Financial Corporation of IFC in 2012 
 
 
To ensure that the displaced 
should benefit from projects. 
a. avoiding and minimising of involuntary 
resettlement by any possible solution;  
b. if it is not possible, there should be 
resettlement plans,  
c. encouraging community participation in 
planning and implementing resettlement;  
d. integrating resettlers into host 
communities and minimising impacts on the 
host;  
e. providing land, housing, infrastructure 
and other compensation to the affected 
population. 
- Impoverishment 
risks 
- Livelihood 
restorations and 
improvement/Res
ettlement with 
Development 
(RwD) 
- Meaningful 
participation 
- Rights of 
affected 
populations 
including 
vulnerable groups 
Report on Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision 
Making of WCD in 2000 
Strategic priorities: 
1. Gaining public acceptance of all affected groups comprising the vulnerable groups based on 
recognising rights, addressing risks; 
2. Comprehensively assessing options considering alternatives to dams based on a 
comprehensive and participatory assessment process;  
3. Long term monitoring and evaluation of cost and benefits of dams during their project life with 
a focus on outstanding social issues;  
4. Understanding ecosystem services and human wellbeing in the river basin scale to avoid 
impacts;  
5. Improve livelihoods and living standards of the affected people through joint negotiation;  
6. Compliance with regulation, guidelines, criteria should be met by governments, developers, 
regulators and operators during planning, implementation and operation phases;  
7. Projects with water storage and conversion on shared rivers require constructive co-operation 
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2.7. Research gaps and research questions 
Having addressed the four literature research questions at the international level (Table 2.3) and 
Vietnamese specific (Table 2.5), there are significant research gaps and emerging issues which 
require further research. 
2.7.1. Long term consequences of resettlement projects on the resettled ethnic groups’ livelihoods 
Vietnam is a multi-ethnic nation with more than 54 ethnic groups who speak different languages 
and mostly live in the uplands (Rambo, 2003, Leisz and Vien, 2006). Their living areas are ideal 
places for building dams. Therefore, most of the people suffering the cost of dam building are 
ethnic minority people. However, the previous studies in Vietnam such as the resettlement studies 
on Son La Dam in Vietnam by Bui and Schreinemachers (2011) and Bui et al. (2013), Song Tranh 2 
Dam by Tranh (2011), Na Hang hydropower by Chu et al. (2011) did not take into account the 
diversity of ethnic groups with different cultural and social backgrounds and their relationships and 
interactions in the resettlement sites. Thus, it is important to consider ethnicity as a factor in dam-
induced resettlement studies.   
The previous studies tended to pay more attention to immediate impacts and the first generation of 
resettlers with shorter timeframes (less than two to four years) after the resettlement. Furthermore, 
the previous studies tended to focus on some livelihood capitals instead of the full range of 
livelihood capitals, and to ignore resettlement settings which involved ethnically diverse groups. All 
livelihood capitals play important roles in society. Therefore, this research will address: 
Research question 1: How has the Yali Falls Dam resettlement project affected the resettled ethnic 
groups’ livelihoods? 
2.7.2. Long term livelihood strategies and outcomes of the resettled ethnic groups 
There is an urgent call from scholars to raise the bare minimum standards of DIDR (with a focus on 
improving and at least restoring livelihoods and standards of living to the pre-resettlement level) to 
the level where they can build a socially integrated, stable community by raising adaptation and 
resilience through a long-term process of facilitation following the lessons from the refugee studies 
and environmental change (McDonald-Wilmsen and Webber, 2010). It should be noted that an 
increase in household income does not mean the livelihood of the household is sustainable—
vulnerabilities do exist (Galipeau et al., 2013). Therefore, it is necessary to understand livelihood 
outcomes of the resettlers not only in terms of the number of working days, income, wellbeing and 
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capabilities, but also in terms of sustainability aspects such as resilience and vulnerability, 
adaptation and natural resource base.  
The previous literature review (Chapter II) found several factors such as local historical context, 
access to livelihood capitals (social, financial, natural, human, psychological and knowledge). 
These are manifest in access to land resources, and influence adaptive capacity, which in turn 
depends on age, education level, culture, and skills extension practices involved in the resettlement 
process (from the four global case studies and Vietnamese experience). Therefore, this research will 
address: 
Research question 2: How and why do the subsequent livelihood strategies and outcomes differ 
among the ethnic groups? 
2.7.3. Framework for reconstructing and improving the ethnic resettlers’ livelihoods 
The literature review indicates the conceptual challenge in DIDR. Although the key frameworks in 
DIDR have been developed and widely applied, specifically the four stage framework (Scudder and 
Colson, 1982), the risk and reconstruction framework (Cernea, 1997) and the routine and dissonant 
culture framework (Downing and Garcia-Downing, 2009), our understanding of the livelihood 
complex is still limited and the failure of livelihood reconstruction outcomes continues. Therefore, 
it is necessary to explore strengths and weaknesses of the current frameworks and propose a new 
framework for understanding, monitoring and enhancing livelihood resilience of the resettled 
people based on the context of Vietnam. Thus, this research will address the following research 
question:  
Research question 3: What are the key modifications to the existing DIDR frameworks that could 
improve resettlement program planning and implementation in Vietnam?  
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CHAPTER III. 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1. Introduction 
Chapters I and II established the context of this study as being hydropower dam development and 
associated resettlement in Vietnam. Furthermore, Chapter II set out the global pragmatic challenge 
of improving the livelihoods of resettled people, and identified the limited knowledge that exists on 
how resettlement involving ethnically diverse groups impacts on livelihoods and complexities 
inherent in the resettlement process. The three primary research questions were defined for this 
research:  
1. How has the Yali Falls Dam resettlement project affected the resettled ethnic groups’ 
livelihoods? 
2. How and why do the subsequent livelihood strategies and outcomes differ among the ethnic 
groups? and;  
3. What are the key modifications to the existing DIDR frameworks that could improve resettlement 
program planning and implementation?  
This chapter discusses the research process and associated methods. Section 3.2 provides an 
overview of the research process. Under Section 3.2, the five phases of the research process are 
presented. The first phase of research problem definition and research design explains the 
researcher’s positionality and reflexivity in this research, reasons for the selection of research 
paradigm and case study approach. The description of study site context with implications for the 
resettlement project and case study background are also provided. The two rounds of data collection 
with different methods in the second and third phase are described. The fourth phase deals with data 
analysis and validation. The last phase explains research synthesis and framework development. 
The process of ethical approval is presented in Section 3.3.  
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3.2. The research development process 
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the five phases of the research process. It shows how the research problem 
was defined and addressed, and knowledge on the dam-induced displacement and resettlement has 
been built up during the process. The following sections describe every phase of the research in 
detail.   
 
Figure 3.1: Research development process and the related thesis chapters 
3.2.1. Phase 1: Research design 
3.2.1.1. Positionality and reflexivity 
Positionality (or, the biography of the researcher) plays a crucial role in the research process 
including fieldwork and data analysis (England, 1994). Positionality not only enables and constrains 
access to field sites but also influences the data collection process, the relationships between 
researcher and the researched, and interpretation of the findings. Thus, different strategies of 
reflexivity are applied by researchers to locate their positionality in the research process to situate 
knowledge (Rose, 1997). The following sections discuss several aspects of my positionality during 
the research process.        
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From my first involvement (Dao et al., 2001) in a rapid assessment of the impacts of the Yali Falls 
Dam on the communities in 2001 and following up other case studies and the news on resettlement 
sites in Vietnam in the 2010s, I found that the situation had not improved and appeared to have 
deteriorated with the repetition of the same problems over the previous decade. These observations 
were the main reasons for me to select the topic of this research. Moreover, the nature of the 
research problem and my previous experiences in conducting both qualitative and quantitative 
studies with the ethnic minorities in the uplands of Vietnam (Hung et al., 2001, Trung et al., 2007, 
Pham et al., 2014) have influenced my selection of the research paradigm and methods which are 
discussed in Section 3.2.1.2.  
For foreign researchers, there are many challenges for getting permission to enter the field and 
conduct fieldwork in respect of politically sensitive topics as perceived by the government, 
including ethnic minorities, impacts of hydropower dams, differentiation, women’s rights and land 
conflicts (Turner, 2010, Scott et al., 2006, McDonald-Wilmsen, 2009). Foreign researchers such as 
Brooke McDonald-Wilmsen, conducting research in China and Steffanie Scott, Fiona Miller and 
Kate Lloyd, undertaking research in Vietnam often developed research partnerships with local host 
institutions in the countries to allow access to field sites. Being Vietnamese, I have been in an 
advantageous position to more easily undertake fieldwork in Vietnam. However, given that my 
topic related to hydropower dams and resettlement with ethnic minority people, I still faced 
challenges given that this is a social and political topic for Vietnam. As such, I had to prepare a 
detailed fieldwork plan with an official letter with a red stamp from my institution, the Central 
Institute for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies (CRES), in Hanoi to submit to the 
district people’s committee before getting a permit to enter and work in the field. I was not 
restricted in terms of time for working in the field sites but I was noticed by a government official 
and advised that I should not sleep overnight in the resettled villages.  
Being a Kinh and male (ethnic Vietnamese) outsider, it was also a limitation for me to approach and 
interview ethnic minority people, especially female participants. However, I was often accompanied 
by two assistants including a female agricultural extension official from Jarai group and a male 
agricultural extension official from the Bahnar who introduced me to households of the resettled 
ethnic minority groups before interviews. For most of the interviews with the resettled households 
from the ethnic groups, I could speak with them in the Vietnamese language. In addition, my 
limited ability to speak the ethnic minority groups’ languages allowed me to break the ice and 
reduce the distance between me and the research participants.        
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Given my background in environmental sciences and human ecology as well as my long working 
experience with ethnic minority people in the uplands of Vietnam since 1999, I understand the 
importance of respecting key informants and their local culture and the information and opinions 
they provide. I positioned myself as a researcher from an independent institute in Hanoi who seeks 
to understand the significant issues and local dynamics by carefully listening to the local resettled 
people in order to transfer their messages to the government. Moreover, my study objectives of 
understanding challenges of the resettled people in resettlement sites and suggesting ways to 
overcome those challenges were always mentioned in the introduction. I also asked for verbal 
consent which drew the attention of key informants and encouraged them to share their opinions 
about life in the resettlement sites. 
3.2.1.2. Research paradigm 
Selection of an appropriate research paradigm for a study on resettled diverse ethnic and cultural 
groups is very important. This type of study could be approached as a detailed in-depth set of case 
studies derived from in-depth interviews which would provide rich personal insight into individual 
experiences such as the study on Gwembe Tonga displaced by the construction of Kariba Dam in 
Zambia and Zimbabwe (Colson, 1971) and the study of farmers displaced by Norris Dam in the 
United States (McDonald and Muldowny, 1981). Such an approach would be very time consuming 
and would be limited in its ability to provide insights that could be generally applied. Conversely, a 
highly quantitative study could provide results which could be generalised (Galipeau et al., 2013, 
Xu et al., 2015) but would be limited in the ability to explore more detailed experiential data to 
understand quantifiable trends in livelihoods and changes that resulted from relocation. For this 
reason, it was considered that mixed methods were essential to understand the phenomenon of 
resettled people at the general population level, but with sufficient insights into the subtleties and 
diversity of individual household experience (Creswell and Clark, 2007, McDonald-Wilmsen, 2009, 
Jakobsen et al., 2007, Robson, 2011).   
Therefore, this research has the following methodological organisation. Two rounds of data 
collection were conducted. The first round included in-depth interviews with the government 
officials and the resettled people to understand the local context, key issues of the resettlement sites 
and individual experiences and opinions on the resettlement process. In addition, during this first 
round, a household survey developed based on the literature was also piloted. The results from the 
first round had been used to refine the household survey which was subsequently used to interview 
the resettled populations. During the process of this study, the researcher also conducted participant 
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observation, took photographs and collected secondary data. Details of the data collection process 
and analysis are presented in Sections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3.  
3.2.1.3. Case study approach and case study selection 
A case study approach is useful for an empirical inquiry to investigate a contemporary phenomenon 
in its real life context, especially when the boundary between phenomenon and context is not 
clearly evident (Yin, 1981). George and Bennett (2005) defined case study as a class of events that 
the investigator chooses to study with the aim of developing theory regarding the causes of 
similarities or differences among cases of that class of events. This research aims at exploring long-
term impacts of hydropower resettlement projects on resettled ethnic groups’ livelihoods and their 
livelihood strategies and outcomes and analysing several factors involved in the resettlement 
process complex. Thus, case study approach is an appropriate approach due to the nature of this 
research.  
The types of research questions not only define the research approach but also the unit of analysis 
(Yin, 2009). The research questions of this research are “how and why” questions which are 
relevant to the use of a case study approach. Moreover, the research addresses the questions related 
to different resettled ethnic groups out of the whole resettled population which become units of 
analysis. Therefore, the design of this research falls into a single embedded case study (Yin, 2012) 
to explore the complexity of the case.  
This research deals with the changes in temporal and spatial conditions, contextual conditions and 
in-depth inquiry. With the three conditions, it often requires a large number of variables of interest 
in a single embedded case study (Yin, 2012). Moreover, both qualitative and quantitative methods 
can be applied in case study research, especially embedded case study (Cousin, 2005, Yin, 2009). 
The methods include in-depth interviews, structured households’ interviews, participant observation 
and taking photos, and are described in detail in Section 3.2.2.3.    
The case study of the resettlement project of the Yali Falls Dam was selected for this research due 
to three main reasons. First, it is a resettlement project of a hydropower dam which included 
relocation and resettlement of people offering a case for the researcher’s interest in focusing on 
resettlement issues. Second, the resettlement project involved the resettled population from four 
ethnic groups. Third, the resettlement project was initiated between 1999 and 2000 making it 
suitable for studying the long-term impacts of resettlement. This enables the case study to provide 
insights into the effects of the initial resettlement policies after a period of 10 to 15 years.        
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In summary, this research employed a single embedded case study approach and applied mixed 
methods to meet its aims.  
3.2.1.4. Study site and case study background: Central Highlands of Vietnam and the Yali Falls 
Dam resettlement project 
The Central Highlands of Vietnam stretches across an area of more than 5.4 million ha which 
belongs to five provinces, namely Gia Lai, Kon Tum, Daklak, Lam Dong and Daknong. This region 
has experienced a long and complicated history with remarkable changes in socio-economic, natural 
conditions, and institutions. The contextual changes over the last decades have shaped the 
development in the Central Highlands, in which the resettlement project of the Yali Falls Dam has 
taken place. The historical timeline (Figure 3.2) outlines the key events and significant changes in 
the region in different periods.  
 
Figure 3.2: The historical timeline of the Central Highlands of Vietnam 
In the French colony period and until the 1950s, the Central Highland region was home to 12 native 
ethnic groups including Bahnar, Jarai, Ro Ngao with a total population of 0.65 million people who 
were called savages by the French and later Montagnards in French literature and documents and 
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người Thượng (highlanders) by South Vietnamese during the Vietnam war (Hickey, 1982b, Rambo, 
2003). During this period, the community ownership was still respected by the French colonists 
although some French approached the village leaders in the Central Highlands and were able to 
occupy and develop some coffee, rubber and tea farms, most of these being located near the 
highways and suburb areas. Therefore, most of the land in the Central Highlands during this period 
was still under community management (Tinh, 2003). Regarding religion, French missionaries were 
successful in establishing the mission station in Kon Tum province, and alliances with Bahnar and 
Ro Ngao in the middle of the nineteenth century (Salemink, 2003). Hickey (1982a) recorded in his 
book on ethnohistory of the Vietnamese Central Highlands (1954-1976) that the Catholic mission 
station in Kon Tum had considerable influence on Bahnar and all the Bahnar leaders in his study 
were Catholic.   
During the Vietnam War (1955 to1975), the country was divided into the North and the South. The 
Central Highlands belonged to the South Republic of Vietnam under the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. 
There was a significant increase in the Kinh moving from the lowland to the region. It was recorded 
that about 60,000 Kinh people, mainly Catholic Vietnamese, were moved by the Ngo Dinh Diem 
regime to the Central Highlands (An, 2014). The regime developed policies to occupy land of the 
native ethnic groups by denying community ownerships of land and forcing the French farm owners 
to sell their farms. It led to disagreements and resistance movements of the native ethnic groups 
throughout the Central Highlands. Thus, the successor government under Nguyen Van Thieu 
employed different policy approaches and issued Special Regulation for the native ethnic groups 
with recognition of the community ownerships. However, until 1975 there was no significant 
change in land use and land ownership in the region and most of the land and forest was under the 
control of native villages and communities (Loi et al., 2000).  Regarding the development of 
religion, the Christian and Missionary Alliance (CMA) started the Protestant mission in the Central 
Highlands in this period (Xuan, 2006).  
In the times after the country’s reunification in 1975 and the pre-renovation policy period until 
1985, there were remarkable changes in the Central Highlands. The government implemented the 
New Economic Zones program together with sponsored migrations programs to move people from 
the lowland in the Red River Delta and central region to the Central Highlands. Therefore, the 
population increased sharply from 0.65 million people in 1954 (Loi et al., 2000) to 2.49 million 
people in 1989 (Dien, 2003). At that time, the Kinh people made up more than 64% of the total 
population. On the other hand, many state forest and agricultural enterprises were established 
following the nationalisation policy of land and forest. Most of the land and forest in the region was 
nationalised, ignoring and eliminating community ownership in this period. By 1988 about three 
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million ha of land and forest in the Central Highlands was managed by 79 State owned farms and 
83 Central forest enterprises and many province and districts’ forestry enterprises (Tinh, 2003). 
However, this period witnessed a remarkable loss of forest due to a timber export boom and the 
development of coffee and rubber plantations. The forest cover reduced from 90% in the French 
colony period to 67% in 1976 (Wood et al., 2000).    
Vietnam has experienced economic development since 1986 when the Sixth Congress of Vietnam 
Communist Party implemented—Doi Moi (the renovation policy)—following a philosophy of 
‘market economy with socialist orientation’. The Seventh Congress of Vietnam Communist Party 
(1991-1995) continued this development with a strategy of industrialisation and modernisation. 
Thus, the Central Highlands has continued experiencing additional substantial changes since the 
policy was issued. One of the most important events during this period was the declaration of the 
Land Law in 1993 which defined the allocation of land use rights to households, individuals, 
organisations such as army units, state enterprises, administration units, however community 
ownership was still not recognised. Households were granted five land use rights, namely transfer, 
exchange, lease, mortgage, and inherit. In reality, the state could not fully control forest and forest 
land (Tinh, 2003) which were mostly still under community use.  
The population of the Central Highlands has reached 5.4 million people because of the continuing 
sponsored migration programs together with free migration. Thus, the ethnicity composition has 
radically changed from only 12 native ethnic groups including Jarai, Bahnar, Ro Ngao into 54 
ethnic groups including Kinh (Vietnamese ethnic) and other ethnic groups. Thus, the region is now 
home to almost every ethnic group of Vietnam.   
Under the strategy, the government have implemented many economic programs such as timber 
logging for export, expansion of coffee, rubber and cassava plantations, development of several 
hydropower dams, and mineral exploitation in the region. From 1986 to 1991, 3.5 million m3 of 
wood were exploited by the state forest enterprises (Wood et al., 2000). Between 2000 and 2012, 
there was rapid development of coffee, rubber, and cassava plantations with an increase of two to 
threefold, which led to the conversion of large areas of natural forest. With the dense river networks 
including three main rivers, namely Se Se, Serepok and Sekong, hundreds of medium and large 
hydropower dam projects have been developed in the Central Highlands. The mass development of 
hydropower dams has occupied about 65,239 ha including 16,600 ha of forest area and resettled 
about 26,000 people in the region (Tu, 2014). The forest cover in the region has drastically dropped 
from 90% in the French colony times to only 50.7% now. 
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Another important change is the rapid development of Protestantism and the recent influence of 
Buddhism in the region since Doi Moi. The number of Protestant followers has significantly 
increased from 52,803 in 1975 to 228,618 in 1999 and 393,546 in 2004 (Xuan, 2006). Vietnam 
Buddhist Sangha also attempted to influence the ethnic minority groups in the Central Highlands in 
this period. About 3,000 ethnic minority people joined Buddhism in Sa Thay district, Kon Tum 
province in 20093. Thus, it has become a religiously diversified region since this period.     
In general, the Central Highlands has experienced several significant changes in socio-economic 
and natural condition over the last decades. These include a rapid population growth with a higher 
rate of outside migrants including the Kinh group, the reconfiguration of land ownership from 
community ownership to individual households, the considerable decline of natural forest cover in 
the region, and the development of different religions. The changes have implications for the Yali 
Falls Dam resettlement project.    
The Yali Hydropower Dam was the first dam out of six large dams which were constructed and 
operated along the Krong Poko River, a main tributary of the Se San River, in the Central 
Highlands of Vietnam (Figure 1.1). The Se San River is one of the largest tributaries of the Mekong 
River (Hirsch, 2006). The annual discharges of the Se San, Srepok and Sekong Rivers in the Central 
Highlands contribute up to 20% of the annual flow of the Mekong River (Piman et al., 2012). The 
Krong Poko River originates from the North of the Central Highlands and flows through Ratanakiri 
and Stungcheng provinces of Cambodia before entering to Mekong River.  
This third largest dam in Vietnam with a dam height of 69m above sea level and a reservoir of 
6,450 ha was built and completed in 1999 to produce 720 MW of hydroelectricity (Dao et al., 
2001). This project inundated an area of 2,958 ha of cultivation land and 1,933 ha of forest land 
(YHMB, 2004). In addition, more than 6,700 people from four ethnic groups with different 
lifestyles including Kinh (ethnic Vietnamese 40%), Jarai (35%) and Ro Ngao (19%), Bahnar (6%) 
were forcibly moved due to flooding of the reservoir (Dao et al., 2001). 
The Kinh households are recent economic immigrants from the Red River Delta in the North who 
migrated after the reunification of Vietnam in 1975 and into the early 1980s under the New 
Economic Development Program as discussed in the above section in the context of the Central 
Highlands. The Kinh have brought wet rice and fish pond culture to the Central Highlands and 
practised fixed cultivation based on a combination of wet rice production and other additional crops 
                                               
3 http://phatgiao.org.vn/van-de-quan-tam/201607/Phat-giao-o-Tay-Nguyen-Thieu-so-va-tiep-tuc-giam-sut-23308/ 
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such as maize, cassava, sugarcane, pulses and vegetables. About 80% of the surveyed Kinh 
households stated that their agricultural output was sufficient for family needs (Electrowatt, 1992). 
The Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao groups are the native ethnic groups in the Central Highlands who 
occupied a clearly defined territory before the Kinh’s arrival (Rambo, 2003). The native ethnic 
groups lived a subsistence oriented lifestyle, often growing upland rice, rainfed rice near streams, 
collecting forest products and fishing in the river (Dao et al., 2001). During the cooperative time in 
the 1980s, they learnt cultivating wet rice from the Kinh. These groups did free range raising of 
beef cattle and buffaloes. According to an EIA report by (Electrowatt, 1992), 78% of the ethnic 
minority people owned beef cattle with an average number of 2.44 per household and from 70-80% 
of the ethnic minority groups had sufficient agricultural production for their subsistence 
requirements.  
The relocation was conducted between 1995 and 2000. The resettled ethnic groups received 
housing, compensation for the loss of perennial crops such as sugar-cane and loss of fishponds. In 
addition, for the loss of wet-rice fields, they would receive a six month supply of rice and the 
project would reclaim irrigated fields for wet-rice and secondary crop cultivation(YHMB, 2004). 
The loss of common property such as swidden fields, access to forest and river, and grazing land 
was not compensated.  
Previous studies (VESDI, 2000, Dao, 2010, Trung, 2013) found several shortcomings related to the 
resettlement planning and compensation process of the Yali Falls Dam project. It was conducted in 
a top-down manner with limited participation of related stakeholders and information sharing. The 
resettlers just followed the house designs with many shortcomings, provided by the compensation 
and resettlement and management board. The ethnic minority groups were marginalised from the 
process and in the meantime the Kinh generally influenced and benefited from the process. 
Moreover, the compensation policy also offered advantages for the Kinh as it focused on the loss of 
cash crops such as sugar-cane and fishpond. The studies also clearly indicated that the reclamation 
of wet-rice and secondary crops fields was unsuccessful due to inappropriate design and to being in 
the flooded area or in the area under ownership of other villages.  
In brief, there were several shortcomings during the planning and compensation process of the Yali 
Falls Dam project such as limited participation, cash compensation in favour of the Kinh farming 
style, the influence of Kinh over the process and inappropriate design of reclaimed fields. 
Therefore, it started the process of differentiation among the resettled ethnic groups with 
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implications for the later resettlement process and livelihood reconstruction of the resettled people 
which will be discussed in the results chapters IV,V and VI. 
 
 
Figure 3.3: Map of the original locations and the resettlement sites 
3.2.2. Phase 2 and 3: Two rounds of data collection 
3.2.2.1. In-depth interviews 
The selection of an in-depth interview method for this study was due to its advantages. This method 
allows researchers to delve deeply into social and personal matters by selecting and discussing them 
with key informants with a good knowledge regarding the research issues (DiCicco‐Bloom and 
Crabtree, 2006). It also encourages key informants to talk about the things that are meaningful and 
important to them in their own words without influences or biases of other member can happen in 
focus group discussions when members are known to each other or a hierarchy exists (Minichiello 
et al., 2008). This face-to-face interview technique not only offers an opportunity for the researcher 
to investigate important issues found during the interview process but also to capture non-verbal cue 
messages from interviewees (Robson, 2011). With the advantages of the method, therefore, the 
researcher would be able to obtain local context, understand key issues of the resettlement sites and 
hear individual experiences and opinions on the resettlement process.   
62 
 
In this study, the in-depth interviews were conducted with government officials and resettled people 
who were involved and understood the resettlement process during the first fieldwork. The list of 
interview informants including the local government officials and resettled people is presented in 
Table 3.1. The interviews with individuals from the two groups in the first fieldwork are described 
as below. 
Snowball sampling was used to recruit the government officials for the interview. According to 
Browne (2005), this method has advantages of being simple and time and financial resource saving 
as well as being able to identify hidden populations. Moreover, it would help researchers understand 
the social network and connections between the participants. However, it should be noted that it has 
disadvantages such as the single dependence on the first participant and the uncertainty of choosing 
appropriate populations. In this research, the researcher started interviewing the head of agricultural 
and rural development of the district people’s committee in Sa Thay district, Kon Tum province 
who had been responsible for supervising all issues related to the development in the resettlement 
site. Then, the head introduced the researcher to other government officials from both the district 
and commune people’s committees who were involved in the resettlement process.  
The in-depth interviews with each key informant were conducted alone in Vietnamese at their 
offices. It took between one and one and a half hour for each interview. The checklist with broad 
questions below guided the researcher to conduct the interviews. Additional probing questions were 
also used during the interviews to clarify points in more detail and get insights into the issues. 
✓ How was the resettlement project implemented? 
✓ How was compensation implemented? 
✓ How were the relocations of different populations implemented? 
✓ What were the advantages and disadvantages of implementing the resettlement projects? 
✓ What advantages and disadvantages have the resettlers faced? 
✓ How have the central and local governments responded to their challenges?  
✓ What would you have done better if you had a chance to do it over again? 
Second, in-depth interviews with the resettled people were held using the snowball sampling 
selection method. Village heads and elders were first contacted for the interviews. Subsequently, the 
resettlers introduced by the village heads and elders from four ethnic groups were interviewed to 
collect stories of their life experiences before and after the resettlement.  
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The interviews with the resettled people were also conducted in Vietnamese at their houses. 
Sometimes, their family members or neighbours were sitting there due to their curiosity. Each 
interview often took from one to one and a half hours with the following broad questions.   
✓ How has your life been changed since the resettlement?  
✓ What are the remarkable changes?  
✓ What have you done to respond to the changes? 
✓ What advantages and disadvantages have you faced in the resettlement sites? 
✓ Please predict/comment about the trend in the future? 
Table 3.1: List of interview informants 
Informants Code Date Positions and institutions 
Local government 
Informant #1 GoJ1 12/12/2014 Head of a division of Sa Thay district people’s 
committee 
Informant #2 GoJ2 13/12/2014 Communist party secretary of a resettled commune 
Informant #3 GoJ3 15/12/2014 Chairman of a resettled commune 
Informant #4 GoK4 17/12/2014 Chairman of a resettled commune 
Informant #5 GoR5 15/12/2014 Vice chairman of a resettled commune 
Informant #6 GoJ6 14/12/2014 Chairman of a resettled commune 
Informant #7 GoK7 23/12/2014 Head of a division of Sa Thay district people’s 
committee 
Resettled people 
Informant #8 RJ1 21/12/2014 A resettled man from Jarai group in O village, Yasier 
commune 
Informant #9 RJ2 14/12/2014 A resettled man from Jarai group in Tum village, Yali 
commune 
Informant #10 RJ3 14/12/2014 A couple from Jarai group in Tum village, Yali commune 
Informant #11 RJ4 13/12/2014 A Jarai couple in O village, Yasier commune   
Informant #12 RJ5 13/12/2014 A Jarai man in Trang village, Yasier commune 
Informant #13 RB1 18/12/2014 A Bahnar resettled man in Klauklah village, Ngoc Bay 
commune 
Informant #14 RK1 17/12/2014 A Kinh resettled man in Binh Giang village, Sa Binh 
commune  
Informant #15 RK2 18/12/2014 A Kinh couple in Binh Son village, Sa Binh commune 
Informant #16 RK3 17/12/2014 A Kinh resettled man in Thon 2, Kroong commune  
Informant #17 RR1 15/12/2014 A Ro Ngao couple in Kroong Klah village, Kroong 
commune 
Informant #18 RR2 15/12/2014 A Ro Ngao resettled woman in Kroong Ktuh village, 
Kroong commune 
Informant #19 RR3 15/12/2014 A Ro Ngao resettled man in Kroong Klah village, Kroong 
commune 
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3.2.2.2. Structured household interviews 
The reasons for choosing structured household interviews were threefold. First, this technique could 
generalise findings based on collected data for a large population with enough sample size (Robson, 
2011). Second, analysis of the collected data could show numeric trends of the different sampled 
group populations and statistical significance of their livelihood assets, strategies and outcomes. 
Third, the relationships between different predictor variables defining dependent variables such as 
livelihood strategies and outcomes would be discovered.    
A structured household interview was developed and tested in the first field trip. The questions in 
the interviews had been based on the checklist of key household livelihood assets in the Central 
Highlands of Vietnam developed by Cramb et al. (2004) which included variables of the human, 
natural, financial and physical capitals. However, it was an incomplete checklist for understanding 
changes of the resettlers’ livelihoods in the Central Highlands. Therefore, other variables (DFID, 
2001) needed to be added such as education level of household heads, skills (human capital), forest 
land, fishpond, access to river, access to fresh drinking water, quality of land (natural capital), 
saving and debts, ability to generate income, access to credits and remittance (financial capital), 
access to infrastructures, boats, fishing nets, water pump, mobile phone (physical capital). In 
addition, the bonding social and bridging capitals (Compton and Beeton, 2012) in terms of mutual 
help and participation in social organisations, religious membership, participation in the 
government programs were also covered. Positive psychological capital was also assessed by asking 
the resettlers’ about their perceptions about remarkable changes in the resettlement sites, rating how 
they felt about their life before and after the resettlement on a10 point scale, and their worries 
(Detail in Table 3.2). On the other hand, the livelihood strategies used in the pilot household 
interview initially adopted the categories developed by Scoones (1998) including migration, 
agricultural intensification and livelihood diversification.  
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Table 3.2: Household livelihood assets 
Capital Variables according to Cramb et al. (2004) Additional variables 
Human capital Household size (no.) 
Full-time labour (no.) 
Part-time labour (no.) 
Education level of household 
members 
Skills 
Natural capital Land owned (ha): residential land, field crops 
(such as wet rice, upland rice, cassava, maize, 
sweet potatoes, and sugarcane), tree crops 
(coffee, rubber), grazing land 
Forest land 
Fish pond (no. and area) 
Access to drinking water 
Access to  river 
Quality of land 
Financial capital Cattle kept (no.) 
Cash shortage (no. of months) 
Credit (no. of loans) 
Sources of credit: 
Private providers (no. of loans) 
Government sector (no. of loans) 
 
Cash income 
Saving/Debt 
Ability to generate income 
Access to credits and 
remittance 
Compensation 
Physical capital Electricity (no. of households) 
Brick or concrete houses (no. of households) 
Motorbike (no. of households) 
Tractor (no. of households) 
Water pump (no. of 
households) 
Mobile phone (no. of 
households) 
Boat (no. of households) 
Fishing nets (no. of 
households) 
Bonding and bridging 
social capitals 
(Compton and Beeton, 
2012) 
 Mutual help 
Membership of social network 
Participation in government 
programs 
Positive psychological 
capital (Luthans et al., 
2004, Beeton and 
Lynch, 2012) 
 Perception of changes in the 
resettlement sites, rating life 
before and after the 
resettlement on a 10 point 
scale, worries and wishes of 
the resettled people  
 
 
The household interview included both closed questions and open-ended questions. A closed 
question is followed by an open-ended question to get respondents to expand on their answer to the 
closed questions. For example, after answering “yes” or “no” to a question about selling cultivation 
land, respondents were asked to answer, “why, or what was the reason for selling land”.       
The first round of fieldwork clearly identified the key issues related to the resettlement sites such as 
land purchasing and leasing, debt, illegal logging, religious conversion, changing jobs since the 
resettlement, participation of the household in government programs and compensation package. 
Based on the findings of the first round of fieldwork, the structured household interview was then 
further refined to collect quantitative and supporting qualitative data at the household level. The 
structured household interview enquired into the household demography, the changes to household 
assets, specific livelihood pathways of households, livelihood outcomes and general perceptions 
about life in the resettlement site which were derived from the sustainable livelihood approach 
(Scoones, 1998). For example, the livelihood strategies including immigration, agricultural 
66 
 
intensification and livelihood diversification adopted from Scoones for the pilot household 
interview were supplemented with questions on several other coping strategies such as land 
purchase, work as labourer, borrowing money, return to the swidden field etc., after the first field 
trip (See Appendix 1 of the structured household interview). 
To estimate the required sample size for the full household survey and interviews it was necessary 
to determine the approximate total population of each of the ethnic groups in the study area. 
Detailed up to date population statistics were not available so it was necessary to interpolate from 
earlier published data. This estimate was based on the figures of the EIA report completed by the 
Electrowatt consulting company in 1993. This provided a number of different resettled ethnic 
households as shown in the first row of Table 3.3. That is, the number of resettled households 
provided in this report was used to develop a sample size for each ethnic group by using the 
software of sample size calculator provided by Creative Research Systems 
(http://www.surveysystem.com/sscalc.htm). With a confidence level of 95% and a confidence 
interval of 8%, the numbers of interviewed households from the ethnic groups required are in the 
second row of this table. In total, interviews with 397 resettled households from the four ethnic 
groups were completed for this study (detailed in the third row of Table 3.3).  
Table 3.3: Estimated current resettled ethnic households and target number of households to 
be interviewed 
 Kinh Jarai Ro Ngao Bahnar 
Number of resettled households 
based on the 1993 survey  
490 404 222 53 
Household sample size (95% 
confidence level; 8% confidence 
interval) 
115 110 90 39 
Total interviewed households 116 126 103 52 
 
The interviews with household members were conducted at their houses. In many interviews, more 
than one member of each family such as husband and wife took part in the interviews. Each 
interview was about one and a half to two hours long. 
3.2.2.3. Participant observation and photographs 
Participant observation is a tool to enable a researcher to take part in daily activities, rituals and 
events of the people under study to learn about their daily routine, cultural and related activities 
(DeWalt and DeWalt, 2011). The additional application of this method to other qualitative methods 
such as in-depth interviews and surveys makes validity of the research stronger and increases 
understanding of the context and phenomena observed (Kawulich, 2005). This method is also useful 
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in terms of creating a relationship with key informants. The researcher joined several activities with 
the key informants such as going to their previous swidden fields, cassava and Litsea harvesting, 
joint fishing, taking part in weddings and funerals, village walk etc. During the participant 
observation activities, the researcher had informal talks with key informants to understand their 
perceptions and the related issues in the resettlement sites and wrote up daily field notes.          
During the two field trips, the researcher took photos which captured the interviews, different land 
uses in the resettlement sites, livelihood resources and the activities of the resettled people. More 
importantly, the photos taken were closely related to the issues discussed in the interviews with the 
participants. The researcher went through each photo, systematically coding attributes of the image 
after the detailed coding of the qualitative data was completed. The coded images could be used 
with other sources of qualitative data to provide evidence and enrich the analysis.     
3.2.2.4. Secondary data collection 
The secondary data such as the EIA report of the Yali Falls Dam, related resettlement policies, the 
government reports on the resettlement issues and other research and project reports were collected 
from the district people’s committees’ offices. The articles from the central and local newspapers 
discussing the resettlement issues over the last decades on the websites were also collected. In 
addition, to provide understanding of the resettlement issues for designing the second round of the 
field trip, these sources of data were also coded together with the primary data to augment the 
primary data in the analysis.   
3.2.3. Phase 4: Data analysis and validation 
3.2.3.1. Qualitative data 
The NVivo qualitative data analysis software (QSR International Pty Ltd. Version 10, 2012), was 
used for managing, coding, querying, visualising and reporting qualitative data. This program is 
purposely designed for application within mixed methods analyses (Bazeley and Jackson, 2013). 
Thus, it could be used to analyse the qualitative data of this study and integrate Statistical Package 
for the Social Science (SPSS) data into NVivo to facilitate the synthesis of mixed methods and 
enrich findings.    
This study employed thematic analysis in order to identify, analyse and report patterns (or themes) 
within the qualitative dataset following six phases (Braun and Clarke, 2006). First, the researcher 
read and re-read through all the data to get a general sense of the information and note down ideas. 
Second, after getting initial lists of ideas, the researcher started producing initial codes which 
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identified features of the data such as impacts of the resettlement, perception of changes in life since 
the resettlement, worries of the resettled people, advantages and disadvantages of the resettlement 
process, land issues, etc. Third, the list of different codes in the previous phase was sorted to form 
candidate themes. For example, the themes are positive and negative impacts of the resettlements 
and sub-themes such as land loss, water shortage, rice shortage, etc. Fourth, the candidate themes 
were reviewed and refined to have a satisfactory thematic map for analysis. Fifth, was the final 
refinement of the thematic map to identify scope and contents of each theme as well as clearly 
identify the story and aspects of the theme in relation to the research questions. The final phase was 
conducting thematic analysis and writing up, which should provide story from the data with 
sufficient evidence of themes and argument to answer the research questions. All these phases were 
conducted in the NVivo program (See Appendix 2 – Sources, Codes and Nodes in NVivo).         
3.2.3.2. Quantitative data 
Statistical Package for the Social Science (SPSS version 16) provides a wide range of applications 
such as data storage and management, statistical analysis, seeing patterns and interpretation of 
quantitative data in different forms (Bryman and Cramer, 2001). Details of the use of this program 
in this study are presented below. 
The interview data of 397 households were entered and stored in the spreadsheets of the program. 
For example, the numeric data regarding household capitals (amount of cash compensation, areas of 
different types of land holding, land quality measured on a five point scale, number of cattle, access 
to forest use and fishing, physical assets, saving and debt, remittance), livelihood pathways (number 
of households applying livelihood pathways and their main sources of incomes), livelihood 
outcomes (number of months with rice sufficiency, nutrition status, household income, household 
expenditure, agricultural outputs) which were collected from the structured household interviews, 
were entered into the program.   
Impacts of resettlement on the resettled people’s livelihoods were measured by examining the 
changes in household livelihood assets and outcomes. A paired sample T-test was applied to 
investigate whether differences of the impacts on the households with different demographic 
characteristics were statistically significant (Doutriaux et al., 2008, Galipeau et al., 2013). 
The trends of livelihood pathways of the four resettled ethnic groups were also defined by 
measuring the number of households applying specific livelihood pathways in response to the 
resettlement. In addition, changes in sources of income after the resettlement were also found 
through this analysis.   
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There are a number of independent variables defining impacts of the resettlement project on the 
household livelihoods, their livelihood strategies and outcomes. These variables are: distance to the 
old site, education level of the household head, household with member working for local authority, 
farm size, ethnicity, religion, age of household head, institution etc... Pearson correlation and 
regression analyses were conducted to find out the independent variables defining the dependent 
variables in terms of impacts and outcomes (Doutriaux et al., 2008, Bui et al., 2013).  
3.2.3.3. Validating data 
The use of mixed methods in this study aimed to converge and validate collected data in order to 
best address the research questions (Creswell and Clark, 2007). The quantitative dataset derived 
from the structured household interviews and the qualitative dataset derived from the in-depth 
interviews address the same questions. Therefore, it is possible to converge and validate them. 
Moreover, the qualitative dataset including the in-depth interview information and other sources 
such as related articles, pictures, documents could provide context and insights into the issues which 
the single dataset of quantitative would not make possible.              
The main strategy of validating quantitative and qualitative data in this study was the use ofa matrix 
in comparing the results from the two datasets in NVivo (McEntarffer, 2003). For example, the 
column includes different worries of the resettled people in the resettlement sites from the 
quantitative dataset, while the row includes quotes or number of times the participants mentioned 
the worries from the qualitative data. In addition, qualitative data were used to interpret the 
quantitative data more accurately and get insights into the issues. For instance, the quantitative data 
could show the numeric changes in the household assets such as land loss without understanding the 
process of losing land due to the reservoir or due to the land purchase and leasing since the 
resettlement. In this case, the qualitative data from the in-depth interviews and participants’ stories 
provided insights to the issues.  
3.2.4. Phase 5: Research synthesis and framework development 
The results of this research in Chapters IV and V are based on the case study of the Yali Falls Dam. 
The results in Chapter VI combine Yali Falls Dam data with other case study data in Vietnam. They 
are examined through different existing frameworks in DIDR including the four stage framework 
(Scudder and Colson, 1982), the risk and reconstruction framework (Cernea, 1997), the routine and 
dissonant culture framework (Downing and Garcia-Downing, 2009), and the sustainable livelihoods 
framework (Scoones, 1998) in order to find the strengths and weaknesses of the frameworks, 
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recommend policy implications for improvement, and propose a new/adapted framework for 
understanding, monitoring and enhancing the livelihood resilience of the resettled people.  
3.3. Ethical review and approval 
The structured household interviews and the checklist for in-depth interviews received ethical 
approval from the University of Queensland Ethics Committee. Verbal consents were obtained prior 
to any interviews. Personal information of the participants in the interviews and data are stored in 
de-identified form with password protection. Their names in the database were given special codes 
which only the researcher knows. In addition, their names are not recorded in any questionnaires or 
reported in the thesis or related publications.  
The related research documents have been stored at the University of Queensland and will be 
destroyed after a suitable date. The information in any form will not be given to any third party. The 
researcher guarantees that all the information related to participants in the interviews is 
confidentially protected. The ethical approval number for this project is GPEM number 20130058 
(see Appendix 3—for the ethical approval letter for this research). 
3.4. Conclusions 
This chapter has presented the entire process of research development and the justification for 
selecting the research paradigm, case study approach and descriptions of study site background and 
data collection methods. Due to the nature of the research and research questions, an embedded case 
study approach and mixed method were chosen. The data collection methods used in this study 
include the in-depth interview of 19 key informants from the local government and resettled people 
from the four ethnicities, the structured household surveys of 397 resettled households and 
participant observations together with photos taken. It also described the data analysis to answer the 
research questions. Both thematic analysis of the qualitative dataset and statistical analysis of the 
quantitative dataset were employed and compared to validate the collected data. The following 
chapters present research findings to answer each research question.   
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CHAPTER IV. 
IMPACTS OF THE YALI FALLS RESETTLEMENT PROJECT ON ETHNIC GROUPS 
LIVELIHOOD RESOURCES IN THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF VIETNAM 
 
4.1. Chapter introduction 
This chapter addresses the first research question of the thesis of how the Yali Falls resettlement 
project has affected the resettled ethnic groups’ livelihood resources. In order to understand the 
impacts of the resettlement project, this study measures the long-term changes in livelihood capitals 
and livelihood outcomes by employing the modified sustainable livelihood approach (Scoones, 
1998) which was justified in detail in Chapter III.  
The data and information for this chapter are primarily based on the quantitative data derived from 
the 397 household surveys with the four ethnic groups in the Yali Falls Dam’s resettlement site. 
Data on affected households’ livelihood assets pre- and post-resettlement was collected. Household 
livelihood outcomes and perceptions of the resettled people about life before and after the 
resettlement were also collected. 
The chapter details the impacts of the resettlement project on livelihood resources including natural, 
human, social, physical, financial, and psychological capitals. The overall changes of livelihood 
resources were examined and qualitatively assessed, using radar charts to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of impacts of the resettlement project. This chapter also shows the impacts in terms 
of livelihood outcomes and overall wellbeing. The Yali Falls case is discussed in the context of 
similar research from Vietnam, and provides a summary of the key findings.  
4.2. Impacts of the resettlement project on livelihood resources 
This section discusses the impacts of the resettlement projects on the resettled ethnic groups through 
measuring the changes of each type of household livelihood capital between pre and post-
resettlement.   
4.2.1. Natural capital 
Land holding and land quality 
The ethnic minority groups of Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao often experienced greater losses of land 
because their farming and cultivation areas were originally located in the valley floors near the main 
river and its tributaries. The household interview results (Table 4.1) show that all the ethnic 
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minority groups lost a significant area of wet rice, upland rice and maize after the resettlement. For 
instance, the average area of wet rice of each household from the Bahnar and Jarai groups dropped 
from 2,038 m2 and 5,312 m2 to 138 m2 and 736 m2, respectively. Similarly, they previously grew 
rainfed upland rice before resettlement and each household had access to more than 1ha. However, 
according to the compensation policy, they received only six months of rice supply without any 
cash compensation for wet rice and upland rice land loss. Instead, the resettlement project reclaimed 
wet-rice and secondary crops fields in the resettlement sites to allocate to them. But it was 
unsuccessful due to limited land resources in the resettlement site. In addition, inappropriate design 
was evident by the selected land being in flood prone areas or in the area under ownership of the 
other villages.  
As many of the Kinh people often cultivated cash crops such as sugarcane and raised fish in ponds, 
they tended to receive significantly more cash compensation. Table 4.1 demonstrates that on 
average, each Kinh household used to have 3,967 m2 of sugarcane which was flooded and they got 
cash compensation for crop loss. The survey result shows that the amount of cash compensation 
received by the Kinh households was significantly higher than that of the ethnic minority’s 
households. On average, the amount compensation received by the Kinh was 25 million VND while 
compensation was less than 10 million for the ethnic minority groups. 
There was a significant difference of total land holding between the Kinh and the ethnic minority 
groups after the resettlement. The Kinh doubled their cultivation land on average while the Jarai and 
Bahnar people had a decrease in cultivation land (Table 4.1). The reasons are twofold. First, as 
mentioned above, land loss was not compensated for and only cash crop loss and flooded fishponds 
and crops such as sugarcane received cash compensation. Thus, the Kinh people received large 
amounts of compensation for losing their sugarcane and fishponds were able to buy land after the 
resettlement. Second, food insecurity and financial stress after the resettlement such as the need for 
cash to buy rice, have forced the ethnic minority into selling and leasing their land to the Kinh who 
have used the land for cash crops (See Section 5.2.2). Thus, overall, the Kinh people now own large 
areas of rubber and cassava than the other ethnic groups.           
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Table 4.1: The average area of land for each ethic group, in m2 per household, dedicated to a 
range of productive agriculture purposes both before and after resettlement (n=396). 
Ethnicity  
Wet rice 
(m2) 
Upland rice 
(m2) 
Sugarcane 
(m2) 
Maize 
(m2) 
Cassava 
(m2) 
Rubber 
(m2) 
Total 
(m2) 
Kinh 
(n=116) 
Before 3,452 1,272 3,967 1,328 1,698 0 11,716 
After 1,780 0 0 217 11,510 10,304 23,811 
Bahnar 
(n=52) 
Before 2,038 5,904 442 558 1,125 0 10,067 
After 138 0 0 423 5,009 3,663 9,285 
Jarai 
(n=125) 
Before 5,312 12,784 288 868 366 0 22,618 
After 736 0 0 0 9,632 3,120 13,560 
Ro Ngao 
(n=103) 
Before 827 13,897 715 0 0 0 15,616 
After 726 0 0 140 4,145 2,237 7,248 
 
On the other hand, the resettlers considered that their old cultivation land was much more fertile 
than the current cultivation land since they were used to cultivating productive alluvial lands near 
the river or more fertile swidden fields. Cultivation was now primarily undertaken on sloping land 
with poor soil. The majority of resettlers (86%) rated their current land as being worse compared to 
their land before the resettlement (Figure 4.1). Only 5% of households indicated that their land was 
‘better now’. The remaining 9% of the interviewed households responded that the quality of land 
was the same as before.  
 
Figure 4.1: Household perceptions of land quality after resettlement (n=394). 
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Access to the river resources 
The number of households harvesting fish has also declined. Many of the ethnic minority 
households carried out fishing for their own subsistence before the resettlement. Figure 4.2 
indicates that the percentage of interviewed households from the Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao groups 
who were harvesting fish before the resettlement was 54%, 72%, and 67%, respectively. According 
to respondents, living far from the river and the inundation of streams has discouraged fishing in the 
relocated settlements. In addition, they cannot afford to buy timber to make log canoes or buy 
engines for boats. Previously, about 60 to 80 percent of households (Table 4.6) owned their own log 
canoes because they could get timber from the adjacent forest to make them. Nevertheless, the 
number of Kinh households that are fishing had increased slightly after the resettlement from 13% 
to 17%. The main reason is that they can invest in the equipment necessary to undertake 
commercial fishing in the reservoir.  
 
Figure 4.2: Number of households fishing before and after the resettlement 
Access to forest resources 
Due to the dam construction and living far away from the forest, the ethnic minority groups have 
limited access to its resources. Forest resources are an important part of local livelihoods. Here, they 
could practise rainfed swidden farming, cattle grazing, collection of forest products such as wild 
vegetables, bambooshoots for food, and hunting wild animals. In addition to these subsistence 
activities, they previously collected honey, rattan and medicinal plants to sell for cash. The survey 
results in Figure 4.3 indicate that more than 80% of the interviewed households of the Bahnar and 
Jarai groups used to collect forest products before the resettlement. But afterwards, only 10-30% of 
them collect collect forest products. 
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Figure 4.3: Change in access to forest resources after the resettlement 
Access to fresh drinking water 
Before the resettlement, the ethnic minority people often lived near the river and springs where they 
could collect fresh water for household use. But after the resettlement they were living far away 
from the river and many springs were submerged and therefore not available. As part of the 
resettlement process, each group of four to six households had one well constructed for them. 
However, because the ethnic groups were living at higher altitudes, these wells were failing to 
provide adequate water during the dry season because of the seasonal lowering of the water tables. 
As shown in Figure 4.4, more than 70% of the ethnic minority households mentioned a decrease in 
water availability after the resettlement.  
 
Figure 4.4: Situation of drinking water in the resettlement sites compared to the old villages 
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The clear conclusion is that the natural capital of the ethnic minority group had been significantly 
reduced while overall the Kinh households had tended to increase their natural capital after the 
resettlement.  
4.2.2. Human capital 
Human capital is defined as the skills, knowledge, ability to labour and good health and physical 
capability which are important for the successful pursuit of different livelihood strategies (Beeton 
and Lynch, 2012, Scoones, 1998). This study examined the human capital of the households in 
terms of their education levels and their own skills.   
Table 4.2 below shows the formal education level of the household heads. Considerable numbers of 
the household heads of the ethnic minority groups of Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao had no formal 
education (60.9%, 61.3% and 42.3%, respectively). While the rate of Kinh household heads not 
going to school was low (8.6%), almost a quarter of all Kinh household heads (23.3%) completed 
high school, in comparison to Bahnar (1.9%), Jarai (2.4%) and Ro Ngao (3.9%) household heads. A 
similar result was found for secondary school completion with the highest proportion of Kinh 
household heads (29.3%) and lowest proportion of Jarai (11.3%). 
Table 4.2: Formal education attainment of the resettled groups (n=390) 
 
 No formal 
education 
Primary Secondary High 
school 
Vocational 
school 
University Total  
Kinh Count 10 43 34 27 0 2 116  
 % 8.6% 37.1% 29.3% 23.3% 0% 1.7% 100%  
Bahnar Count 28 11 6 1 0 0 46  
 % 60.9% 30.9% 13.0% 2.2% 0% 0% 100%  
Jarai Count 76 30 14 3 1 0 124  
 % 61.3% 24.2% 11.3% 2.4% 0.8% 0% 100%  
Ro Ngao Count 44 32 23 4 1 0 104   
 % 42.3% 30.8% 22.1% 3.8% 1.0% 0% 100%  
 
The resettlers were also asked whether their children were attending school. All Kinh household 
reported their children going to school. However, about one fifth of the responding households of 
Bahnar (23.1%), Jarai (23.2%) and Ro Ngao (18.4%) did not go to school or had dropped school 
(Table 4.3). The main reasons for withdrawing children from school were that they were not able to 
cover the costs of school fees and that their children had to work with parents to make a living. In 
addition, many Jarai and Ro Ngao resettlers reported that their children had to go with them to their 
cassava fields far from home or in some cases having to leave them completely unsupervised at 
home and therefore not able to attend school. 
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Table 4.3: Percentage of children who did not go to school by ethnicity 
Ethnicity 
Do your children go to school? 
Yes No Children are not at school age 
Kinh  (n=116) 100%   0% 0% 
Bahnar (n=52) 75% 23.1% 1.9% 
Jarai (n=125) 74.4% 23.2% 2.4% 
Ro Ngao (n=103) 79.6% 18.4% 1.9% 
 
Compared to the results of the survey in the EIA report (Electrowatt, 1992), the Kinh group had 
shown improvement after the resettlement. For example, about 32% of the surveyed household 
heads received some degree of primary education, 30% of this group received junior education and 
31% experienced secondary education in the pre-resettlement. But the rate of attainment of primary 
education, secondary education and university was higher in the post-resettlement as shown in 
Table 4.2. Nevertheless, the ethnic minority groups had not shown improvement after pre-
resettlement. For instance, the rate of household heads of Jarai not having any formal education was 
42% before the resettlement and 61.3% in the current survey. It was 36% for the Bahnar household 
heads before the resettlement and increased to 60.9% after the resettlement.   
Many household heads had few specialised labour or livelihood skills. The results in Table 4.4 
indicate that most of Bahnar households (89.1%), Jarai (79%) and Ro Ngao households (85.6%) did 
not have any skills. There were 62.9% of the total Kinh households which did not have any skills. 
Out of the total responding households’ skills, Kinh ethnic groups had skills related to rubber 
plantation and harvesting which were much higher (32.8%), in comparison to Bahnar (10.9%), Jarai 
(8.1%) and Ro Ngao (8.7%). 
Table 4.4: Skills of the resettled ethnic groups (n=396) 
 
No 
skill 
Rubber 
plantation, 
harvesting 
Litsea 
plantation, 
harvesting 
Cultivation 
techniques 
Livestock 
breeding 
Integrated 
pest 
management 
Handy 
craft 
Total 
Kinh 73 38 2 2 1 0 0 116 
 62.9% 32.8% 1.7% 20.0% 0.9%% 1.7% 0% 100% 
Bahnar 41 5 4 0 0 0 0 46 
 89.1% 8.1% 0.0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 
Jarai 98 10 4 3 1 0 1 124 
 79.0% 8.1% 3.2% 2.4% 0.8% 0% 0.8% 100% 
Ro Ngao 89 9 1 2 3 0 0 104 
 85.6% 8.7% 1% 1.9% 2.9% 0% 0% 100% 
 
In sum, the members of Kinh households showed their higher level of education attainment and 
production skills compared to the ethnic minority groups. In addition, after the resettlement the 
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Kinh had improved their education situation while the ethnic minority people had got worse and 
many children from the ethnic minority households had dropped school.  
4.2.3. Social capital 
Social capital refers to the social resources (networks, social claims, social relations, affiliations, 
associations) upon which people draw when pursuing different livelihood strategies requiring 
coordinated actions (Scoones, 1998, Compton and Beeton, 2012). This study assessed the social 
capital of the resettlers by using indicators including taking part in social organisations, mutual help 
practice, and religious memberships.  
First, the level of participation in the social organisation of the Kinh people was higher in 
comparison to the other groups. Before the resettlement, there was no social organisation in the old 
villages. It was not until moving to resettlement sites that the social organisations such as farmers’ 
unions, women’s unions, veteran unions, youth unions were established. According to the survey in 
Table 4.5., there was a higher rate of Kinh households being members of the social organisations 
compared to the ethnic minority households. More than one-third of Kinh households were 
members of the farmers’ union and women’s union (39.7% and 33.6%, respectively). Nevertheless, 
a small number of the responding households of Bahnar (3.8%) and Ro Ngao (5.8%) were members 
of the farmers’ union. The proportion of Bahnar households taking part in the women’s union 
(23.1%) was relatively higher compared to Jarai (10.4%) and Ro Ngao (13.6%). Some informants 
explained the lower rate of the ethnic groups in the social organisations that they spent most of time 
in the fields or worked as hired labour far from home. In addition, many of them just come back 
home during weekends for services in the churches.  
Table 4.5: Memberships of the social organisations 
Ethnicity 
Farmers’ union Women’sunion 
Yes No Yes No 
Kinh 
(n=116) 
46 
(39.7%) 
70  
(60.3%) 
39  
(33.6%) 
77  
(66.4%) 
Bahnar 
(n=52) 
2  
(3.8%) 
50  
(96.2%) 
12  
(23.1%) 
40  
(76.9%) 
Jarai 
(n=125) 
13  
(10.4%) 
 
112 
(89.6) 
13  
(10.4%) 
112  
(89.6%) 
Ro Ngao 
(n=103) 
6  
(5.8%) 
97  
(94.2%) 
14  
(13.6%) 
 
89  
(86.4%) 
 
Second, practising mutual help such as shared labour in agricultural production and shared livestock 
raising with relatives and neighbours were very popular before the resettlement, especially for 
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subsistence farmers. They used to help each other in growing and harvesting crops and a group of 
households could share labourers to take care of cattle. However, the results showed that 23% of all 
surveyed households indicated that there was less mutual help compared to before the resettlement. 
Many of them stated that cassava fields were now located too far from home and they had to cross 
the river for farming which was creating difficulties in arranging mutual help. Moreover, many 
resettled people had to work as hired labourers to earn money instead of doing mutual help for each 
other this had further diminished social capital.     
Third, there was a difference in religious memberships within the resettled ethnic groups. The 
survey result shows that the majority of Kinh households were non-religious (93%). In contrast, all 
of Bahnar (100%) and most of Ro Ngao (98.1%) households were Catholic as discussed in Section 
3.2.1.4. Almost 60% of Jarai households had converted to be one of three religious groups after 
moving to the resettlement sites. The ratios of conversions were Catholic (34.4%), Protestant 
(16.4%), and Buddhist (6.6%). 
Overall, the Kinh group had shown increases in social capital compared to the ethnic minority 
groups. These changes were in terms of being involved in the social organisation (bonding social 
capital) and increase their bridging capital by building external contacts. However, the ethnic 
minority groups had not been active in participating in the social organisations and external contact 
consequently they experienced a decline in their social capital with the consequence of less mutual 
help. The Bahnar and Ro Ngao groups had been maintaining but not increasing their social capitals 
by religious membership. The Jarai conversions to religions could be a response to their loss of 
bonding and bridging social capital. This will be discussed further in Chapter V. 
4.2.4. Physical capital 
Physical capital comprises the human infrastructures and production equipment and tools which are 
essential for pursuing livelihood strategies (DFID, 2001, Beeton and Lynch, 2012).   
The resettlement project had made positive impacts on the infrastructures of the resettled 
communes. Based on the resettled household’s responses in Figure 4.5, infrastructure including 
roads, markets, clinics, schools and electricity were much better in the resettlement sites. Resettlers 
were very satisfied with the improved accesses to electricity and health care since there was no 
access to the services in the past. All the interviewed households ranked access to electricity as 
either an increase or a great increase. Similarly, more than 70% of the respondents positively rated 
the improvement in market and road infrastructure. However, the resettled households were not 
satisfied with the irrigation system. 74% of the interviewed households expressed the belief that 
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there had been no change in the irrigation. In fact, all the irrigation systems for reclaimed wet rice 
fields built by the resettlement project had been ineffective.  
 
Figure 4.5: Access to infrastructure after the resettlement (n=392) 
 
The resettled people were also asked about the situation of housing after the move. Large numbers 
of the resettled households from the four ethnic groups (about 70%) responded that their housing 
was better (Table 4.6). Many resettled households said that they had invested large amounts of 
money to expand and repair the houses received as compensation after some years living the 
resettlement sites. However, a considerable number of interviewed households from the three ethnic 
groups rated their housing situation as getting worse or much worse (from 17 to 24%).   
Table 4.6: The resettled rated their situation of housing compared to before the resettlement 
 Worse & much worse No change Better & much better 
Kinh (n=115) 5% 22% 73% 
    
Bahnar (n=52) 17% 12% 71% 
    
Jarai (n=123) 20% 2% 78% 
    
Ro Ngao (n=100) 24% 5% 71% 
    
 
The resettled households reported an improvement in communication. The results in Table 4.7 
indicate the considerable increase in household goods for all the ethnic groups. The resettled 
households did not own any mobile phone before the move. But after the move, more than 90% of 
the surveyed households of the Kinh group and more than 60% of the surveyed households from the 
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ethnic minority groups had their own mobile phone. After the resettlement, more than 80% of the 
ethnic minority in all the ethnic groups owned a motorbike or TV. It was reported that most of the 
compensation in cash was used to buy motorbikes and TVs. A higher percentage of the Kinh 
resettled households have their own motorbike, TV and mobile phone (more than 92%) and also 
luxury goods such as a fridge (70%).  
Table 4.7 also shows the situation of production equipment of the surveyed households. More of the 
interviewed Kinh households had tractors, water pumps, or boats. Moreover, ten percent of the 
surveyed households from the Kinh group had freezers for keeping foods and beverages in their 
convenience stores. In contrast, there had been a significant decrease in the number of households 
owning boats in the ethnic minority groups. For example, the rate of Jarai households owning boats 
dropped from 81% to 12%.     
In brief, the resettled households experienced improvement in the basic infrastructures such as 
access to market, road, clinic, electricity, and housing. Most of the households had motorbikes, 
TVs, and mobiles. But the production equipment for subsistence fishing had declined remarkably 
for the ethnic minority groups. The Kinh households had increased their production equipment.    
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Table 4.7: Percentage of the households surveyed from four ethnic groups who owned 
household goods and production equipment before and after the resettlement 
  Kinh (n=115) Bahnar (n=52) Jarai (n=125) Ro Ngao (n=102) 
Household goods      
Motorbike 
Before 17% 2% 1% 1% 
After 97% 88% 83% 83% 
TV 
Before 19% 6% 0% 0% 
After 92% 83% 82% 81% 
Radio cassette 
player 
Before 10% 0% 2% 0% 
After 35% 12% 6% 15% 
Mobile phone 
Before 0% 0% 0% 0% 
After 92% 65% 62% 68% 
Fridge 
Before 3% 0% 0% 0% 
After 70% 4% 7% 3% 
Production equipment 
Water pump Before 7% 0% 0% 0% 
After 93% 56% 56% 88% 
Ox-cart Before 3% 12% 8% 7% 
 After 1% 10% 0% 3% 
Tractor Before 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 After 10% 4% 1% 3% 
Boats Before 9% 69% 81% 66% 
 After 21% 23% 12% 8% 
Freezer Before 0% 0% 0% 0% 
 After 10% 0% 2% 0% 
 
 
4.2.5. Financial capital 
Financial capital is the most recognised form of capital such as cash, credit/debt, savings which 
people use to achieve their livelihood objectives (DFID, 2001, Beeton, 2006). In this study, the 
resettled households’ financial capacity was measured by their savings and debts before and after 
the resettlement and the cash compensation amount received. In addition, cattle kept was an 
important valuable financial asset for the rural households in the Central Highlands of Vietnam 
(Cramb et al., 2004). Therefore, the resettled households were also asked about the cattle they 
owned.  
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Cattle and livestock 
The resettlers in the study site reported that they faced difficulty in searching for grazing land in the 
resettlement sites. Before the resettlement, the ethnic minority practised free range pig raising 
around their villages and raised their cattle in the common grazing land near the river and streams. 
However, the grazing land was inundated and their farm land was now on the high and sloping hills. 
Furthermore, the ethnic minority people had not got used to caged raising as the Kinh had after the 
resettlement. As shown in Table 4.8, the average number of cattle raised by the ethnic minority 
households fell dramatically from about 4.69 animals per household to less than one animal per 
household. The average number of cattle raised by Kinh increased slightly from 1.23 to 1.43 cattle 
per household.  
Table 4.8: The mean number of cattle kept by the resettled ethnic groups 
Ethnicity Mean number of Cattle kept 
 Before After 
Kinh  (n=115) 1.23   1.43 
Bahnar (n=52) 3.33 0.83 
Jarai (n=125) 4.69 0.58 
Ro Ngao (n=103) 3.09 1.32 
 
Financial circumstances (debt and savings) 
Before the resettlement, none of the resettled households had any debt and some Jarai families 
(2.4%) reported that they had savings. In general, most households were primarily subsistence 
before resettlement. The financial situation had changed significantly after the resettlement (Table 
4.9). A large proportion of households in the ethnic minorities were in-debt (Bahnar (27%), Jarai 
(62%) and half of the Ro Ngao. They had to borrow money from the Kinh “convenience stores4” 
with a high interest rate of 50% per year to cover their family costs including buying rice, foods, 
hospital fees and the production costs such as fertilisers, pesticide and gasoline. However, only 7% 
of the Kinh households were in debt.   
The financial situation of the Kinh households after the resettlement was improved. About one third 
of the Kinh (28.7%) resettled households had savings. But only a small number of the resettled 
households of Jarai and Ro Ngao (less than 6%) had savings. No Bahnar household had savings.         
                                               
4 Market access is often limited in the Central Highlands in particular and in the Mountainous Region of Vietnam in general compared to the lowlands and 
cities. Therefore, the Kinh migrants with advanced access to transport, market, information, and finance often set up and run their stores in every village 
and commune to sell necessary goods such as salt, fish sauce, monosodium glutamate, groceries, cigarette, beer, alcohol, meat, rice, fertilisers, pesticides 
and even to lend money with high interest rates.  
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Table 4.9: Financial capacity of the resettled households 
Ethnicity 
Before After 
Debt Saving Debt  Saving 
Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Kinh  (n=116) 0% 100% 0% 100% 7% 93% 28.7%  71.3%  
Bahnar (n=52) 0% 100% 0% 100% 27% 73% 0% 100% 
Jarai (n=125) 0% 100% 2.4% 97.6% 62% 38% 5.6% 94.4% 
Ro Ngao (n=103) 0% 100% 0% 100% 50% 50% 5.9% 94.1% 
Amount of cash compensation 
The resettled ethnic groups received housing, compensation for the loss of perennial crops such as 
sugar-cane and loss of fishponds. In addition, for the loss of wet-rice fields, they would receive six-
month supply of rice and the project would reclaim irrigated fields for wet-rice and secondary crops 
cultivation. The loss of common property such as swidden fields, access to forest and river, and 
grazing land was not compensated.  
Based on the compensation policy, the Kinh, losing their main crop of sugar-cane and fishpond, 
received large amounts of cash compensation. The result indicates that the amount of cash 
compensation received by the Kinh households was significantly higher than the ethnic minority’s 
households (Average amount of Kinh was 25 million VND while it was less than 10 million for the 
ethnic minority groups). 
The reclamation of wet-rice and secondary crops fields had not been successful due to inappropriate 
design and being in the flooded area or in the area under ownership of other villages. Therefore, it 
has had a serious impact on the ethnic minority people who lost their swidden fields and common 
property and faced difficulties in converting their subsistence farming into intensive agriculture 
with limited land resources. 
In general, the ethnic minority people faced a financial and confidence crisis after the resettlement 
because of changing lifestyles from subsistence farming into commercial intensified farming given 
their loss of access to wet rice and upland rice as well as reductions in cattle numbers and their 
financial accounts. However, the Kinh attained higher financial capacity after the resettlement in 
terms of the number of households having savings.  
4.2.6. Psychological capital 
Financial and physical capital refers to what you have, human capital implies what you know and 
social capital means who you know. Positive psychological capital (Who you are and your self-
belief) can overlap with human and social capital but it is important to make the traditional capitals 
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recognised to drive success of individuals and groups (Luthans et al., 2004, Beeton and Lynch, 
2012). This study examined the four main capacities including confidence, hope, optimism and 
resilience through the historical context, perception of the resettled people about changes in their 
life after the resettlement and the coping strategies in the resettlement situations. 
The contextual background shows that the ethnic minority groups (Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao) in 
the Central Highlands of Vietnam have been victims in different historical periods. They were 
under the influence of and exploited by French colonists. They were forced to become involved in 
the army under the South Vietnam Government against the North Vietnam Government of the 
communist party. They have been approached by different religious missionaries and strategies. The 
Kinh group with their higher education level and familiarity with wet rice and pond culture which 
were familiar to the Kinh-dominated government after the country reunified have increased their 
capitals as mentioned in the previous sections. In addition, many programs and policies have 
attempted to nationalise all the land and forest and changed the swidden lifestyles of the ethnic 
minority people which are considered as “old fashion” by the Kinh. Thus, it has forced these 
changes for the psychological capital of the Kinh to go up while the ethnic minority go down and 
see themselves as losers in the development process. 
The perception gained from asking about the remarkable changes since the resettlement proved the 
dominant negative perceptions from the ethnic minorities people. They complained about the land 
and water shortage issues, they worried about the daily meals and debt (Figure 4.10) and they 
complained that they had not had education levels and cultivation skills like the Kinh to develop 
their economy. A large percentage of the ethnic minority people assessed their life as worse than 
before (Figure 4.9). The limited human capital, decline in natural capitals and the fact that they 
were a facing financial crisis had driven by a decline in psychological capitals of the ethnic minority 
people.          
In general, the psychological capital of the ethnic minority groups had been gradually decreased 
while it had been increased for the Kinh group. It would have implications for differentiated coping 
strategies and outcomes which will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V.   
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4.2.7. Overall changes to livelihood capitals 
The data reviewed so far in this chapter have revealed individual changes in different capital 
parameters of the resettled households. The remainder of the chapter will integrate these findings 
and discuss the overall implications of the shifting capital stocks of resettled groups. 
To visualise and summarise the key changes in capital, a series of radar charts have been developed 
using a semi-qualitative assessment of the factors contributing to each form of capital. The radar 
chart (Figure 4.6) uses a five-point rating scale to demonstrate access to livelihood capitals of the 
ethnic household groups in pre and post resettlement. These different points demonstrate access and 
capital owning level of each ethnic group in the pre and post resettlement times. The five-point 
scales are as follows: 5–the highest access or full capital owned; 4–high access or high level of 
capital; 2–low access or low level of capital owned; 1–the lowest access or having limited capital 
owned; 0–no access to capital or not having capital. 
Kinh (n=116)      Bahnar (n=52) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Jarai (n=126)      Ro Ngao (n=103) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6: The changes in five household livelihood capitals in pre-resettlement (dotted line) 
and after resettlement (solid line) in five point scale (0: no access to capitals and 5: the highest 
access to capitals) 
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With regard to the natural capital before the resettlement, the ethnic minority groups of Bahnar, 
Jarai and Ro Ngao enjoyed full access to forest land, grazing land, stream and the river and an 
average area of 1.0 to 2.5 ha of swidden cultivation land and wet rice so these groups were marked 
as five in the dotted line in Figure 4.6. The Kinh group owned wet rice and sugarcane cultivation 
land with an average area of 1.1 ha which got two in the dotted line. After the resettlement, the Kinh 
increased their natural capital as they had double the area of cultivation land of rubber and cassava 
while the ethnic minority suffered significant losses in natural capital with a remarkable decrease in 
cultivation land as well as in their access to forest land, grazing land and streams and river. Thus, as 
shown in the solid line, the Kinh group got a relative increase in their natural capital and the ethnic 
minority people got a remarkable decrease in their natural capital after the resettlement. 
In terms of human capital, as discussed above, there was no improvement in education level of the 
resettled ethnic minority groups of Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao. However, the Kinh progressed and 
achieved a higher level of education and production skills. Thus, no change in this aspect was 
demonstrated in Figure 4.6 for the ethnic minority groups while education significantly increased 
for the Kinh group.   
With regard to physical capital, there was an improvement perceived by all the resettled ethnic 
groups. However, the Kinh group was higher since they were moved to live closer to the road and 
market than the remaining groups. The Jarai groups, however, were disadvantaged in terms of 
access to physical capital as they were located to remote areas, and therefore had limited access to 
the road, market and town. The Bahnar and Ro Ngao groups had better access to physical capital 
due to living near the road but lower access compared to the Kinh. As demonstrated in Figure 4.6, 
all resettled ethnic groups experienced an increase in access to capital but it was highest for the 
Kinh group. Therefore, the Kinh got the highest improvement with regard to physical capital since 
the resettlement while the improvement was lower for the Bahnar and Ro Ngao. The lowest 
improvement was for the Jarai group.    
With regard to financial capital, the Kinh group developed their financial capacity remarkably, with 
higher cash compensation, more savings, maintaining the cattle kept and smaller households, 
whereas before the resettlement, they had been in debt with high interest rates. Therefore, they 
achieved the highest level of improvement in financial capital compared to the pre-resettlement 
conditions. The ethnic minority groups lost their financial capacity with a large proportion of the 
ethnic minority people being in debt and owning a limited number of cattle as their savings account 
after the move. The highest rate of households in debt after the move was the Jarai followed by the 
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Ro Ngao and the Bahnar. Only a small number of Jarai and Ro Ngao households had savings. Thus, 
the Jarai got the smallest increase after the resettlement and the Ro Ngao and the Bahnar groups had 
slightly a higher improvement after the resettlement compared to the Jarai group.    
Regarding the social capital, the ethnic minority groups of Bahnar and Ro Ngao had been 
maintaining their religious membership since joining. Small numbers of household heads of these 
groups had formed social organisations although there was less practice of mutual help. Thus, it was 
presented as a minor decrease in social capital in the radar chart. The Jarai group lost their 
traditional mutual help and had lower participation in the social organisations and started joining 
religions. Thus, their level of social capital was relatively decreased after the resettlement. 
However, the Kinh showed an increase in social capital as they were more active in social 
organisations. This is shown by the significant increase in the solid line.  
In general, the results found that the Kinh group had increased overall capitals after the 
resettlement. But the ethnic minority groups had faced a significant reduction of their natural and 
social capitals. The ethnic minority groups experienced a minor increase in financial capital.  Figure 
4.6 above describes the overall picture of household capitals as livelihood resilience of the resettled 
ethnic groups.  
4.3. Impacts of the resettlement project on the resettled ethnic groups’ livelihood outcomes 
Impacts of the resettlement project on different capitals were examined and discussed in Section 
4.2. The changes in livelihood capitals and different livelihood strategies applications have 
produced the outcomes which are outlined in the Sustainable livelihoods framework (Scoones, 
1998). Thus, this section examines livelihood outcomes of the resettled ethnic groups in term of 
food insecurity, poverty (as per capita income and debt), and wellbeing which are considered as the 
outcomes of the resettlement project.  
Food security 
The losses of wet rice and upland rice and the shift into mono-cassava cultivation mentioned above 
have significantly affected food security of the ethnic minority groups of Bahnar, Jarai and Ro 
Ngao. The interviewed households were asked about the number of months in a year with sufficient 
rice for consumption. Figure 4.7 shows that the proportion of all four resettled groups having 10-12 
months of rice consumption before the resettlement was quite high (from 70% to 80%). However, a 
substantial proportion of the ethnic minority households faced a rice shortage after the resettlement. 
It was only 20%, 30% and 10% of the interviewed households from the Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao 
groups, respectively, who had enough rice for their consumption for 10 to 12 months.  
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On the other hand, the results in this figure show that more than 75% of the Kinh households had 
sufficient rice for 10 to 12 months. As shown in Table 4.1, they still owned an area of wet rice and 
had an increase in their cassava and rubber cultivation land. Thus, they could earn money to buy 
rice for their families.  
 
 
Figure 4.7: Percentage of the interviewed households having sufficient rice consumption 
before and after the resettlement 
Poverty: Per capita income and debt 
Most of the ethnic minority people with their subsistence farming styles were able to ensure their 
food security before the resettlement. After the resettlement they slipped into poverty. Table 4.10 
shows that the income per person of most of the ethnic minority groups of Bahnar (63%), Jarai 
(38%) and Ro Ngao (64%) was under the national poverty line. On the contrary, the Kinh group had 
a much higher standard of living, with 94% of households above the poverty line.  
Table 4.10: The average per capita income of the ethnic people (n=376) 
Average per capita income  
(VND) 
Kinh  
(n=110) 
Bahnar  
(n=52) 
Jarai  
(n=117) 
Ro Ngao 
(n=95) 
1-400,000 (under the national 
poverty line) 
6% 63% 38% 64% 
400,001-1,000,000 25% 35% 45% 31% 
More than 1,000,000 69% 2% 16% 5% 
  100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
The losses of land and access to the communal property impoverished many ethnic minority people. 
This is apparent in the high number of the ethnic minority people who were facing a financial crisis. 
A high percentage of the interviewed households from the Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao were in debt 
27%, 62% and 50%, respectively (Fig 4.8). They had borrowed money from the “convenience 
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stores” which were mostly owned and operated by Kinh with high interest rates of 50% per year, to 
cover their family expenditure including buying rice, foods, hospital fees and the production costs 
such as fertilisers, pesticide and gasoline. This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter V. 
 
Figure 4.8: Percentage of the interviewed household borrowing money at high interest rates 
Wellbeing 
The resettled people were asked to rate how well off they felt they were before and after the 
resettlement on a scale of 10 points (whereby one equals the worst and ten equals the best life). 
According to Figure 4.9, more than half of the Kinh resettled ethnic group households (57%) rated 
their life in the new village with a higher score. However, only less than one third of the Bahnar 
(26%) and Jarai (22%) and about one third of the Jarai (33%) gave a higher score for their life in the 
new village. 
 
Figure 4.9: Percentage of the resettled households of each ethnic group giving a score for their 
life before and after the resettlement. 
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Based on the mean scores (Table 4.11), the Kinh perceived their circumstances as worse than 
before, seen as a slight decrease of the mean score from 5.9 to 4.7. By contrast, the remaining ethnic 
groups of Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao perceived their life to be better than before with a slight 
increase of the mean scores. 
Table 4.11. The Score their life’ means given by the ethnic groups 
 
 Kinh 
(n=115)  
Bahnar 
(n=46) 
Jarai 
(n=117) 
Ro Ngao 
(n=96) 
Scoring  your life in the old village Mean 5.9 4.8 4.7 4.6 
 Std. Deviation 1.7 1.8 1.9 1.9 
Scoring your life in the new village Mean 4.7 5.5 5.2 5.6 
 Std. Deviation 1.4 2.0 1.7 1.5  
      
 
The interviews indicated that many ethnic minority people highly appreciated the positive changes 
in infrastructure in the resettlement sites such as electricity, roads, school and clinics. These are 
probably the main reasons for their score of life being higher in the resettlement sites compared to 
the old village. Many participants highlighted the better access to electricity, housing, road, school 
and clinics in the resettlement sites. However, they were not satisfied with land and water resources 
in the resettlement sites.  
The inconsistence of the self-assessment by the Kinh group with other data suggests that the 
hegemony of false consciousness is involved. This concept of false consciousness in Marxist theory 
explains the symptom which occurs in the situation where someone or a social group wants their 
true social and economic situation to be unknown by others (Eyerman, 1981). In reality, checking 
up the score rated by the well-off households of Kinh group supports the explanation. This could be 
the case with the Kinh group who have somehow benefited from the resettlement process.      
The responses of the resettled people regarding their worries about life in resettlement sites further 
explain the situation. As shown in Figure 4.10, the most mentioned issue in the resettlement site 
was land shortage. The second most important issue was job opportunities, followed by children’s 
education and water issues. However, a significant number of resettled ethnic minority groups of 
Jarai and Ro Ngao showed their concern about daily meals and debts which they were suffering.    
In conclusion, the livelihood outcomes of the resettled ethnic groups were consistent with the level 
of impacts of the resettlement project on different household groups’ capitals. The most remarkable 
reduction in agricultural production land and common pool resource led to food insecurity and a 
high poverty rate in the ethnic minority people. Given the increase in natural capital and social 
capital after the resettlement, the Kinh group had improved their household economy with a high 
92 
 
number of households living above the poverty line and a high number of households with savings 
and stable food security.  
 
Figure 4.10: Worries in the resettlement sites mentioned by the resettlers 
 
 
 
 
4.4. Discussion 
Studying the differential impacts on diverse social groups, especially those left behind is an 
emerging concern in DIDR (Neef and Singer, 2015). This chapter has provided a comprehensive 
understanding of the impacts of the resettlement projects on all livelihood capitals of the ethnic 
groups. The resettlement project had differentiated impacts on the resettled ethnic groups with 
different lifestyles. The ethnic minority groups including the Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao subsistence 
farmers, faced a significant loss of swidden farming land, wet rice fields, forest and river which 
they relied heavily on. The Kinh group with a long experience of migration and higher cultivation 
techniques as well as higher human capital had not suffered much if at all from the resettlement 
projects and were able to increase their livelihood capitals. However, a large percentage of the 
ethnic minority households faced hardships such as poverty, food insecurity and debt. In addition, a 
large number of household heads from the ethnic minority people did not have any formal 
education or have any skills. Moreover, many children from the ethnic minority groups dropped out 
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of school. By contrast, the Kinh group had higher incomes, more food security and a higher level of 
education.  
This chapter also highlights several important issues of compensation in the case of different 
ethnicity with different lifestyles. First, the cash compensation policy focusing on the sugarcane and 
fish ponds was in favour of the Kinh, who cultivated large areas of sugarcane while few ethnic 
minority people did so. Second, the loss of swidden fields and communal property including forest 
land and grazing land had significant impacts on the ethnic minority people. In fact, the rainfed 
upland rice had fed the ethnic minorities people for generations. Furthermore, the loss of grazing 
land led to a remarkable reduction in livestock breeding and cattle kept. As a result, the ethnic 
minority people suffered both food insecurity and a financial crisis. Third, the resettlement policies 
were often aimed at creating off-farm jobs for the resettlers who lost their farm land. In this case, it 
would have been impossible for the ethnic minority people with low formal education levels and 
lacking in skills to gain remunerative employment. This is the case in resettlement projects 
throughout the world, which often overlook and do not sufficiently compensate losses.  
The chapter also shows the implications for considering the long-term impacts of resettlement 
projects on resettled ethnic groups. It is believed that improvements in infrastructure in terms of 
such things as roads and schools would lead to improvement in the livelihood outcomes of resettlers 
(WB, 2004, ADB, 1998). All the resettlers in this study perceived an improvement in infrastructure 
on the resettlement sites, especially in access to schools and roads. However, the Kinh group had 
attained higher formal education compared to the resettled ethnic minority groups. The loss of 
natural capital and the reduction in financial capital made it difficult for the ethnic minority group to 
improve their education. There were still a considerable number of children from the ethnic 
minority groups dropping out of schools and a remarkable number of household heads who had not 
taken any formal education or just completed primary level. Moreover, a large number of the ethnic 
minority did not own any skills. This would make future development difficult for the ethnic 
minority people.  
There are both similar and contradictory findings to the previous studies. The global review on 
dam-induced resettlement cases found a remarkable loss of area of cultivation land holding after 
people were moved into resettlement sites (Ty et al., 2013, Bui and Schreinemachers, 2011, Bui et 
al., 2013, Dao, 2011, Tilt et al., 2009) and no single successful case of livelihood recovery 
(Scudder, 2005a). In this case, the ethnic minority people experienced a similar situation but the 
Kinh were likely to be able to recover their livelihoods and increase their land holding. Their 
different lifestyles and experiences explain the difference which will be discussed in detail in 
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Chapter V. It would have been hard for the ethnic minority groups with their lower level of 
education and their subsistence-oriented lifestyle to have improved their situation given their 
significant loss of natural capitals and consequent decrease of food security and with a financial 
crisis after the resettlement. However, it was an advantage for the Kinh with their higher cash 
compensation, higher level of education and production skills which meant that they would be able 
to recover their livelihoods by intensifying their cassava and rubber farming. As a result, a 
considerable number of the ethnic minority households lacking food and money had to sell and 
lease out their land to the Kinh. Thus, this study discovered the important finding that the ethnic 
minority people suffered not only the dam-induced displacement but also agricultural intensification 
induced displacement due to the Kinh. A similar case on the displacement of an ethnic minority 
group named Ede by the Kinh’s intensification of coffee farming was observed in the Central 
Highlands by Doutriaux et al. (2008). The “double displacement” has caused the poverty and 
indebtedness of the ethnic minority people in this case.  
There was a surprising difference between the outcomes of resettlement and personal perception of 
life in the resettlement compared to the old villages before moving. Although many resettlers from 
the ethnic minorities had got poor outcomes of resettlement such as food insecurity and high rates 
of poverty, they rated their life in the resettlement villages with higher mean scores in comparison 
to the old villages. It could be because they had put more weight on the improvement in 
infrastructure rather than on their land holding and access to common property. The inconsistence 
between the self-assessment of the Kinh group and their livelihood outcomes showed their tendency 
of preventing others knowing about their real economic and social situations.    
4.5. Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has resolved the first research question by employing the modified sustainable 
livelihoods framework with a focus on livelihood capitals and livelihood outcomes to examine the 
impacts of the resettlement project on the resettled ethnic groups’ livelihood resources. It provided 
significant insights into the differential impacts of resettlement, along ethnic lines, among the 
resettled groups. The resettlement project has caused considerable decline natural, social and 
psychological capitals for most households in the ethnic minority groups, while it has provided 
advantages for the Kinh group to increase all of their livelihood capitals. Consequently, many of the 
ethnic minority groups have been living below the poverty line and are faced with ongoing 
indebtedness. This is in stark contrast to the majority of Kinh group who have been more 
prosperous in terms of ensuring food security, physical capital and increasing financial capacity.     
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The results have emphasised the importance of holistically considering all livelihood capitals, how 
they are impacted by resettlement and the interactions between them. For instance, the decline in 
natural capital adversely affected the ethnic minority groups’ subsistence livelihoods as it caused 
food insecurity, high poverty rates and significant financial stress. Moreover, it constrained their 
ability to improve their limited human capital. But the increase in land holding after the resettlement 
and having production skills would enable the Kinh group to increase their financial, social, 
physical and human capitals over the long term.  
This chapter has provided a foundation for explaining the adaptive capacity of those affected, which 
will be presented in more detail in Chapter V.  
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CHAPTER V.  
LIVELIHOOD STRATEGIES OF RESETTLED ETHNIC GROUPS IN  
THE CENTRAL HIGHLANDS OF VIETNAM 
5.1. Chapter introduction 
Chapter IV demonstrated the differentiated impacts of resettlement on the household capital of four 
ethnic groups. The three ethnic minority groups (Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao) had faced significant 
loss of access to their land and forest resources and faced considerable financial difficulty. In 
addition, the ethnic minority people were disadvantaged in terms of education and skills generation 
relating to rubber plantations and cultivation techniques. In contrast to the three ethnic minorities, 
the Kinh (ethnic Vietnamese) had largely increased their land holding and improved their financial 
capacity, and had fared better in terms of education and skills.  
This chapter addresses research question 2: “How and why do the subsequent livelihood strategies 
and outcomes differ among the ethnic groups?” The findings of this chapter are drawn from both 
qualitative and quantitative data. The in-depth interviews (n=19) with local government officials 
and resettled people provide narratives about livelihood strategies. In addition, the livelihood 
outcomes of the resettled households are mainly derived from the survey of 397 households and 
supported by the interviews. Both the household surveys and in-depth interviews are used to 
analyse factors influencing the livelihood strategies and outcomes. By responding to the questions, 
this chapter provides insights into the adaptive capacities of resettled households, which is often 
limited in academic literature.  
In this chapter, the different coping strategies of the resettled ethnic groups in the resettlement sites 
are firstly described and followed by a section on livelihood outcomes of the resettled ethnic 
groups. The key factors influencing and defining the strategies and outcomes are analysed in the 
next section. The findings from this chapter and relevance to broader DIDR literature are then 
discussed. The concluding section emphasises the long-term changes which occurred due to the 
resettlement project and complexity involved in the process.        
5.2. Livelihood strategies of the resettled ethnic groups 
The resettled households were asked about how they made a living in the resettlement sites. These 
households employed a range of strategies to cope with the situation in the resettlement sites. These 
strategies have been classified into two types: formal and informal coping strategies. The formal 
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strategies have been based on the government programs and policies, and the informal strategies 
comprise all the strategies initiated and employed by the resettled people themselves.  
Table 5.1 summarises the survey results of the coping strategies used by the resettled households 
and Table 5.2 shows their importance in terms of the contribution to household income. Each 
formal and informal strategy and the characteristics of households using each strategy are described 
in detail in Sections 5.2.1. and 5.2.2.   
Table 5.1: Coping strategies used by the resettled people in all ethnic groups (n=397) 
Coping strategies % households  
Hired labour 63.5 
Borrowing money from government bank 56.9 
Borrowing money with high interest rate 37.8 
Buying land 27.7 
Fishing 24.9 
Renting land 24.7 
Agricultural intensification 21.2 
Religious conversion 17.9 
Migration to work in the cities 14.1 
Diversify crops and livestock 11.6 
Leasing land 8.6 
Clearing forest for cultivation land 7.6 
Gold panning 7.1 
Collecting left-over agricultural products 6.3 
Lending money 6.0 
Selling cultivation land 5.8 
Timber logging 3.5 
Return to work and live in swidden field 2.5 
Providing services and trade 2.3 
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Table 5.2: Contribution of income sources to total household income in all ethnic groups 
(n=397) 
Income sources 
Contribution to total 
household income (%) 
Field crops (cassava) 40.2 
Tree crops (rubber, Litsea) 13.2 
Hired labour 12.8 
Government salary and subsidies 9.6 
Livestock breeding 7.7 
Remittance 6.2 
Trade and services 5.3 
Fishing 2.9 
Timber logging 0.9 
Gold panning 0.4 
Land leasing 0.4 
Collecting left-over harvest products 0.2 
Handy craft 0.1 
Non timber forest products (NTFPs) 0.1 
TOTAL 100.0% 
 
5.2.1. Formal livelihood strategies 
The socio-economic development strategies for the Central Highlands during the last two decades 
were defined in Communist Party Resolutions in 2000, 2006 and 2010 and focused on hydropower 
dam development, agricultural development and mineral exploitation. These development strategies 
have very much been reflected in the study sites, causing both positive and negative impacts on 
households. For those households that have been resettled due to hydropower dam development, 
several formal livelihood strategies have been utilised as detailed below.  
Technical and financial support for agricultural development and intensification 
According to the resettlement program for Yali Falls Dam (Electrowatt, 1992), it aimed to assist the 
Kinh maximise agricultural production, while a special sedentarisation program was proposed for 
the resettled Jarai village. All resettled people from all ethnic groups were given agricultural 
extension support during the first year at the resettlement sites. This support was in terms of 
providing crop varieties, fertilisers and technical training. In addition, a number of government and 
provincial policies and programs on agricultural development flourished. These included the: 
Forestry and Agricultural Extension Program No. 07 (07-DA-HU) for the period 1997 to 2000 by 
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the Kon Tum People’s Committee and Sa Thay District People’s Committee in 2004 Rubber 
Development; The Direct Support Program to Poor Households in Remote and Difficult Areas 
under Decision 102 dated in 2009 by the Government (102/2009/QD-Ttg); and the Small Rubber 
Plantation Program under the Kon Tum Provincial People’s Committee’s Decision named Decision 
07 dated in 2012 (07/2012-QD-Ttg). These programs concentrated on providing technical support 
related to rubber and cassava to reduce poverty and develop socio-economic conditions across the 
province. It became a primary strategy of the resettled people in their resettlement sites.  
Agricultural production was the key income generation activity for the resettled households. Most 
of the resettled households were involved in agricultural activities. They cultivated the main field 
crops of cassava and rice and tree crops including rubber and Litsea5. The resettled people also 
raised cattle, pigs and chickens. On average, the income from the agricultural sector such as tree 
crops, field crops, livestock breeding and fishing comprised 61% of the resettled households’ total 
income (see Table 5.2). 
The results of the agricultural intensification policies of the government in the resettlement sites 
have been mixed. Being resettled in an area with limited land would be difficult for the ethnic 
minority people who often practised subsistence swidden farming and had limited adaptive capacity 
to the new farming type and market economy. As indicated in Chapter IV, on average, the resettled 
ethnic minority people now had less than one ha of cultivation land while each household of Kinh 
owned more than two ha. Thus, the number of resettled households reported to intensify agriculture 
and diversify their crop and livestock was about 21% and 12%, respectively (see Table 5.1), of 
which, about 85% of the households conducting agricultural intensification were Kinh while only 
15% were from the three ethnic minorities. As a local authority stated: 
Many Kinh household owned rubber trees. But some ethnic minority households just started 
planting while Kinh in the two resettled villages already harvested. The main issue is that 
the ethnic minority people have limited land or already sold their land. They also did not 
know much about rubber tree. (Kinh Government official-GoK4) 
The limited cultivation land in the resettled sites was caused by number of reasons. First, the 
available cultivation land in the villages was flooded due to the reservoir. Second, the reclaimed 
land for wet rice cultivation in some resettled villages such as O and Trang was not able to be 
                                               
5  Litsea glutinosa is an indigenous, multi-purpose, green broadleaved species found mostly in semi-deciduous forest in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. 
Most of its biomass (stem, bark, and leaves) can be used or sold in the market to produce different products. For example, its bark is used to make glue 
and incense stick production, and stem is used as timber HUY, B. 2010. CO2 Sequestration Estimation for the Litsea - Cassava Agroforestry Model in 
Mang Yang District, Gia Lai Province in the Central Highlands of Vietnam Vietnam: World Agrogorestry Center and Southeast Asian Network for 
Agroforestry Education .  
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cultivated due to the lack of irrigated water. Thus, the resettled ethnic minority people facing rice 
shortage and cash shortage had already sold the reclaimed land to Kinh people from Binh Duong 
province in the South (Plate 5.1). Third, there was a case where the resettlement project 
management board allocated an area of 150 ha of land in the Yali commune to eight local district 
leaders during the beginning of the resettlement project for their own use. Thus, the cultivation land 
budget for allocating to resettled people was limited. The area was expected to reclaim wet rice 
fields for resettled people from the Jarai group in Chu, Cho and Tum villages of the Yali commune 
(Plate 5.2). These resettled people have been suffering from land shortages since moving to the new 
resettlement sites. A government official in Yali commune argued: 
My commune would not face land shortage if the land was not allocated to some leaders. 
They should share among our people, many of whom are facing land shortage and are 
hungry or do not have any land at all. (Jarai Government Official–GoJ3) 
The situation in several resettled villages provides a clear picture of agricultural development of the 
resettled people. All the villages have been surrounded by rubber tree farms under the ownership of 
outsiders, especially Kinh people, both from the same communes and from other provinces such as 
Binh Duong from the South, more than 600 km away. The resettled ethnic minority people had to 
travel about 20-40 km to plant cassava on sloping land, and therefore returned to their swidden 
fields to cultivate cassava and live there or do other off-farm jobs to make a living.  
The financial capital of households was one of the key factors influencing the ability of households 
involved in agricultural intensification. Many ethnic minority people faced financial crises and had 
not been able to access bank loans while a high investment was needed for planting rubber. On 
average, it costs about 50 million VND to invest in a plantation of one ha of rubber. Nevertheless, 
many Kinh households had been able to access higher loans since they could use their house and 
land as collateral and could access the banks by holding a membership with mass organisations. 
According to the survey results, the average amount of money borrowed by the Kinh (60 million 
VND) was about 7.5 times higher than the average loan to the ethnic minority people (8 million 
VND). The results also showed that only five of the poor households surveyed utilised agricultural 
intensification while 20 middle income households and 55 well-off households did so. 
The education level of household heads and their membership in the mass organisations also 
affected the choice of livelihood. Out of 397 surveyed households, 150 households not employing 
this activity of agricultural intensification were headed by members without any formal education. 
The education level attainment would have made it difficult for those households in applying for 
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bank loans as well as understanding plantation techniques and market for rubber. On the other hand, 
the households with members taking part in mass organisations such as farmers’ unions, women’s 
unions and youth unions had a much higher rate of implementing agricultural intensification than 
the non-participating ones (50% and 10% respectively). It should be noted that the organisations 
could provide technical and other training to the members or support them in getting loans through 
the government banks. Thus, it would be advantageous to be members.       
In sum, several factors including limited cultivation land, access to bank loans and limited 
education level prevented the resettled people, especially the ethnic minority people from being 
involved in and benefiting from the agricultural intensification program of the government.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 5.1: Kinh from Binh Duong province bought about 200 ha of the reclaimed cultivation 
land in O village in Yasier commune to plant rubber6 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 5.2: A typical example of a rubber plantation covering 150 ha around Tum village in 
Yali commune, which is predominantly owned by Kinh 
 
The program to relocate resettled people to a new district 
A program was initiated by the province more than five years ago to move resettled people to a new 
district to reduce population pressures on limited land availability in the resettlement site. 
According to the program, some of the resettled people, especially young households facing land 
                                               
6 All photographs in this thesis provided by the author. 
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shortages in the resettlement sites in Sa Thay district, would be moved to the new established 
district named H’Drai where large areas of land and forest were available. This new district is about 
100 kilometres from the resettlement sites.      
The resettled people, mostly the ethnic minority people, had registered on a list which was 
submitted to the district people’s committee in 2013. The resettled people signing the list were 
mostly from the ethnic minority people of Jarai in Sa Binh communes who had not been able to 
recover their livelihoods and felt uncertain about their future in the resettled villages. However, they 
continued to wait for the final decision to enable them to move. Thus, they had been living in limbo.  
A local government official of the Sa Binh commune provided this account of the program: 
About 200 households with 700 persons registered to move to the H’Drai district. Most of 
them are ethnic minority people from Ka Bay and Lung Leng villages. Those people are not 
happy with the resettlement sites due to limited land resources. Thus, they want to move to 
the new area again where there is more land resource. The new district with new local 
authority office was established in 2014 but we have not heard any further from the 
program after our people registering and sending the list to Sa Thay district and Kon Tum 
provincial people committee.  (A Kinh government Offical–GoK4) 
A statement from a man in the Binh Long village in Sa Binh commune demonstrated the urgency to 
move to the new district: 
We have nothing to do and eat in this new village. All households in this village registered 
to move to new village with the hope that we have land to cultivate to feed our families. But 
no one tell us when we can go there.  (Jarai resettled man–RJ4)  
In general, the formal strategy was to relocate people again, but to date this program had not been 
implemented and people were uncertain if it would occur, thus causing further uncertainty and 
frustration. 
Payment for environment services (PES) 
A PES policy was firstly piloted in two provinces in Vietnam in 2008. Consequently, the 
government has implemented a nationwide policy since 2010 by issuing Decree 99/2010 ND CP 
dated in 2010. The Government of Vietnam issued Decree No. 99/2010/ND-CP on 24/9/2010 with 
regard to PES. It is considered by the government as a tool to conserve its forest and biodiversity, 
reduce poverty and improve livelihoods of the ethnic minority people in the mountainous region 
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(MARD, 2014). Therefore, this policy has the potential to provide positive outcomes for those 
people affected by hydropower dams across the country. 
The policy is based on the principle of service users having to pay on an involuntary basis and sets 
up a relationship between users and providers of the services. According to this policy, three users 
or payers—hydropower producers, clean water production companies and tourism companies—
have to pay for PES based on a fixed rate. It is VND 20/1 kwh for the hydropower producer, VND 
40/1 m3 for commercial water producers and 1-2% of total revenue of tourism providers. The 
suppliers subjected to the payment include forest owners and organisations, households, individuals 
or residential communities and those who are contracted for forest protection with state forest 
owners. The buyers make the payment to a provincial forest protection and development fund 
before paying the forest owners.      
The payment of the tax revenue is based on the forest area of forest owners in the watershed. The 
forest protection and development of Kon Tum provinces receives an annual tax revenue of about 
five million USD under PES from the Yali Hydropower Company (Yali Hydropower Company - 
EVNHPC Yali, 2013) and 284 billion VND or 14 million USD from all of the environment services 
users in the province (MARD, 2014). Each forest owner should receive 150,000 VND per ha per 
year. However, out of the six resettled communes in the resettlement sites, no forest was found in 
three communes and small areas of forest existed in the Ya Tang commune. Ya Tang was the only 
resettled commune having a large forest area of 4,861 ha. But more than 70% of the area was under 
management of a state forest enterprise. The remaining area of 1,400 ha had been contracted to 59 
households in Ya Tang for protection. Therefore, each household would receive about 2,000,000 
VND per year. Out of the surveyed households (n=397), no household received income from this 
policy. In general, the resettlers in those communes are excluded although they should benefit first 
from the policy. 
In conclusion, although PES is a good mechanism for sharing benefits from hydropower 
development to the resettled people, limited access to forest resources and a lack of entitlement 
definition are barriers for them to benefit from this mechanism.  
5.2.2. Informal livelihoods strategies 
This section presents different strategies which were initiated and developed by the resettlers 
themselves to make a living in the resettlement sites.   
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Work as labourers in the resettlement sites and neighbouring districts 
The shift from practising subsistence farming to being hired labourers was a significant livelihood 
change which occurred due to the hydropower dam construction. The dam reservoir flooded a large 
area of cultivation land while the compensation land received was much lower than the loss. 
Consequently, the resettled people needed to work as hired labourers to compensate for the loss of 
income and food supply.  
This became a key coping strategy for many resettled people in the resettlement sites due to land 
loss and the need to earn a living. The survey results in Table 5.1 indicate that 63.5% of the total 
surveyed households were hired to work in agricultural production for large farm owners in the 
resettlement sites and neighbouring districts. Tasks included soil preparation, spraying pesticides 
for crops, planting and harvesting cassava and coffee, loading crops, weed removal, and collecting 
rubber latex which often does not require skills (Plate 5.3). On average, this labour accounted for 
12.8% of total household income of the resettlers (Table 5.2). A district government official 
commented that:  
The Yali hydropower dam project produces electricity and turn-over of billion VND to the 
country, but the villagers are still facing hardship. The hydropower project just changed our 
people from land owners to the waged labourers. (Kinh government official–GoK7) 
The three ethnic minority groups made up 81% of total households using this strategy, but only 
19% of the Kinh. A member of the Ro Ngao group elaborated on the situation in the resettlement 
site:  
We must do anything to earn money here. Not like in the past, we could have enough rice to 
eat from cultivating rice in the swidden fields. Now, we have only some land to live on. We 
grow cassava to sell, but it is not enough for us. Therefore, we have to work as hired 
labours, do gold panning, working in cities and sometimes harvesting left-over cassava and 
rubber latex of the state enterprise. Our house is here but we have to go to work everywhere 
in this province to earn money. (Ro Ngao resettled man–RR3). 
Those working as labourers could receive about 100,000 VND each day. However, this was on-call 
and seasonally-based work and depended on the crops and market. The resettled people could only 
work for some months in a year. Moreover, they needed to travel by motorbike to work in the fields 
which could be in the local area or about 40 kilometres from their homes. A Jarai man breathed a 
sigh and talked:  
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What can we do now? We just work as hired labour to get money to buy rice. No land at all 
to produce for family. We have to work for any people in this village and Kinh village. It 
depends on people's needs. Sometimes they need us to harvest their cassava. Sometimes they 
just called us to spray pesticides. That is all. In general, we just do three month waged 
labour a year, no work for the entire year. (Jarai resettled man–RJ1). 
The selection of this strategy was influenced by several factors. First, most of the households 
involved in this work (70%) held less than one ha of land and only a small proportion of the 
resettled households (11%) holding more than two ha of cultivation land were involved in this 
work. Second, it was the main livelihood of many poor households which comprised 50% of the 
households involved in this study. Third, 60% of the households working as hired labourers faced 
rice shortages lasting from 6 to 12 months. Last, the households taking part in this activity were 
often large households which had no or limited (primary and/or secondary) formal education (93% 
of households) and did not have any skills (63% of households). 
In sum, many resettled people had to work as hired labour which was not stable and could earn only 
limited income for their households. Therefore, their high dependence on the single limited income 
source made them more vulnerable to future changes and shocks.  
 
Plate 5.3: Harvesting and loading cassava 
Borrowing and lending money with a high interest rate 
Since moving to the resettlement sites the resettled people had been more involved in the market 
and cash economy. Nevertheless, the resettled people, especially the ethnic minority people, faced 
cash shortages as well as a reduction in cattle numbers (as mentioned in Chapter IV). Thus, 
borrowing money with a high interest rate was a very widespread problem in the resettled villages. 
The survey results in Table 5.1 indicated that 37.8% of the total surveyed households employed this 
strategy.  
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“Convenience stores” were located in every resettled village after the resettled moved in (Plate 5.4 
and 5.5). The “convenience stores” were mostly run by Kinh people who were familiar with the 
market economy. The resettled people could buy many necessary items at the “convenience stores” 
such as rice, cooking oil, meats, vegetable and gasoline. More importantly, they could buy on credit 
and borrow cash with a fixed interest rate from the “convenience store” owners.     
Many households had got further into debt since they came to the resettlement sites. It was easier 
for the ethnic minority people to be in debt as they did not have enough land to cultivate to supply 
enough rice for their families and limited income generation sources. Thus, they had to buy rice, 
fertilisers and gasoline on credit or borrow money to pay for hospital and tuition fees or to purchase 
wine and cattle for weddings and funerals and other formal celebrations. 
There were many cases where households were in significant debt due to accumulating principal 
and interest over several years. The results of the household survey show that the highest percentage 
of households being most heavily in debt were from Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao (27%, 62% and 
50% respectively). The number of Kinh households borrowing money with high interest rate was 
only 7%. It should be noted that those households being in debt are those households having income 
under the national poverty level. A Ro Ngao man complained:  
My family and many families in this village have been in debt since moving here in 1999. We 
borrowed money to buy rice and foods and medicine or paid for hospital fee in the first 
years. We also borrowed gold. We borrowed 1 million VND and pay 1.5 million VND or 
borrowed one tenth of a teal and pay 1.5 times of this after each crop season. (Ro Ngao 
resettled man–RR1) 
One of the reasons that the resettled ethnic minority people borrowed money from the “convenience 
stores” rather than banks is that it was very convenient. The “convenience stores” were nearby in 
terms of distance from their homes and they could also borrow at any time without any paper work. 
A government official of Ya Tang commune explained the debt issue:  
They do not want to borrow money from the government banks because the paper work is 
complicated and many local people do not know how to read and write. Sometimes they also 
had to pay some money for middleman in order to borrow money from banks. In addition, 
the ethnic minority people do not have land and good houses to use as collateral to borrow 
money from banks. Thus, it would be much easier to borrow money with high interest rate 
from the “convenience stores” located in villages owned by Kinh. Even I myself have been 
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in debt of 40 million VND. Some of the government officials of this commune have been in 
debt of more than 100 million VND. (Jarai government official–GoJ6) 
A Ro Ngao from Ka Bay village complained that: 
It was very complicated to get bank loan from the government banks. It was also small loan 
of 15 to 20 million VND. Whilst we can borrow 80 million VND from “convenience stores” 
owners. But the Kinh in Binh Nam and Binh Son villages could borrow 50 to 70 million 
VND from the banks. The government bank may think that the ethnic minority people would 
not be able to pay back. But many Kinh got loan from the bank and lent us money with 
higher interest rate. (Ro Ngao resettled woman–RR2). 
Another reason for this increasing debt was that the Kinh “convenience store” owners had 
intentionally forced the ethnic minority people into this debt situation. They had different strategies 
to manipulate the ethnic minority people financially, especially the poor households. For example, 
many households of Jarai and Ro Ngao mentioned that they were told by Kinh that they would get 
financial support to plant rubber if they let the Kinh plant cassava intercropping with rubber for 
three years. Of course, such financial support was considered as a loan with a high interest rate. 
The Kinh people also used another strategy where they lent the resettled people money to build a 
new house. Many resettled families were getting bigger and their children would get married and 
live separately after many years living in the resettlement sites. This was a key reason for why many 
resettled ethnic minority were getting increasingly into debt over several years. When asked about 
reasons for leasing out land and being in debt, a Jarai man told his story, worth quoting at length: 
Knowing that we had some land, a Kinh from Sa Thay town came and asked us to rent. The 
Kinh told us that they would build a new house for us but we had to let them renting the land 
of one ha. The rent of one ha of land is 13 million VND per year. We agreed with that. He 
built a house next to our old house as you see and cost us 80 million VND. We had to lease 
our land to them with the rent which would be gradually deducted to the construction cost. 
We have been leasing this land about three years so far. They told us that we have been still 
in debt of 30 million VND which we would have to pay. Thus, we have to continue leasing 
the land to him in one more year. Otherwise he threatened us that he would destroy the 
house. We do not know what to do in this situation. Sometimes we like living in the swidden 
field to avoid them. Otherwise they would threaten us with death. (Jarai resettled man–RJ3)   
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Purchasing fertilisers and pesticides for cassava plantations on credit was also popular in the 
resettlement sites. The common problem was that the selling of harvested cassava was not enough 
to pay for the purchase of these materials on credit before the crop was planted, because of the high 
interest rate. Consequently, it caused constantly rising debt from crop to crop for the resettled ethnic 
minority people.  
The survey results show several factors related to the households employing this coping strategy. 
First, cultivation land holding was a key factor. It is reflected in the survey results with about 65% 
of the resettled households being in debt not owning any land or if they did, it was less than one ha. 
Second, more than 75% of the involved households had large households, from five to thirteen 
persons. Third, 55% of the households were poor and 82% of them did not have enough rice to eat 
for between three to twelve months of the year. Finally, most of these households (75%) did not 
have any formal skills.     
In general, the resettled people’s daily life and agricultural production had been closely associated 
with debt. Given the limited livelihood alternatives and resources in the resettlement sites, they had 
been trapped into the vicious cycle of food insecurity, poverty and deeper debt.  
 
Plate 5.4: A “convenience store” of Kinh in Kroong Klah village 
 
Plate 5.5: A “convenience store” of Kinh in Dong Hung village 
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Purchasing cultivation land 
Land purchase was a coping strategy of the resettled people in the resettlement sites. This strategy 
had been used since the resettlement project started during the 1990s. The survey results in Table 
5.1. show that 6% of the total surveyed resettled households reported having sold their land, 28% 
had bought land, 25% had rented cultivation land and 9% had leased out their land. Out of the 23 
households selling land, only one Kinh household had sold land while the remaining households 
selling were ethnic minority people. The number of Kinh households buying cultivation land made 
up about 60%.      
There were three main reasons for land purchasing. First, the reorganisation of the transfer and 
purchasing rights in the land law issued in 1993 radically changed the land tenure in the Central 
Highlands from common property ownership to private ownership (Loi et al., 2000, Tinh, 2003). 
This was discussed in the context of the study site in Section 3.2.1.4 in Chapter III. It should be 
noted that before the land law issues, the ethnic minority people practising common ownership were 
not allowed to transfer their land right to outsiders and every transfer transaction had to be reported 
to their village elders. Second, the agricultural intensification of the Kinh had accelerated the land 
purchase and land lease issues in the study sites. Third, the poverty and debt situation had driven the 
ethnic minority people to sell or lease out their remaining limited land.  
An interview with a Kinh informant clearly describes the Kinh people’s strategy to accumulate their 
land in the resettlement sites: 
In fact, the Kinh people have relied much on the ethnic minority people since coming here. 
The ethnic minority people often need cash to pay for buying pigs and beef cattle for funeral 
and wedding, paying hospital fee. Little by little, the Kinh lend them money, make them 
become more dependent and in debt, then tell them to sell land. The more money the ethnic 
minority people borrow the more willingness and happier the Kinh would be. Thus the 
ethnic minority people have gradually moved further and further to do their swidden in the 
forest. Most of the ethnic minority people in Ka Bay and Lung Leng villages of Sa Binh 
commune have been in debt.   
I bought three hectares of swidden fields of the Jarai people in Sa Binh five years ago. The 
swidden land owner borrowed my money but was not able to pay back. Thus, I asked them 
to sell the land to me. I have cultivated both rubber and cassava in the field which is not far 
from here. Several Kinh people in this village also did the same by lending money to the 
ethnic minority people. In addition, the Kinh people also asked the ethnic minority people to 
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lease out their land so that the Kinh could grow cassava in the land. (Kinh resettled man–
RK1) 
A commune leader in Yali commune echoed this situation of land purchase often due to the 
challenges of debt in households:   
Land purchase has become increasing over the last 5 years. I know that 15 households in 
Yali commune sold their land to Kinh people without informing the commune people 
committee since the villagers got more debts and price of cassava was getting decreased. (A 
Bahnar government official–GoB3) 
When the research was conducted in 2015 and 2016, although land purchase was not allowed 
without approval of the local authorities it was still taking place in many villages and communes. A 
commune leader said:  
Now it is not allowed to sell land to people from outside. Actually, all land areas are still 
sold to people from Binh Duong and Daklak provinces and Sa Thay town of Kon Tum 
province without informing us. There are different ways that the outsiders could buy the 
land from the local people. One of the ways is they let the local people borrowing cash with 
high interest rate. Another way is that the ethnic minority need to worship with cattle and 
pigs it would cost a lot of money. The Kinh people would lend money to the ethnic minority 
and make them in debt, then have to sell them land. If the district and provincial people 
committee ask them to return land they would require paying for their plantation of rubber 
which they planted already. Each tree would cost 3,000 VND per tree now (after seven 
years of plantation). You know that 70% of cultivation around Ya Tang commune was 
already sold to people from outside. (Jarai government official–GoJ6) 
Considering the characteristics of the households selling land, it clearly indicated that most of them 
were poor and middle income households (about 80%). In addition, rice shortage affected their 
choice as 65% of the households that selected this strategy also faced a rice shortage. In contrast, 
households buying land were from middle and high income groups (85%) and 60% of the 
households that had enough rice for nine to twelve months. 
Overall, the situation of land purchase had been happening over a long-time due to the changes in 
land use rights and the agricultural intensification and land accumulation of the Kinh as well as 
other rich people. It made the situation of the ethnic minority people and the poor whose livelihoods 
are based on land resources become more challenging.        
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Migration to urban areas for work 
Migration to work in cities such as Dong Nai and Sai Gon in the south was used by the resettled 
people to solve the land shortage and jobless situation in the resettlement sites and increase 
household income. These migrants had to move to the south which is more than 600 km from their 
homeland. They then often found work in the construction or garment industries, or with noodle 
companies.  
Fifty-six out of the 391 households surveyed (14%) utilised this strategy. Most of the resettled 
people engaged with this activity were young people (aged from 18 to 40 years). Among the 
households using this strategy, more than 60% owned less than one ha of cultivation land in the 
resettlement site and almost 80% faced food insecurity. In addition, 25% of the households were 
poor.  
The results of the in-depth interviews as well as the household surveys clearly indicated that 
religious networks were a key factor influencing the choice of this coping strategy. More than 70% 
of the households applying this strategy were Catholic from Bahnar and Jarai resettled people. 
Many young resettled people of the Bahnar and Jarai worked in the south of Vietnam through the 
introduction of nuns and the church system. Most of them were working in a noodle company in 
Bien Hoa city where they could earn four to five million VND per month. The remittances sent 
back were important to people in their families. Average income from this strategy made up 6.23% 
of the total cash income of resettlers (n=397). As a couple of Ro Ngao indicated: 
My daughter has been working in a noodle workshop in Bien Hoa. The nun introduced her 
to work there. It has been three years so far. Her salary is four million VND per month. 
Each month the boss would send salary to the nun where we could collect money to buy rice. 
The boss and nun did not give money to my daughter. They thought that being young girl 
from the rural to city, she would spend all the money instead of sending home. We have 
relied on the money. We used the money not only for buying rice and food, but also to pay 
for renting cultivation land in Ho Mong village to cultivate. Many young people in this 
village have been working for the workshop now. They trust and depend on the nun since 
they do not know anything about the outside society. You know that many families in this 
village have been relying and waiting for the money to buy rice every month. (Ro Ngao 
resettled couple–RR1) 
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The role of nuns and the church system in the Catholic villages was very crucial for this coping 
strategy. They understood every family situation and provided support to the families in the village. 
A commune leader expressed that: 
A nun has been based in the Kroong Klah and Kroong Ktuh. She is very supportive. She not 
only teaches children but also introduces their parent jobs in cities, provides rice, rubber 
trees... She knows situation of every families in the villages. (Ro Ngao government official–
GoR5) 
Commercial fishing in the reservoir 
After the resettlement, fishing in the reservoir was a source of income. However, this was mainly 
done by Kinh households because they could buy engine boats and fishnets to do fishing in the 
reservoirs with strong wind and waves. According to the survey, about 14 out of 19 Kinh headed 
households did commercial fishing in the reservoir. But the ethnic minority people could not afford 
to buy boats and fishnets. Therefore, the number of households from the three ethnic minority 
groups engaged with commercial fishing was quite low. It was 17%, 18% and 13% for the Bahnar, 
Jarai and Ro Ngao groups, in which, most of them did fishing to get food for their families (Plates 
5.6. and 5.7). A Jarai man in Cho village in Yali commune said that: 
Few people in this village do fishing now. Because they could not afford to buy fishnets and 
boats. In addition, it takes us a while from this village to the reservoir for fishing. (Jarai 
resettled man–RJ4)  
The survey results also indicated that most of the resettled household having income from fishing 
were from well-off household groups (11 households) and middle group (9 households) and only 
two households were of poor income level. During fieldwork in Lung Leng, Binh Long and Ka Bay 
resettled villages of Sa Binh commune, some groups of Jarai men said that they borrowed money 
from the Kinh in Binh Giang and Binh Son villages of the same commune to invest in boats and 
fishnets.  
In general, fishing in the reservoir was a livelihood strategy for several Kinh households after the 
resettlement but this was not often the case for the ethnic minorities of Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao.       
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Plate 5.6: The researcher joined a fishing trip in the reservoir with a Jarai man 
 
Plate 5.7: A Jarai woman in Cho village preparing collected fish for a meal 
Returning to work and living in the swidden fields 
When the first fieldwork was conducted in December 2015, I visited a Jarai resettled people’s 
village named Tum in the Yali commune where most of the villagers had left their homes and 
gardens. An old man in the village indicated that they were moved in 2000 and each house owner 
received a house with one ha of cultivation land. However, after five years living in the resettlement 
site all the villagers had been in debt and had sold the remaining limited land near the villages to 
their creditors and returned to their previous swidden fields to live since 2005. During the second 
fieldwork in May 2016 I met and interviewed these people in the swidden fields. A village leader 
told me that: 
73 out of 75 households work and live in the old swidden fields. We just made small 
temporary house (hut) to live there. Thus you could not find us in the resettled houses. We 
spend about one month to live in the field and go back to the new village for some days only. 
We call the resettled house as the hut or temporary but the huts in swidden fields are our 
home. (Jarai village leader–RJ2) 
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The villagers selected this last option of returning to their previous swidden field to continue 
cultivating and living there to solve the land and water shortage and hunger in their resettled 
villages based on their own culture and traditional skills of doing swidden farming. They often lived 
in the swidden field and just returned to the resettled village for religious services each month (Plate 
5.8). It took them about two hours by motorbike and boat to cross the reservoir to the swidden 
fields. A Jarai woman said: 
Living in the swidden field is more comfortable than in the resettled houses. You can get 
water from the streams and springs anytime and you can cultivate cassava and rice to eat. It 
is happy in the fields because of many people. Thus our people still like living in the huts in 
swidden fields. The limitations are only no electricity and TV.  (Jarai resettled woman–RJ3) 
During the second fieldwork, all of the 10 households interviewed in the swidden fields were still in 
debt for between20 and 80 million VND per household. They could earn about 20 million VND 
from planting one ha of cassava per year. For them, living in the swidden fields was also to avoid 
the complaints of their creditors. However, their life was on the whole more difficult and their daily 
meals were mainly cassava leaves, wild animals with some rice. In addition, it was difficult for their 
children to go to school. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 5.8: A series of photographs showing a. the home constructed for a family in the 
resettlement area that remains largely unused, b. the location of the former swidden field used 
by the family that is largely inundated by the dam, and c. the ‘temporary’ hut constructed by 
the family who has chosen to return to the swidden field rather than live in the allocated 
resettlement house. 
 
b. a. c. 
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Cultivation in the drawdown areas 
Cultivation in the drawdown areas was a strategy of the resettled people living near the river to cope 
with the situation of limited land resources in the resettlement sites. Although the resettlers knew 
the risks of flooding, they still cultivated in the drawdown area since moving (Plate 5.9).  
The resettled people often took risks by cultivating in the drawdown areas due to the inconsistent 
coordination in water release which led to flooding and caused remarkable damage in the province. 
A Bahnar resettled man complained that: 
Drawdown area is the remaining cultivation area where the resettled people live on. But it 
is uncertain to cultivate there. This year, all had been flooded by releasing water before the 
resettled people harvested. Actually, the resettled people were informed that they should not 
cultivate in the semi-flooding area under the reservoir water level. However, due to having 
no land, they still plant corn in the area. My family has three ha which was flooded in the 
area this year. No harvest at all! The hydropower company often sends schedule of 
releasing waters to resettlement communes, but sometimes it can be earlier without notice. 
(Bahnar resettled man–RB1) 
The limited land also led to disputes over the drawdown areas between the two villages in the 
Kroong commune. The drawdown areas used to be under management of Kroong Klah village 
before flooding. After the construction of the hydropower dam flooding the area, the people of 
Kroong Krah village left the land to fallow. However, the people of Kroong Ktuh reclaimed the 
land by clearing grasses and growing corn in the area. The Kroong Klah then started claiming their 
traditional rights in the area. The main reason was that the drawdown areas were not allowed to be 
allocated to any owner and were under the management of the hydropower dam plant. 
 
Plate 5.9: Drawdown areas in Mang La village 
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Gold panning 
Gold panning was a way of earning cash by the resettled people. The number of households using 
this livelihood strategy was 7% of the total surveyed households. But all the households gold 
panning were from Ro Ngao group. The number of Ro Ngao households involved in this activity 
accounted for 26% of its total households. These were mainly poor households which held less than 
5,000 m² of cultivation land per household. People who had engaged in this dangerous activity 
included village heads, women and children (Plate 5.11).   
This income generation activity had become more intensive in recent years. Before moving, they 
just did gold panning in the Po Ko River near their village in the time between crops from April-
August. After resettlement, they did gold panning everywhere in this province all year round when 
there was no job for hired labour. Due to job opportunity shortage, they needed to do gold panning 
as much as they could. They started gold panning work in the Po Ko River in the early morning 
(before 4 am) during the time when the Pleikrong hydropower plant held the water before releasing. 
Doing gold panning near the village could get about 20,000 to 30,000 VND which did not pay for 
the cost of motorbike gasoline. But people often went to the Dakto district, about 60 km from the 
resettled villages, to do gold panning and were able to get about 100,000 - 200,000 per day. 
However, gold panning in Dakto meant paying higher gasoline costs or buying bus tickets (Plate 
5.10). Although the commune people’s committee often assigned their staff with loud speakers to 
stop them from doing dangerous work in the river, they continued to do so.     
A Ro Ngao woman said: 
In the past, we did gold panning for fun and got extra money to buy food. Now we do gold 
panning everywhere, we do it for real to buy rice. (Ro Ngao resettled woman–RR2) 
 
Plate 5.10: A Ro Ngao couple started a gold panning trip to Dak To district 
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Plate 5.11: Ro Ngao people gold panning in Po Ko River 
Collecting leftover cassava and rubber latex after a harvest 
The land loss situation, food insecurity and lack of cash were the reasons forcing the resettlers to 
use this activity to make a living. Table 5.1 indicated that 6.3% of the 397 surveyed households 
depended on this activity as a source of income.  
All the households collecting leftover cassava and rubber latex were ethnic minority households 
including five households of Bahnar, two households of Ro Ngao, and 18 households of Jarai. The 
majority of households (70%) were poor and had large household sizes (from five to thirteen 
people). Moreover, more than 92% of the households had no land or less than one ha of cultivation 
land. 
This was a relatively new coping strategy, and was not generally considered a positive activity by 
many of the villagers. A Jarai man expressed that:  
It was different to the past. Although people were rented to harvest cassava people still 
destroy fence and collect left-over cassava after harvest. They are no longer shy now. Even 
when they were driven away they still came to collect leftover products. It never happened in 
the past. (Jarai resettled man–RJ1) 
For many households, it was a way to earn a little money to pay for daily meals or rice (Plates 5.12 
and 5.13). An old Ro Ngao woman expressed the following: 
Today I will go to collect some leftover rubber latex. I can earn only 20-40,000 VND per 
day. At least it is enough to buy a few kg of rice. During the cassava harvesting time, I and 
my husband glean cassava from their crops too. In the past, we did not do so, now we have 
to do. Not only my family, many families in this village has to do gold panning and collect 
left-over cassava. (Ro Ngao resettled woman–RR1) 
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Plate 5.12: Collected leftover rubber latex provides for additional income 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate 5.13: Jarai boys collecting leftover cassava 
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Timber logging and transporting 
Living in the resettlement sites without any job opportunities, cultivation land to work on and facing 
rice shortage forced many Jarai and Ro Ngao young people to be involved in illegal timber logging. 
Many young men from two ethnic groups were observed to take part in illegal logging and 
transporting of timber. They were hired by timber traders who were often Kinh people from Quy 
Nhon and Binh Dinh provinces. Their jobs included guiding the traders along paths and showing the 
location of good timbers for the timber traders in the forest, sawing trees down, and loading and 
transporting timbers. 
According to the survey, a small number of households surveyed reported being involved in this 
activity (4%). They came from the middle and poor income levels (12 out of 14 households) which 
lacked rice for several months in the year. In addition, most of the young people had not received 
any formal education or only received elementary education (12 out of 14 households). The size of 
households also had a strong influence on their choice (10 out of 14 having from 5 to 13 members). 
A Jarai man in Trang village of Yasier commune explained this situation: 
The younger people faced most disadvantages in this new village since they did not have 
land to work on and no jobs. How could they live here? I think their life would be more 
difficult. My sons did illegal logging over the last five years. Illegal logging work started in 
2009 and was very busy during 2011 and 2012. Now, they started to search for the 
remaining timber and roots to exploit since no good timber were available or become rare. 
It was very dangerous and heavy duty job. They worked in team and went to forest which 
was very far. They spent some weeks in the forest each time to log timber and transport back 
to village before selling to dealers. They were always nervous and being afraid of forest 
rangers. As I know that they could get about one to two millions VND for each trip. But 
sometimes they did not get anything. (Jarai resettled man–RJ4). 
During the fieldwork in Yasier and Ya Tang communes of Sa Thay district, each day three to five 
trucks of timber crossed the villages and many young men used motorbikes to transport timbers 
(Plates 5.14 and 5.15). A Jarai man in O village in Yasier said:    
Large number of the resettled men in O, Trang, and Trap villages involved in timber logging 
(about 500,000 VND per day). Most of them were unemployed young people. The company 
named Hoang Con implemented rubber plantation project there. In fact, they did timber 
logging too. 100% of the young people in this village took part in timber logging activities. 
Even though some middle aged men also took part in too. (Jarai resettled man–RJ1). 
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Plate 5.14: Truck with timber crossing O village, Ya Sier commune 
 
Plate 5.15: Motorbikes for transporting loggers in Trap village, Ya Tang commune 
Religious conversion 
There was an increasing trend of becoming religious in the resettled ethnic groups of the Jarai 
people. Many Jarai people converted to one of three religions: Catholic, Protestant and Buddhist 
after moving to the resettlement sites (56.8% of the Jarai surveyed households). It was easy to see 
the development of three religions in a small village of Jarai people such as O, Trang in the Yasier 
commune, and Chu and Tum in the Yali commune and Trap in the Ya Tang commune in the 
resettlement sites (Plate 5.16).  
Becoming religious or changing religions can be considered as a coping strategy of the resettled 
ethnic groups to the challenges faced in their resettlement sites. In the household survey, they were 
asked the reasons for being members of religions and three main groups of opinions were given as 
presented in Table 5.3. Many Catholics and Protestants from Jarai said that joining a religion would 
avoid some of the costs of traditional worship such as buying cattle, pigs and wine (as seen in 
Group 1, Table 5.3 below). Many other Buddhists, Catholic and Protestants also explained that they 
could receive support from the church and temple when joining the religion (Group 2, Table 5.3). 
They had already received support such as rice, noodles, cooking oil and old clothes. Some Jarai 
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people mentioned that they just followed their parents and neighbours in becoming a member of a 
religion or got information through radio (Group 3, Table 5.3). The motivations of the believers 
obviously showed that the resettled people were searching for a way of avoiding traditional 
practices with their excessive costs and gaining necessary support from the religious network. 
Table 5.3. The resettled people’s opinions about the reasons for religious membership 
Group 1 - Do not want to continue tradition worships which is costly 
Quotes: 
“People in B3 village in IaPhi commune told us about protestant that - no worship Yang, no wine, and no 
cigarettes”. 
“Being religious members, we did not have to worship cattle. Now we did not have enough cattle to practice 
worships” 
“Do not have to worship with cattle and follow sorcerer”.  
“Since we do not want to worship Ancestor. We are poor so we can’t buy cattle and pigs for worshipping”. 
“To be religious membership, we do not have to worship with cattle”. 
“Being membership we could erase the unsound custom” 
“To be Protestant we do not have to worship our ancestor with cattle. Therefore we made our decision”.  
“Do not have to worship ancestors”. 
“We are poor and afraid of worship which is costly. Thus we become Catholic”. 
“Being Catholic will not have to worships and patients have go to hospital instead of worshiping for 
recovering” 
“It meets the spiritual demands and erase the bad customs such as worships” 
“We heard through radio that becoming a Catholic, we do not have to worship which cost a lot of money”                                                                                            
“It is a way of stopping old fashion custom of worship which was costly”. 
Group 2 - Get support 
Quotes:  
“Monk from the temple in Kon Tum town come and provided rice, noodles and carried on missionary work” 
“Church gave us old clothes” 
“Church gave us Kerosene and salt” 
“Whenever we are hungry during the time between crops a monk from temple came to help. Thus we 
decided to be membership. We often go to Pagoda 1st and 15th” 
“We got rice support” 
“They give us noodles, cooking oil and second hand clothes”   
“Monk came to village and brought noodles and soybean sauces. Also we do not have to worship with cattle 
if following Buddha” 
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Group 3 - Just follow others 
Quotes: 
“Follow parents” 
“Our neighbours had joined first, then we followed them” 
“I saw many neighbours following the Protestant and they said it could erase the bad customs of worships 
with cattle and they would teach us how to make a living”.  
“There is a church in the new village and easier road access” 
“Since we came to live in this new village we started to be Catholic”  
“My wife is Catholic. Thus when I got marriage I had to be Catholic”  
“Listened from the radio and believe in” 
“Self decision to be members” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Plate  5.16: Religion development in Jarai life after the resettlement a. A Jarai woman joined 
the Buddhist faith in O village, b. A Catholic family in Trap village, c. A Jarai protestant in 
Binh Long village 
In general, many coping strategies were employed by the resettled people. Some of the strategies 
were based on government policies but most of them were initiated and developed by the resettlers 
themselves.  
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5.3. Key factors influencing selection of livelihood strategies and outcomes 
The research results show that several factors influenced coping strategies and defined outcomes. 
Those factors included agricultural land holding, social differentiation (ethnicity, education level of 
household heads, household size, skills, socio-economic class) and social networks (religious and 
mass organisation memberships) which are discussed in this section. 
5.3.1. Agricultural land holding 
Insufficient agricultural land was the major factor influencing the coping strategies and outcomes of 
the resettled people. Based on the discussion in Section 5.2, the livelihood strategies employed by 
the resettled people have been strongly dependent on their cultivation land holding. The area of 
cultivation land holding made the distinction between different coping strategies. The households 
having more than 1.5 ha of land could intensify their agriculture and receive higher income. 
However, the households having no cultivation land or little cultivation land (less than one ha) had 
not been able to intensify their agriculture such as by developing and investing in rubber 
plantations. Thus, they had been compelled to return to live and work in the previous swidden 
fields, go into debt due to borrowing money with high interest rates and/or wait to be moved again. 
In addition, they had shifted from agricultural subsistence based activities into non-farm activities 
such as hired labour or migrating to work in the cities and had engaged in unsustainable activities 
such as timber logging, collecting left-over agricultural products and gold panning.  
The area of agricultural land also played a role in defining livelihood outcomes in terms of 
household income. The results of the survey in Table 5.3 below demonstrate that the average 
income of households owning larger areas of cultivation land was significantly higher than the 
households owning less land. As shown in Table 5.3, the average household income of the group of 
households with more than two ha was about two to three times higher than the income of the 
groups with less than one ha.    
Table 5.3: Total household income based on the agricultural land holding (N=374) 
Agricultural land holding (ha) 
Mean household income in 
millions (VND) ± SD 
Number of 
households 
No land 36.2 ± (23.9) 29 
Less than 0.5  28.8 ± (24.2) 89 
0.5 - 1 34.8  ± (24.4) 75 
1-1.4 44.5  ± (38.0) 38 
1.4 - 2 50.1  ± (36.2) 63 
More than 2 101.0 ± (68.9) 80 
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Similarly, the agricultural land area strongly affected the rice security of households. Those 
households having larger cultivation land of more than one ha were much better off in terms of rice 
sufficiency compared with households that did not own any land or had less than one ha of 
cultivation land. Table 5.4 indicates that the groups of households without land or with less than one 
ha of land could have enough rice for from 4.9 to 6.5 months in a year while the groups with more 
than 1.4 ha reported to have enough rice for their families for from 7.5 to 10.5 months. It also 
highlighted that the household groups having less land suffered greater loss due to the resettlement 
project in terms of rice security since they experienced a greater rise in the number of months of 
rice shortage in comparison with the slight rise of the larger land holding households.      
Table 5.4: Rice sufficiency based on the agricultural land holding of households (n=389) 
Agricultural land 
holding (ha) 
 
 Number of months having enough rice 
Before the resettlement After the resettlement 
No land Mean  7.9 5.8 
 Number of households 30   
 Std. Deviation  4.5 4.7 
Less than 0.5  Mean  10.7 4.9 
 Number of households 95   
 Std. Deviation  2.4 4.3 
0.5 - 1 Mean  10.7 6.5 
 Number of households 76   
 Std. Deviation  2.6 4.4 
1-1.4 Mean  11.4 8.3  
 Number of households 40   
 Std. Deviation  1.4 3.8 
1.4 - 2 Mean  11.3 7.5 
 Number of households 65   
 Std. Deviation  1.9 4.3 
More than 2 Mean  11.5 10.5 
 Number of households 83   
 Std. Deviation  1.6 3.0 
  n=389   
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5.3.2. Social differentiation 
The resettled communities were not homogenous, which was the conventional view of the planners 
and developers. The results of this study highlight the different axes of social differentiation 
including ethnicity, education level, skills, socio-economic class, household size and ages, and 
occupation of household heads. These factors have influenced the differences in their selection of 
coping strategies and consequent livelihood outcomes.  
Ethnicity 
Ethnic differentiation played a key role in the impacts of the resettlement process on the livelihoods 
of people and entire households. Many ethnic minorities from Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao had been 
involved as hired labourers and engaged in unsustainable jobs such as gold panning, timber logging, 
collecting left-over agricultural products or returning to their previous swidden fields. This contrasts 
with the Kinh people since they lost the access to cultivation land, forest, streams and river and 
changes in socio-cultural life and limited job opportunities. Many Jarai returned to live and work in 
their old swidden fields. Moreover, they were the only group which had joined three religions since 
moving to the resettlement sites to avoid the traditional worship with cattle and wine which many of 
them could not afford now. Most of the resettled people who chose the strategies of borrowing 
money with high interest rates, gold panning, collecting left-over agricultural products were those 
from the Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao groups who had become more dependent on the cash economy 
and fallen into deeper debt since moving to the new area.  
The ethnic differentiation also impacted on the livelihood outcomes of the resettlement project. 
Large numbers of Kinh people had a much higher incomes compared to the three ethnic minority 
people. Figure 5.1 shows that the average income of Kinh households was two and a half to three 
times higher compared to the average income of the ethnic minority people. Moreover, the ethnic 
minority people depended on hired labour and other unstainable jobs such as gold panning, timber 
logging, and collecting left-over agricultural products in contrast to the Kinh. According to Table 
5.5, the income from agriculture made up more than 70% of the total income of the Kinh 
households while it was about 40% of the Bahnar and Ro Ngao groups and 60% of the Jarai. The 
income from non-farm activities such as hired labour of the three ethnic households was much 
higher than that of the Kinh.   
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Figure 5.1: Average household income of the resettled ethnic groups (n=377) 
 
Table 5.5: Income contribution of the resettled ethnic households 
Income sources Kinh Bahnar Jarai Ro Ngao 
Field crops (cassava) 40.74% 34.03% 51.96% 34.77% 
Tree crops (rubber, Litsea) 20.37% 4.53% 8.40% 4.21% 
Livestock breeding 10.18% 0.00% 3.18% 3.51% 
Fish 4.19% 1.24% 1.55% 0.34% 
Farm labour 2.89% 33.78% 9.08% 32.82% 
Non farm labour 0.62% 5.35% 1.44% 1.81% 
Land leasing 0.00% 0.36% 1.33% 0.00% 
Remittance 3.06% 20.16% 3.24% 13.80% 
Timber logging 0.00% 0.00% 3.49% 0.00% 
Gold panning 0.00% 0.00% 0.13% 2.71% 
Handicraft 0.00% 0.00% 0.50% 0.00% 
Government salaries 8.90% 0.00% 15.61% 4.06% 
Services 9.04% 0.00% 0.00% 0.35% 
Collecting left-over agricultural products 0.00% 0.55% 0.00% 1.02% 
Collecting non timber forest products 0.00% 0.00% 0.09% 0.60% 
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There was also a difference in poverty levels of the resettled households between the Kinh and the three 
ethnic minority groups. More than 60% of Bahnar and Ro Ngao households were living under the national 
poverty line and it was 38% for the Jarai. But the Kinh group had a much higher proportion of its households 
living above the poverty line (94%) with only 6% of its households being poor (Table 5.6).  
Table 5.6: The average per capita income of the ethnic people (n=376) 
Average per capita income  
(VND) 
Kinh  
(n=110) 
Bahnar  
(n=52) 
Jarai  
(n=117) 
Ro Ngao 
(n=95) 
1-400,000 (under the national 
poverty line) 
6% 63% 38% 64% 
400,001-1,000,000 25% 35% 45% 31% 
More than 1,000,000 69% 2% 16% 5% 
  100% 100% 100% 100% 
 
Similarly, the data in Table 5.7 indicates the higher proportions of Kinh households with enough 
rice to eat (10-12 months), compared with only 10% of the Ro Ngao group and less than 30% of the 
Jarai and Bahnar groups.   
Table 5.7: Rice sufficiency of the ethnic people (n=390) 
Rice shortage (months) 
Kinh 
(n=114) 
Bahnar 
(n=51) 
Jarai 
(n=123) 
Ro Ngao 
(n=102) 
10-12 months 75% 20% 28% 10% 
7-9 months 11% 43% 24% 11% 
4-6 months 2% 25% 17% 9% 
less than 3 months 11% 12% 32% 71% 
  100% 100% 100% 100% 
Education level and skills 
The education level of household heads, skills of the household members and ages all influenced 
the coping strategies used by the resettled households. The household heads with no formal 
education or primary education and with little skills tended to not be able to apply agricultural 
intensification. Poor agricultural skills were mentioned by the resettled people as a constraint to 
agricultural development. Many households did not receive any skill training on cultivation 
techniques or livestock husbandry and relied on their old traditional cultivation skills or engaged in 
unskilled hired labour. On the other hand, the age of household members was associated with 
coping strategies such as urban migration and timber logging. Most of the resettled people who 
migrated to work in the cities were young people.   
These above factors also influenced incomes among the resettled households. The higher the 
education level attained by the household heads the higher the average income the households 
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achieved. The average income of the households with no formal education was much lower than 
those households which had attended secondary and high school as presented in Table 5.8. The 
results also show significant difference in household income between the households that received 
training skills and the households with no training. The former group had an average household 
income of 60 million VND, but the latter group had an average income of 43 million VND.          
Table 5.8: The average per capita income of each group with different education levels 
Education level Mean household income in millions (VND) ± SD N 
No formal education                        31.2 ± (23.0)  146 
Primary                        51.6 ± (47.5) 114 
Secondary                        74.1 ± (62.8)  72 
High School                        90.6 ± (61.9)  33 
Vocational School                        69.5 ± (26.1) 2 
University degree                        85.5 ± (24.7)  2 
Total   369 
 
Socio-economic class 
Socio-economic class was another factor influencing the coping strategies of the resettled people. 
The main coping strategies of the poor households included hired labour, borrowing money from 
“convenience stores”, gold panning, and collecting left-over agricultural products. The middle and 
rich households mainly focused on agricultural intensification and borrowing money from the 
government banks. Thus, stratification could occur in the resettlement sites as the consequence of a 
considerable number of subsistence farmers moving into the hired labourer class. Table 5.9 
describes the trends of stratification and the gaps between the rich and poor. The income of poorer 
households came largely from unsustainable sources such as hired labour, gold panning, timber 
logging, and collecting left-over agricultural products. The poor household group received 34% of 
their total income from hired labour while it was only 3% for the better-off household group. 
Income from timber logging, gold panning, and collecting left-over agricultural products comprised 
4% of the poor households’ income. In addition, the poor group depended strongly on remittance as 
household members migrated to work in the cities.    
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Table 5.9: Household proportion of the poor and better-off7 household groups 
  
Poor households 
(n=146) 
Better-off households 
(n=101)  
Field crops 45% 36% 
Tree crops 2% 19% 
Livestock breeding 0% 11% 
Fish 1% 4% 
Farm labour 32% 2% 
Non farm labour 2% 1% 
Land leasing 1% 0% 
Remittance 12% 4% 
Timber logging 1% 0% 
Gold panning 2% 0% 
Government salary and subsidies 1% 13% 
Services 0% 9% 
Collecting left-over agricultural products 1% 0% 
Collecting non timber forest products 0% 0% 
 
Household size and age of household heads 
Household size in terms of number of members per household was also associated with the 
selection of some coping strategies such as hired labour, borrowing money, gold panning and 
timber logging. Given the higher number of family members and dependents living in the resettled 
sites with limited land and resources, the larger resettled households were driven to select strategies 
to overcome the challenges faced. 
The results also indicated that the higher the number of household members the lower the overall 
household income. On average, the large households with more than eight members had an overall 
income of 35 million VND per year which was much lower than households with fewer than four 
members which had an overall average income of 55 million VND per year. 
There was a difference in terms of income between the young, middle and old age groups. This 
reflected the difficulties of the resettled young households which often did not own any cultivation 
land or only a small area of land or faced job shortages in the resettlement sites. Table 5.10 shows 
that the average income of the young household groups (25-30 and 31-40 years old) was much 
lower than the average income of the remaining groups (41-50 and 61-70 years old).      
  
                                               
7The classification of poor and better-off households is followed the national poverty line (the Circular of Ministry of Labour, Invalids and Social 
Affairs17/2016/TT-BLĐTBXH): Poor household - Average per capita income is under 400,000 VND per month; Better household: Average per capita 
income is over 1,000,000 VND per month 
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Table 5.10: Household income based on the age group of the household heads 
Age groups of 
household heads 
Mean household income in 
millions (VND) ± SD 
Number of 
households (N) 
25-30              38.6 ± (45.9)        19  
31-40              44.4 ± (38.2)       68  
41-50              52.5 ± (50.7)      101  
51-60              50.3 ± (43.5)        74  
61-70              63.3 ± (62.2)        67  
more than 71              51.3 ± (47.6)       37  
Total 
 
    366  
 
The situation of rice sufficiency for household consumption was also influenced by the age of the 
heads of households and household size. The proportion of the household groups headed by 25-30 
year olds which faced rice shortages for more than six months was 63%. It was about 40% of the 
groups with ages 41-50 and 51-60. Furthermore, the households with large size suffered a longer 
period of rice shortage each year in comparison with the smaller ones, as was the case overall. Sixty 
percent of the large households (8-13 members) faced rice shortages for more than six months but 
only 34% of the small households with less than four members.  
Occupation of household heads 
Three types of occupation were held by household heads in the resettled population. Most heads of 
the resettled households (more than 87%) worked as farmers. A small number of resettled 
households were headed by persons working as government officers and traders or service 
providers (about 5%). Households with different occupations employed different coping strategies. 
The survey found that more than 50% of the households headed by the government officers and 
traders and service providers had utilised agricultural intensification, while only 20% of the pure 
farming households had intensified their agriculture. Table 5.11 shows that the income from 
households headed by government officers and traders was from two and a half to three times 
higher than that of the farmer headed households. The government headed households often got an 
income from cassava plantation and rubber plantation. The traders and service providers who 
owned “convenience stores” around the villages also invested in cassava plantations and rubber 
plantations besides their income from the “convenience stores”.       
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Table 5.11: Household income based on the household heads’ occupation 
Occupation of household 
heads 
Mean household income in 
millions (VND) ± SD 
Number of 
households (N) 
Government officer 107 ± (68.8)       19  
Farmer 41.5 ± (37.2)       327  
Trader and service provider 131 ± (61.1)     20  
Total 
 
    375  
 
5.3.3. Social networks 
Becoming members of the mass organisations and religions also influenced coping strategies and 
outcomes of the resettled households. The results show that more than 50% of the households that 
became members of the mass organisations such as farmers’ union, women unions and youth 
unions practised agricultural intensification. Only 10% of the non-members did the same. Similarly, 
37% of the mass organisation members diversified crops and livestock. However, less than 1% of 
non-members selected these strategies. The average income of the household group being members 
of mass organisations was 1.7 times that of the non-member households (Table 5.12).   
Table 5.12: Average income of the mass organisation member and non-member households 
Membership of the 
mass organisation 
Mean household income 
in millions (VND) ± SD 
N 
Yes               65.8 ± (55.6)  178 
No               38.0 ± (37.4) 197 
Total   375 
 
With regard to religion, many Catholics migrated to work in the cities following the introduction of 
nuns and the church. Thus, the results clearly indicated that 85% of the household members 
migrating to work in the cities were Catholic believers. The remittances sent home accounted for 
20% of the total household income of the Bahnar and 14% of that of the Ro Ngao (Table 5.5). In 
terms of the average household income, the non-religious with most of the Kinh households had the 
highest income which was more than twice the average income of religious households (see Table 
5.13).          
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Table 5.13: Average income of the religious and non-religious households 
Religion Mean household income in 
millions (VND) ± SD 
N 
Catholic        32.0 ± (25.5)         191  
Protestant        29.8 ± (21.3)           19  
Buddhist  33.0 ± (12.9)           12  
Non        79.2 ± (60.6)        153  
Total   375 
 
5.4. Discussion 
This research provides a comprehensive understanding of the livelihoods of the resettled ethnic 
groups by applying the sustainable livelihoods approach. Using this approach has helped to 
understand the embedded local realities (Scoones, 2009) of those people resettled and how they 
have adopted a host of strategies to help them cope with the resettlement. Informal coping strategies 
were dominant amongst the resettled people, which showed the limited engagement of institutions 
and policies dealing with the challenges of limited resources for the resettled people, including 
cultivation land, jobs and livelihood alternatives in the resettlement sites. In addition, most of the 
informal coping strategies were unsustainable over the long-term and even exacerbated the 
vulnerability of the resettled people.  
Resettlement should be understood as a process which unfolds over time (De Wet, 2006). However, 
previous DIDR studies and livelihood studies (Nguyen et al., 2016, Sayatham and Suhardiman, 
2015, Bui et al., 2013, Souksavath and Nakayama, 2013, Scoones, 2009, Wilmsen et al., 2011a, 
Randell, 2016) have focused mainly on the short-term changes of resettlement and ignored the local 
dynamics relating to the livelihood reconstruction process. In this case, the research found long-
term impoverishment of the resettled people because of the hydropower dam and agricultural 
development in the context of changing lifestyle of subsistence farmers and land tenure. The 
hydropower dam development caused the loss of access to forest, cultivation land and fish resources 
leading to food insecurity and poverty of the ethnic minority people who used to practise 
subsistence farming. The agricultural development of the Kinh people started the process of land 
accumulation through land purchase since the community land ownership no longer existed and the 
resettled ethnic minority people faced more hardship in their life. The trend had been continuing 
that the ethnic minority people had been increasingly dependent on the market and cash economy 
and had fallen deeper into debt. Thus, the most prominent change in the communities had been the 
shift of a large number of subsistence farmers into hired labour, urban migration and religious 
conversion.   
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It was clear that the resettlement process had not taken place in a vacuum since the resettled 
communities were not homogenous. De Haan and Zoomers (2005) emphasised that the livelihood 
trajectories of individual households are embedded in historical and social differentiation. Many 
scholars including Sakdapolrak (2014) have called for advancing the sustainable livelihood 
approach by drawing on Bourdieu’s theories of habitus and social practices to highlight human 
actions and their social embeddedness and path dependent characters. Koenig (2001) and Koenig 
(2006) raised the importance of studying social differentiation in DIDR to understand 
differentiation within groups and the potential conflicts of interest. This research makes a 
significant contribution to this area. It highlights several factors related to social differentiation 
involved in the resettlement process and outlines the subsequent divergent livelihood outcomes. The 
four ethnic groups being moved and resettled chose different coping strategies to respond to the 
changes in the resettlement sites based on their available assets and networks. The results found that 
not only ethnic differentiation but also the education level of the household heads, skills, socio-
economic class, household size and age, and occupations of household heads caused the 
differentiation in terms of coping strategies and outcomes. It was found that the community 
stratification in terms of household incomes and religion or mass organisation memberships had 
been increasingly recognised as a consequence of the complexity of resettlement. Thus, looking 
carefully into the influencing factors and differentiation would be able to provide a better 
understanding of the local situation and enable the development of more appropriate policies to 
improve the resettlement process and outcomes.         
Informal coping strategies and informal institutions played an important role in the livelihood 
reconstruction of the resettled people in post resettlement times. Few studies (Downing and Garcia-
Downing, 2009, Bisht, 2014, Lam, 2015) have demonstrated the informal coping strategies of 
resettled people to overcome their challenges in resettlement sites. Such informal strategies and 
institutions should be understood and taken into consideration in the resettlement planning and 
development process. In this case, although the formal structure such as local government and 
policies had not worked effectively, the informal institutions such as religious membership and 
mass organisation had made a committed and effective contribution in supporting the resettled 
people in dealing with challenges in the resettlement sites. Moreover, the study also found the 
religious conversion of the Jarai ethnic group was a way of responding to hardships in the 
resettlement sites and moving away from their old traditional culture.       
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5.5. Chapter conclusion 
This chapter has resolved the second research question by providing a comprehensive 
understanding of different livelihood strategies and outcomes and the influencing factors. The 
findings indicated that the resettled people applied a range of coping strategies to recover their 
livelihoods in the resettlement sites. After more than 15 years, the Kinh people had been successful 
in improving their livelihoods but most of the ethnic minority people still struggled with their daily 
life and a high number of ethnic minority households lived under the poverty line, faced food 
insecurity and were involved in unstainable livelihood strategies. This research found that the most 
crucial proximate cause for the successful restoration of livelihood was agricultural land holding 
which enabled the resettled people to be involved in agricultural intensification of cassava and 
rubber to secure an income. This was the case for the Kinh people who had larger tracts of 
agricultural land and as such had received higher incomes and were able to ensure food security. 
However, the ethnic minority people holding little land, or not owning any land, joined the hired 
labour force which became an important source of their household income. The ultimate cause for 
this appeared to lie in the social dynamics associated with the erosion of human, social and 
ultimately psychological capital that led to land loss and indebtedness. 
By studying the long-term process of livelihood reconstruction in the post resettlement process, this 
study has provided significant insights into livelihood resilience of the resettled ethnic groups who 
coped with displacement and resettlement. The resettled people applied many formal and informal 
coping strategies to survive in the resettlement sites. However, given limited supporting institutions 
and sound polices as well as limited resources in the resettlement sites, many of the ethnic minority 
faced hardship and become vulnerable. The understanding of all coping strategies and their adaptive 
capacity is a foundation for further steps to ensure their long-term livelihood development and 
advance the knowledge around DIDR and livelihood related studies. 
Other factors such as social differentiation and social networks were important to the livelihood 
reconstruction process. The adaptive capacity of the households was dependent largely not only on 
land holding but also on the education level of household heads, skills, household size and age of 
the household heads, socio-economic class and occupation of household heads. All of these factors 
have the potential to strongly influence the livelihood reconstruction of households and livelihoods 
if attention is paid to capital building initiatives. A pathway in social network building for the ethnic 
minority resettled people could be through their receiving key support from the religious networks 
in restoring their livelihoods. Those who joined the mass organisations received dedicated support 
such as facilitation of bank loans and training on cultivation techniques which made them more 
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successful in developing their livelihoods. This is not the only pathway but it provides a map for 
significant policy modification that orientates relocation away from a narrow compensation model 
to one focused on the development of communities with strong multi-capital systems. This is the 
subject of the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER VI. 
AN ADAPTED FRAMEWORK FOR UNDERSTANDING, MONITORING AND 
ENHANCING LIVELIHOOD RESILIENCE OF THE RESETTLED PEOPLE 
 
6.1. Chapter Introduction 
Chapter IV, in addressing research question 1 “How has the Yali Falls Dam resettlement project 
affected the resettled ethnic groups’ livelihoods?”, demonstrated how the overall changes in 
multiple capitals among the ethnic groups provided a foundation for explaining the adaptive 
capacity of the groups when confronted with the changes associated with relocation. Chapter V 
addressed research question 2 “How and why do the subsequent livelihood strategies and outcomes 
differ among the ethnic groups?”. In doing so it discussed the different coping strategies of the 
resettled ethnic groups in responding to the challenges in the resettlement sites and several factors 
influencing the resettlement process and outcomes. The results identified that the Kinh group 
(ethnic Vietnamese) and rich households from the ethnic minority people employed more viable 
coping strategies while the majority of ethnic minority groups used unsustainable livelihood 
strategies. The main factors, including agricultural land holding, social differentiation, networking 
and the dynamics of capital stocks, played a key role in influencing and defining coping strategies 
and outcomes in the resettlement process for the four ethnic groups in the study.  
The conclusion in Chapter V was that the Kinh had been systematically advantaged by the 
resettlement dynamic while the three remaining ethnic groups had undergone significant livelihood 
decline. This chapter addresses this by considering research question 3: “What are the key 
modifications to the existing DIDR frameworks that could improve resettlement program planning 
and implementation?” To answer this question, the chapter examines the resettlement processes and 
outcomes of the resettled ethnic groups through the three major frameworks in DIDR namely: 
▪ four stage framework (Scudder and Colson, 1982),  
▪ risk and reconstruction framework (Cernea, 1997),  
▪ routine and dissonant culture framework (Downing and Garcia-Downing, 2009). 
Although the sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) is not a major framework of DIDR it 
informed aspects of the surveys and interviews and provided useful insights. It receives some 
attention later in this chapter. The results of this research and other relevant livelihood research also 
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highlighted the strengths of  the sustainable livelihoods framework(Scoones, 1998) which will be 
discussed below.  
The strengths and weaknesses of these frameworks are evaluated against the case study of the 
resettled people of the Yali Falls area. Ultimately, an adapted framework for identifying, monitoring 
and enhancing livelihood resilience of the resettled ethnic groups is developed and proposed based 
on the research results and strengths of the existing framework.  
The findings of this chapter are synthesised from the review in Chapter II and the analysis ofthe 
results of Chapter IV and Chapter V together with the additional qualitative data from the survey 
and key informant interviews. The overall objective is to test the ability of the established 
frameworks (Chapter II) and the conclusions reached so far in this study (Chapters III and IV) to 
understand the social dynamics of resettled people and how they adapt.  
This chapter is organised as follows: the first section summarises the findings from Chapter IV and 
Chapter V in Figure 6.1. The second section discusses the strengths and weaknesses of the existing 
frameworks by looking at this case study and other case studies in Vietnam. The third section 
proposes an adapted framework for understanding, monitoring and enhancing livelihood resilience 
of the resettled people.   
6.2. Summary of the research findings in Chapter IV and Chapter V 
The research findings are summarised in Figure 6.1 below. The pentagons in the fifth row of this 
figure show the changes in livelihood resources (Figure 4.6 in Chapter IV) from before and after 
resettlement as dotted line pentagons and the current situation of livelihood resources after the 
resettlement in solid line. It clearly shows that the resettlement project caused positive impacts on 
the resettled people from the Kinh group of economic migrants and negative impacts on the other 
ethnic minority people namely the Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao groups. This came about because the 
range of livelihood strategies employed by the resettled people was significantly different, 
reflecting different social dynamics (Chapter V). The majority of the Kinh group applied 
development strategies such as agricultural intensification, trade and services and commercial 
fishing in the reservoir as shown in the left column of Figure 6.1. However, the ethnic minority 
people tended to employ unsustainable coping strategies including working as labourers, selling 
land, borrowing money with high interest rates, illegal logging, and gold panning to meet the 
challenges in the resettlement sites, as presented in the right column. Only a small proportion of the 
rich households from the three ethnic minority groups and some of the poor households from the 
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Kinh ethnic group followed opposite trends of the development strategies and coping strategies, 
respectively (as in shown in the two solid arrows of Figure 6.1). 
The research identified different key factors influencing coping strategies and livelihood outcomes 
including land holding, differentiation within the resettled communities and social networks. As 
illustrated in the solid connectors, Figure 6.1 demonstrates that land holding influenced most of the 
livelihood strategies. But the social differentiation within the resettled communities such as 
ethnicity, education level, age, socio-economic class, household size also defined the strategies 
used. This is presented as the small dotted line connectors between social differentiation and the 
strategies in this figure. In addition, there is clear evidence that being members of religious groups 
and mass social organisations enabled resettled people to gain access to skill trainings, get jobs and 
migrate to urban areas. This is demonstrated in the dotted line connectors between social networks 
and strategies. The last row of the figure shows differentiated outcomes as the consequence of 
changing the livelihood resources and employing the development and coping strategies. Most of 
the Kinh people in the left column of development strategies achieved better outcomes in term of 
income, food security and wellbeing. But a large proportion of the ethnic minorities in this study 
and resettled people in other resettlement projects experienced the impoverishment risks listed in 
Cernea’s framework which will be discussed below.  
  
139 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Summary of key findings (Chapter II to VI): The historical context of the Central 
Highlands and the Yali Falls Dam resettlement project were discussed in Chapter II and III. 
Chapter IV showed the differentiated impacts of the resettlement project on the resettled 
ethnic livelihoods in terms of the changes in livelihood capitals. Differentiated livelihood 
strategies and influencing factors were revealed in Chapter V. Chapter VI examined the 
resettlement process of the Yali Falls Dam and other relevant case studies in Vietnam through 
the lenses of the DIDR framework and the sustainable livelihoods framework and two trends 
of outcomes. 
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6.3. Examining the resettlement process and outcomes of the resettled ethnic groups through 
the main frameworks of DIDR and the sustainable livelihoods framework 
This section aims to understand the resettlement process and outcomes in the Vietnamese case 
studies by employing the three key frameworks that have been used in relation to DIDR. The 
strengths and weaknesses of each framework are discussed in the specific case of DIDR in order to 
indicate what the limitations for each framework are, and provide a basis for suggesting a more 
comprehensive approach. 
6.3.1. The four stage framework 
As discussed in Section 2.3.2 of Chapter II, the study by Scudder and Colson (1982), based mainly 
on the study of an ethnic group (Tonga in Africa), conceptualised the resettlement process as a four 
stage framework. These stages included: 1. planning and settlement; 2. transition; 3. potential 
economic and social development; and 4. handing over and incorporation. Scudder and Colson 
(1982) developed the framework based on the assumptions that resettled people throughout the 
world experiencing relocation would react in predictable and similar ways to dam resettlement. 
They also emphasised that if opportunities and resources for development were provided rather than 
too much of the focus being on compensation and income, resettlers would be able to reverse risks 
and benefit from relocation. Thus, this framework is used as a device to analyse the dynamics 
involved and predict behavioural responses of resettlers to a resettlement that is successful and goes 
through all the four stages.     
This behavioural framework does not hold true for the resettlement project of Yali and other cases 
in Vietnam. Resettlers have often received inadequate land compensation in most of the 
resettlement projects in Vietnam (Section 2.5.3). Thus, they had to clear forest for cultivation land 
in the case of Yali in the Central Highlands and A Vuong in the Central Region (Singer et al., 2015) 
or find alternative ways to make a living such as labourer and urban migration in this case. In 
addition, the land shortage caused several consequences in the case of Yali and many others. 
Secondly, as mentioned in Sections 1.3, 2.7.1.1, 3.2.1.3, the resettled people in Vietnam have often 
come from different ethnic groups with different social, political and historical contexts who were 
located in the mountainous region where there were favourable conditions for hydropower 
development. The complexity of these groups in the context of history, political and socio-
economic context made the longer-term outcomes of the resettlement project difficult to predict. A 
district government official complained: 
“The hydropower companies and planners always stated that hydropower would develop 
our economy and improve our people’s life. In fact, it has not. We have seen too many 
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problems which we could not think of before resettlement”. (A Jarai government official–
GoJ1). 
Scudder (2005b) wrote that “When opportunities are available, it is interesting that resettlers 
around the world tend to follow the same development strategies” (P. 39). The four stage 
framework does not capture the complexity of the resettlement process which includes access to 
agricultural land holding, social differentiation and social networks involved in the resettlement 
process as in the case of Yali (discussed in Section 5.3 of Chapter V). This is illustrated in the sixth 
row of Figure 6.1. Researchers, planners and developers did not take all the relevant factors into 
account or just simplified the process which was conceptualised in the four stages. In reality, the 
outcomes and consequences of the resettlement process have often turned out in different ways 
which were not predictable. This unexpected complexity is illustrated by the changes in land use 
rights and agricultural land holding which led to uncontrolled land purchase and land accumulation 
by a few, and indirectly led to food insecurity for many households, shifting into the wage labour 
class and slipping into debt. Furthermore, the diverse ethnic background of participants in this study 
with the inherent diversity of lifestyles, education level, age, skills, economic class and occupations 
resulted in a range of responses to the resettlement policy and associated packages and 
compensation. This shows that the complexity inherent in the resettlement process put outcomes at 
risks with differences rather than similarities as was the assumption of this framework (De Wet, 
2006).  
The Yali Falls data indicate that the process and outcomes of the resettlement did not follow the 
simplified set of sequential stages suggested by the four stage framework. Scudder and Colson 
(1982) argued that resettlers experience most distress and feelings of hopelessness in the first two 
stages following resettlement. It was proposed that the majority of the resettled people should then 
become more innovative and improve their living standard in the third phase (Scudder, 2005b). In 
the Yali Falls case of the same resettlement project, after 15 years, the Kinh group and the ethnic 
minority groups had been applying different coping strategies based on their livelihood resources 
and had entered into different stages of resettlement. The Kinh group had entered the third stage of 
social and economic development with agricultural intensification, trading and service business and 
migration while other groups were still in the transition phase and engaged in non-diversified and 
unsustainable livelihoods including selling remaining land, borrowing money with high interest 
rates, illegal logging, and gold panning. Most of the ethnic minority people of Bahnar, Jarai and Ro 
Ngao continued to experience hardships due to financial crisis and rice shortage (details in Section 
4.3 of Chapter IV). 
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“Ethnic minority households in Yali commune used to be poor in their old villages. But they 
have been getting poorer after the resettlement due to losing land. Ethnic minority 
households in Trang village in Yasier commune used to be better-off but become poor after 
losing land along the river by the dam construction. But the Kinh people in Dong Hung and 
Kien Xuong villages of Yali commune can plant rubber and Litsea since they have bought 
lots of lands from other villagers”. (A Jarai government official–GoJ2) 
This framework could not explain the reasons for the religious conversion of the Jarai group only, 
instead of the other three groups since the resettlement. In the same resettlement project, the 
resettled ethnic people from the four ethnic groups had responded to the resettlement challenges 
differently. This framework, with the assumption of similar behaviour responses from resettled 
people failed to explain the different coping strategies of the resettled ethnic groups. This supports 
the warning from De Wet (1988) that this framework, which aimed at a high level of generality, 
may cause significant empirical differences within different types of communities to be overlooked.  
In sum, the framework showed limited value in the context of Vietnam which is similar to the 
experience of the analysis of Mahapatra (1999) when using the framework in the resettlement 
experience of India. The resettlement experiences in this research and other cases in Vietnam did 
not follow the patterns of the proposed progression. Moreover, the model failed to capture the 
relevant factors involved in the resettlement process complex.      
6.3.2. Impoverishment risk and livelihood reconstruction framework 
Impoverishment risk and livelihood reconstruction framework (IRR) (Cernea, 1997) is an analytical 
framework to understand unsuccessful resettlement projects. This framework was developed based 
on the disappointing world wide experience on displacement and resettlement, with three 
fundamental core concepts of risk, impoverishment and reconstruction. It aims to provide a 
predictive function to take into account the eight common risks of resettlement projects, to 
understand the impoverishment process and to propose reconstruction and improvement of 
livelihoods by reversing risks. The following sections examine the relevance of this framework in 
Vietnam and its strengths and weaknesses.  
Strengths of IRR and its application in the resettlement project in Vietnam 
Many studies on the impacts of development-induced resettlement projects have been done in 
Vietnam. However, no study has been systematically conducted in order to understand the common 
risks of the projects. Thus, the IRR framework was used to test against the resettlement experience 
in Yali Falls as well as other studies on dam induced displacement and resettlement in the northern 
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mountain region (Hirsch and Thinh, 1996, Bui and Schreinemachers, 2011, Bui et al., 2013, Thang, 
1992) and central region of Vietnam (Hung et al., 2004, Singer et al., 2015, Ty et al., 2013, Nguyen 
et al., 2016) with the aim of identifying the common risks in the resettlement projects in Vietnam.  
Under this framework, Cernea (1997) identified the eight common risks included landlessness, 
homelessness, joblessness, food insecurity, loss of access to common property, increased morbidity, 
marginalisation and social disarticulation. Table 6.1 below presents the risks from the framework 
which occurred as well as additional risks found in this study and other studies on resettlement 
projects in Vietnam. The risks are put in order from those which occurred most frequently to those 
which occurred least frequently according to the available evidence.  
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Table 6.1: Comparison of published literature on resettlement projects in Vietnam with the 
impoverishment and reconstruction model 
The impoverishment risks Hydropower dam resettlement projects 
Central Highland Central Region Northern Mountain 
This 
study 
Pleikrong 
(2004)8 
A Vuong 
(2006)9 
Ta Trach 
(2011)10 
Ban Ve 
(2005)11 
Hoa Binh 
(1980)12 
Son La 
(2009)13 
Risks from the framework 
  
     
Landless ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ 
Marginalisation ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓ 
Food insecurity ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓  
Loss of access to common 
property 
✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ 
✓✓✓  ✓✓✓ ✓ ✓✓✓ 
Social disarticulation ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓  ✓ ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓ 
Jobless ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓ ✓ ✓✓✓ ✓ ✓ 
Homeless ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓  ✓✓✓ ✓  
Increased morbidity&mortality 
  
     
Additional risks        
Financial crisis ✓✓✓ ✓✓✓ ✓    ✓ 
Power inequity among the 
resettled people 
✓✓✓  
     
Access to education ✓✓✓    ✓✓✓   
(Notes: ✓✓✓: occurred with clear evidence, ✓: occurred with limited evidence, blank: no evidence) 
                                               
8 HUNG, D. T., NGA, D. T. V. & TRUNG, T. C. 2004. Study into existing land use planning, housing, environment and sanitation in resettled communities in 
Pleikrong hydropower dam, Kon Tum province. Vietnam: Centre for Natural Resources and Environmental Studies (CRES) and International 
River Network (IRN). 
9 TY, P. H., VAN WESTEN, A. & ZOOMERS, A. 2013. Compensation and Resettlement Policies after Compulsory Land Acquisition for Hydropower 
Development in Vietnam: Policy and Practice. Land, 2, 678-704; SINGER, J. & HOANG, H. 2014. Participation in resettlement decision-making 
by dam-displaced villagers in central Vietnam. Asia Journal of Global Studies, 6, 16-29. 
10 NGUYEN, H. T., LOBRY DE BRUYN, L. & KOECH, R. 2016. Impact of hydropower dam development on agriculturally based livelihoods of resettled 
communities: a case study of Duong Hoa Commune in central Vietnam. International Journal of Water Resources Development, 1-19. 
11 VO, V. H. 2011. Current Environmental Situation of the Resettlemnt Site of Ban Ve Hydropower. In: TRANH, T. V. H. A. D. (ed.) Research on 
Resettlement in Hydropower Projects in the Doi Moi Period. Vietnam Encyclopaedia Publishing House. 
12 MARD 2013. Results, shortcomings of implementation of compensation, support and resettlement policies of the hydropower dams in Vietnam. Ministry 
of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD). 
13 BUI, T. M. H. & SCHREINEMACHERS, P. 2011. Resettling Farm Households in Northwestern Vietnam: Livelihood Change and Adaptation. 
International Journal of Water Resources Development, 27, 769-785; BUI, T. M. H., SCHREINEMACHERS, P. & BERGER, T. 2013. 
Hydropower development in Vietnam: Involuntary resettlement and factors enabling rehabilitation. Land Use Policy, 31, 536-544; HA, T. V. 
2011. Local People’s Participation in Involuntary Resettlement in Vietnam: A Case Study of the Son La Hydropower Project. In: LAZARUS, K. 
(ed.) Water rights and social justice in the Mekong region. Earthscan; MARD 2014. Report on Implementation of Policies and Mechanisms for 
Resettled People and Resettlement of Irrigation and Hydropower Dam Development of Northwest Region of Vietnam including Lai Chau, Son 
La, Tuyen Quang, Thanh Hoa, Nghe An, Dien Bien, Lao Cai Provinces. Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MARD). 
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Landlessness 
This is the first important risk described in Cernea’s framework. It can be the loss of a part or all of 
the land which forms the production system of resettlers (Cernea, 1997). This risk has resulted in 
economic consequences such as causing resettled people to change from lives as agricultural 
farmers into situations where they work as labourers, get into debt and have social consequences 
(Nayak, 2000).     
There is much evidence that many resettled people in Vietnam have experienced a significant 
reduction in their agricultural land after resettlement (Table 6.1). Prior to resettlement, many 
households had sufficient access to arable land for wet rice and secondary crops in the riverbank, 
near streams and valleys. But after the resettlement they had typically lost the wet rice fields and 
received smaller land areas as compensation. These areas were inadequate and smaller than was 
promised prior to resettlement. The ethnic minority groups in the Yali case received less than one 
ha of cultivation land in the resettlement sites but they used to have two to three ha before moving. 
Similarly, in the A Vuong Hydropower Dam in the central region, each resettled household lost 2.8 
ha of productive land (Ty et al., 2013). This trend was repeated for the resettled people in the Son 
La Hydropower Dam who lost 33% of paddy land and 79% of sloping cultivation land after 
resettlement (Bui and Schreinemachers, 2011). Few households (35% of a resettled village) 
received the area of cultivation land promised by the hydropower authority in the case of the A 
Vuong Hydropower Dam (Singer and Hoang, 2014).    
The loss of land area was significant, but the impact was exaggerated when the small area that was 
provided as compensation was of poor productive capacity. Many resettlers in the resettlement sites 
in Vietnam including Yali complained about the quality of cultivation land received in 
compensation since it was degraded, rocky and sloping and not irrigated (Figure 4.1 in Chapter IV). 
For instance, the reclaimed land for wet rice in the resettlement sites of Yali was not irrigated and 
not ready for rice cultivation. Thus, it was used for cassava and rubber plantations which clearly 
can’t provide the household with adequate food security from rice. A large area of the reclaimed 
land was sold to the Kinh people in the district and other provinces to plant rubber. Moreover, the 
arable land for cassava plantation was sloping and infertile. One resettler in the study site stated: 
“The whole good land was flooded by Yali. The cultivation land now is too sloping and 
infertile for cultivation. Rice productivity was twice in the old village. Cassava harvest is 
poor now with small tubers. We did not have money to put fertilizers in and it needs two 
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years to wait for cassava tubers getting bigger and higher starch amount to be able to sell”. 
(A Jarai resettled man–RJ5)      
In addition to land shortage issues in resettlement sites, becoming landless after the resettlement 
was also observed. As discussed in Chapter V, many ethnic minority people in the resettlement of 
Yali had to sell their remaining land to pay for debt and related costs since moving to the new 
village. Besides that, many households with relatively younger heads had become landless given the 
limited land resources and population growth in the resettlement sites. The risk of landlessness was 
raised by all of the interviewed local government officials and the resettled people.  
In sum, the risk of landlessness is real for most of the resettled people in this case and other cases in 
Vietnam. Furthermore, it has caused other related risks such as homelessness, joblessness, food 
insecurity, marginalisation, financial crisis and education disruptions which are discussed below.  
Marginalisation 
Cernea (1997) defined economic, social and psychological marginalisation as a consequence of 
displacement. Economic marginalisation is considered to be when middle income people become 
landless or have smaller holdings or when people are unable to use their skills at the new place. 
Social and psychological marginalisation is caused by a drop in social status, loss of confidence and 
slipping into vulnerable situations.       
The data from studies on the A Vuong hydropower project (UNDP, 2016, Singer et al., 2015), Hoa 
Binh hydropower project (MARD, 2013) and Son La hydropower project (Ha, 2008, MARD, 2014) 
revealed the risk of economic marginalisation experienced by the resettlers. The results outlined in 
Chapter V showed that approximately 43 % of the total resettled households of the Yali project 
were living under the poverty line and described the downward spiral path with unsustainable 
livelihood activities and slipping into poverty due to losing land and getting higher debt. The 
poverty rate increased significantly by more than 30% after the resettlement in two resettled 
communes in the Dong Giang district of the A Vuong Hydropower Dam. The poverty rate of 
resettled households in Dien Bien provinces of the Son La project made up 38.9% of total 
households. The government report on 15 hydropower resettlement projects in Vietnam indicated 
that the poverty rate in the resettlement sites was relatively high (36.1%) compared to the whole 
national poverty rate (10%).  
Social and psychological marginalisation was also observed in the Yali Falls study and other cases 
in Vietnam. Section 4.3 in Chapter IV showed the high number of resettled households, especially 
ethnic minority people who mentioned their worries of debt and acquiring daily meals since 
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resettlement. In addition, about 80 Jarai households in this study and hundreds of Tai and Muong 
households in the Ban Ve case study left the resettlement sites and lived in their previous swidden 
fields which were isolated. Resettled young people in the Ro Ngao group faced difficulty in getting 
married to other non-resettled Ro Ngao people in other areas since they considered resettled Ro 
Ngao as poor and landless people. A resettler from the Ro Ngao group said: 
“The young Ro Ngao men in this village also faced another difficulty is that it is difficult for 
them to get marriage with people in other villages. They know that the man in this villages 
come from households having limited land”. (A Ro Ngao resettled woman–RR1)   
In summary, both economic and social marginalisation was happening to the resettled people from 
the ethnic minorities who had slipped into a downward spiral of development.   
Food insecurity 
Forced uprooting increases the risk that people will fall into temporary or chronic 
undernourishment, defined as calorie-protein intake levels below the minimum necessary for 
normal growth and work (Cernea, 1997). In the context of this research, food security is considered 
as the number of months during which a household has sufficient rice for its consumption and 
access to forest as a source of food.  
Food insecurity has been the most severe and long-term consequence to the resettlers in many 
resettlement sites in Vietnam. Table 6.1 indicates the much evidence of this risk was found in this 
study, in the Pleikrong study in the Central Highlands and in other case studies such as A Luoi, A 
Vuong and Ban Ve hydropowers’ resettlement projects.  This research found that a large number of 
resettled households lost their capacity to supply rice for their family and faced rice shortage for 
several months. They also lost their access to wild vegetables from the forest and fish sources from 
river. A similar finding on food security decline from 53 percent of subsistence food production to 
five percent as a result of significant loss of cultivation land was found in the case of the A Luoi 
Hydropower Dam resettlement project in Thua Thien Hue province, central region (Ty et al., 2013) 
and 80 percent of the resettled households in the Pleikrong resettlement project faced rice shortages 
for more than four months of the year (Hung et al., 2004) and food security decline caused by poor 
soil productivity and decreased access to fisheries and wildlife in the A Vuong Hydropower Dam 
project (Singer et al., 2015, Singer and Hoang, 2014).  
Research by the Institute of Food and Nutrition Science of Vietnam (Oanh, 2014) found that the 
rate of undernourishment in children younger than five years old in the resettlement sites was much 
higher than the provincial average and national average rates. In a study on malnourishment of 
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children under five years old in four resettlement sites of hydropower dams in the Central 
Highlands, the numbers of underweight, stunted and wasting children were 39.2%, 48.7%, and 
10.7% respectively (Oanh, 2014) while the average rates of Kon Tum province were 26%, 40%, 9% 
respectively (PPC, 2016) and the national average rate of stunted children was23% (Chaparro, 
2014). 
In brief, the resettled people throughout the country faced the common issue of rice shortage as a 
consequence of losing areas of cultivation land and diminished access to river and forest resources. 
In addition, malnutrition in children was another issue for the resettlement sites in Vietnam.  
Loss of access to common property 
For poor people, particularly for the landless and assetless, loss of access to the common property 
assets that belonged to relocated communities (pastures, forested lands, water bodies, burial 
grounds, quarries, etc) resulted in significant deterioration in income and livelihood levels. 
Typically, losses of common property assets were not compensated for by governments (Cernea, 
1997).  
This risk is common to the resettlement sites in Vietnam listed in Table 6.1 since the livelihoods of 
most of the resettled people were living in the mountainous regions where livelihoods rely on 
grazing land, forest land and water bodies including river and streams. This research found 
significant reduction (three to four times less) of livestock owned by the ethnic groups due to losing 
their grazing land (see Section 4.2.5 and Table 4.6). Furthermore, Section 4.3.1 presented a 
reduction of access to forest and fishing in about 50% of the resettled households from the ethnic 
minorities in the Yali case. Nguyen et al. (2016) indicated that the contribution of income from 
forest products to total household income dropped from six percent to two percent in the case of the 
Ta Trach project after the resettlement. The number of wildlife hunters decreased by half after the 
resettlement of the A Vuong project due to limited access to forest (Singer et al., 2015). A 
significant decrease in income from forest products was found in the Son La Hydropower Dam 
resettlement project (Bui et al., 2013). 
Another issue was the loss of access to river and springs which provided water to the resettled 
people. More than 70% of the resettled from the ethnic minority groups responded that they had had 
a considerable or some decrease in their previous water availability in the resettlement sites as 
presented in Figure 4.4 and discussed in Section 4.2.1. 
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In general, the subsistence resettlers’ livelihoods relying on the common property had been 
seriously impacted due to the loss of access to common property after the resettlement. However, 
the impacts were not taken into consideration in the planning and compensation process.  
Joblessness 
Cernea (1997) stated that unemployment or underemployment among resettlers often endures long 
after physical relocation has been completed and substantial investment is required to  create new 
jobs. In addition, Wilmsen et al. (2011a) and Tan and Hugo (2011) stated that those resettled people 
often do not have transferable skills, have limited education levels and are not of suitable ages to 
compete in the employment market.      
Unemployment or limited jobs were common challenges for the resettlers in this case and other 
cases in Vietnam. Table 6.1 shows it as a risk for all the resettlement sites. Another challenge is the 
limited human capital of many resettled ethnic minority people, who are unskilled and not well 
educated. Their traditional agricultural and subsistence focused livelihoods mean that skilled jobs 
are not available to them. As Chapter V demonstrated 63.5% of the surveyed households had had to 
work as labourers, yet this employment was generally seasonal and an unreliable income source. 
These poor employment outcomes did not come close to compensating for the loss of agricultural 
production due to displacement. Many resettled young men in the Yali, Pleikrong, A Vuong, Ban 
Ve resettlement sites have had to become involved in illegal timber logging in the forest in other 
places. Moreover, several cases of young Ro Ngao and Jarai resettlers who are illiterate were 
cheated and over-exploited by construction owners without being paid.  
“Six young men of this Ro Ngao’s village went to work as builder’s labourers in Ba Na hill 
in Da Nang. But after 2-3 weeks they returned and did not get any money. They were 
cheated by contractor”. (A Ro Ngao resettled man–RR2). 
Another issue is that hydropower dam development and resettlement projects are expected to 
provide job opportunities and provide job training assistance to displaced people. In this case, no 
resettled people were found to work as workers for the hydropower companies. In addition, the 
government policies and programs on training and creating jobs for displaced people were 
ineffective. Several job trainings were implemented in the resettlement sites. However, no one was 
found to get a job through the government policies and programs or could develop their own 
business in the resettlement sites given their limited financial capacity. A quotation was offered by a 
resettler: 
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“Each year the district people committee held several trainings on motorcycle repair for 
many young people. But you can see how many motorcycle repair shop should be 
established here. We may just need one shop. But too many people joined the trainings”. (A 
government official from Jarai group–GoJ6) 
In general, resettlement projects have put many of the resettled people who used to be subsistence 
farmers without skills and limited education in Vietnam into a situation of unemployment or 
involved as unskilled labourers and in unsustainable jobs.  
Social disarticulation 
Forced displacement tears apart the existing social fabric. It disperses and fragments communities, 
dismantles patterns of social organisations, and interpersonal and kinship groups become scattered 
as well. Life-sustaining informal networks of reciprocal help, local voluntary associations, and self-
organised mutual services are disrupted. This is a net loss of valuable social capital that compounds 
the loss of natural, physical, and human capital. The social capital loss through social disarticulation 
is typically unperceived and uncompensated by the programs causing it, and this real loss has long-
term consequences (Cernea, 1997). 
Loss of traditional culture and religion and joining other religions due to the significant reduction of 
the common property and diminished related natural and social capitals were also found in this 
study and other studies on resettlement (Singer et al., 2015, Ty, 2015). As in this case, the loss of 
spring water sources led to the disappearance of worship regarding spring water. In addition, people 
practised less traditional worship such as puncture buffalo festivals and new rice harvest 
celebrations because of the limited grazing land and financial crisis (See the quotation below in 
6.3.3). Mutual help become rare since the changes in farming system and the inability of the host 
families to feed the sharers during mutual help as presented in 4.3.3 of Chapter IV. On the other 
hand, support from members in kinship groups had declined as they all had to deal with the 
financial crisis and food insecurity. As a result, many Jarai people converted from their traditional 
Jarai religion into other religions such as Buddism, Catholic, and Protestant.  
Changing traditional culture and religious conversion were also found in other resettlement projects 
in Vietnam (Table 6.1). In the A Vuong hydropower resettlement project, 40% of ethnic minority 
households of Co Tu reported changes in their culture to Kinh’s culture (ethnic Vietnamese) after 
the resettlement by speaking Kinh (Vietnamese) language frequently, building houses, preparing 
foods, wearing clothes and giving names as Kinh people did (Singer et al., 2015). It was also 
reported that several households could not maintain their culture and religion and had changed from 
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Co Tu religious tradition to Buddism and Christianity for hunger relief in the resettlement project of 
Binh Dien Hydropower Dam (Ty, 2015).  
In sum, social disarticulation was among the risks found in the resettlement projects. However, the 
model does not completely explain the process by which resettlement causes a risk of social 
disarticulation. That will be addressed in the following Section 6.2.3 by using routine and dissonant 
culture theory.  
Homelessness 
Loss of shelter tends to be only temporary for many resettlers, however, for some, homelessness or 
a worsening in their housing standards remains a lingering condition. In a broader cultural sense, 
loss of a family‘s individual home and the loss of a group’s cultural space tend to result in 
alienation and status deprivation (Cernea, 1997). However, homelessness can refer to the case 
where resettlers do not want to live in the houses and resettlement sites provided as part of the 
compensation package given the limited livelihood bases including cultivation land fields, low 
quality houses, lack of drinking water and jobs to make a living.  
This risk in terms of low house quality is quite common for resettlement projects over the country 
as shown in Table 6.1. The quality of houses provided is always an issue for the compensation and 
resettlement projects in Vietnam. In the Yali resettlement project, many shortcomings related to 
housing such as limited areas, low quality, and lack of toilet and kitchen were already reported (Dao 
et al., 2001). Issues have been repeated in other resettlement projects in Vietnam such as failure to 
capture a sense of traditional architecture, poor quality timbers in houses on stilts, and poor quality 
sanitation with potential of spreading diseases in the A Vuong hydropower resettlement project 
(UNDP, 2016, Singer et al., 2015, Ty et al., 2013). The generally poor quality building standards 
and materials led to rapid deterioration of houses in the case of the A Vuong project (Hung et al., 
2004).  
Another aspect of this risk is that there is often a distance between the homes in resettlement sites 
and their livelihoods. For example, many of the Ro Ngao group in the Kroong commune had to 
travel a long distance—from 20 to 40 km—to their swidden field or to work as hired labour or even 
60 km to do gold panning in neighbouring districts. The Jarai group had even returned to work and 
live in their old swidden fields because there were no available opportunities for making a living in 
the resettlement village (Section 5.2.2). About 200 resettled were waiting for further relocation and 
had lived under an uncertain and frustrating situation of homelessness for several years. Similarly, 
more than 300 resettled households had left the resettlement sites of the Ban Ve hydropower project 
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to live near the reservoirs after spending all their cash compensation within the first few years after 
relocation as there was no access to cultivation land, no electricity, frequent drinking water 
shortages and limited job opportunity in the resettlement sites. Thus, the long distance between 
homes and livelihoods was not a temporary but a long-term cost for the resettled people which 
made the houses provided for them of limited value.  
Overall, the risk of homelessness has been experienced widely in the resettlement sites in Vietnam. 
The longer distance between the resettled people’s homes and their livelihoods as well as poor 
quality housing are significant issues.      
Financial risk 
Financial risk occurs when resettlers, especially subsistence farmers, are in debt due to decrease in 
or loss of the agricultural production and the ability to maintain food sufficiency, unemployment 
and lack of capacity to pay for their household expenditure. Many resettled people from the ethnic 
minority groups had slipped deeply into debt as a consequence of losing land and food security (as 
discussed in Chapter V) and changing from a subsistence lifestyle to one based on a cash economy. 
The situation of debt had been occurring since they moved to the resettlement sites. Many resettlers 
stated that the debt burden had become a serious daily concern. This was frequently mentioned as 
being one of their worries in the resettlement site (See Figure 4.10). The problem was that the 
resettlers had not been able to clear the debt and their life and production had been under pressure 
from the debt. As shown in Table 6.1, it was a high risk for the resettlers in this study and in the 
Pleikrong hydropower project and a medium risk for those in the A Vuong and Son La hydropower 
dam projects.  
Power inequity risk among the resettled people 
This study added another risk of power inequity among the resettled people. This risk occurs when 
different communities with different level of education, skills and capitals are relocated and 
resettled in a place with limited resources. The other risks can be exacerbated with this risk and 
make the situation worse. The double displacement in this case was mentioned in Sections 4.2 and 
4.4 as a consequence of a more powerful group of Kinh with higher education levels and skills who 
took advantage of other ethnic minority groups with limited education and skills during the 
compensation and resettlement process. The sensitivity of this aspect should be taken into 
consideration in the resettlement process. A quote from a Kinh resettled man demonstrates this risk: 
“I used to be the head of this village. Now I retired and have monthly pension. I was able to 
borrow money from the bank by using my property as mortgage and lend it to the ethnic 
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minority people at high interest rate. That is good business why do not I do. Many people in 
this village do so”. (A Kinh resettled man–RK2) 
Education disruption 
Although loss of access to education has not been covered in the IRR model, education has been 
identified by multiple scholars as one of the most important indicators when addressing livelihood 
reconstruction (Mahapatra, 1999, Downing, 2002). According to Downing (2002), empirical studies 
show that a number of children of resettled households had had their schooling disrupted due to 
resettlement projects. These children never go back to school and instead join the labour force at an 
early age. Mahapatra (1999) also reported that the schooling of children of tribal groups resettled by 
the Salandi Major Irrigation project in Orissa, India was interrupted because the government did not 
construct and provide schools during the resettlement process. Affected children were only able to 
return to education nearly 10 years after physical relocation.  
Although great improvement to school after the resettlement was confirmed by the resettled people, 
many children of the resettled households from ethnic minority groups of Bahnar, Jarai and Ro 
Ngao (about 20% of those surveyed) were recorded as not going to school (Section 4.2.2). Parents 
had to bring their children to their swidden fields far from home or required them to work for 
families. Many children were left at home without parental supervision since their parents went to 
work far from home. Moreover, during the field study, many government officials and teachers 
stated that the rate of students finishing secondary school was even lower than before.  
“Many children from Jarai families had to drop schools, because they go to work and slept 
over in the swidden fields with their parents. Here we had to force children going to school. 
Otherwise, they did not want to go to school”. (A government official from Jarai group–
GoJ5) 
This important risk is crucial for sustainable development of the resettled people but it was ignored 
by the model and researchers.  
In general, the impoverishment risks in the model have been real in Vietnam. It can be concluded 
that the model’s strength is to provide planners, developers and resettled people with a predictive 
tool to alert planners to impoverishment risks upfront in the negotiation and development of a 
resettlement plan. However, in addition to not listing the financial and education risks which were 
occurring in Vietnam, this model has several weaknesses regarding its ability to understand the 
impoverishment process with its differentiated impacts and responses and reverse risks into 
development opportunities, which will be discussed below.  
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Weaknesses of IRR framework 
This model has been criticised as a reformist management approach as discussed in Chapter II. The 
scholars (Cernea, 1997, Scudder, 2012) of this approach viewed displacement as inevitable and a 
necessary part of development and aimed to minimise the negative outcomes of displacement by 
developing strategies, policies and financial inputs to reverse the risks into development 
opportunities (Dwivedi, 2002). However, this case clearly showed uneven impacts of the 
development on the resettled ethnic groups and an expanding gap between the Kinh and the ethnic 
minority groups and the rich and the poor which were not expected outcomes of development. The 
government policies and programs may even have exacerbated the situation. The majority of the 
resettlement projects in Vietnam and around the world demonstrate negative trends and result in 
many challenges of reversing risks. It is harder to reverse risks after displacement and resettlement 
and it continues a pattern of inequity in development.         
The second function of this model is to understand risk impoverishment processes. According to 
Chambers and Conway (1992), livelihoods comprise capabilities, assets and activities required for 
making a living. However, the term livelihood is not explicitly defined in this framework. In his 
analysis, Cernea focused on four capitals including physical, natural, human and social capitals 
while ignoring financial and cultural capitals. Thus, the framework does not list and explain 
financial risk. As found in Yali and other resettlement projects in Vietnam, financial risk was also 
taking place during the resettlement process and was related to the changes of lifestyle, reduction in 
natural capitals and the influence of the Kinh group with their possession of higher capitals. On the 
other hand, the loss of cultural identity of the resettlers is not covered in the framework. This makes 
is difficult to develop strategies to address the risk. 
With a focus on mitigating the impoverishment risks and ignoring the historical and socio-economic 
context and institutional process of a resettlement site, this framework fails to capture processes and 
factors which also affect the resettlement processes and outcomes. For example, the Yali 
resettlement project involved different ethnic groups with differentiated assets. The differentiated 
assets as discussed in Chapter IV and V led to a difference in capabilities, assets and processes in 
reconstructing of livelihoods and caused differentiated impacts. In addition, many factors were 
involved in the livelihood reconstruction process. In the Yali case, the changes in land use rights 
from communal into individual households and agricultural intensification would be considered 
good solutions for livelihood reconstruction. However, these changes provided favourable 
conditions for elite to prosper at the expense of impoverishing the subsistence farmers. The limited 
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understanding of the historical context and driving factors would make the framework impossible to 
operate in order to reconstruct and improve resettled people’s livelihoods. 
This framework has a function of providing a road map for reversing risks or reconstructing 
livelihoods by policies, strategies and financial input. However, it suggests mechanical strategies to 
deal with risks (Dwivedi, 2002) and is not sensitive to the different needs of the resettled people. 
One of the strategies is to convert from landlessness to land based re-establishment. The case of 
Yali, in reality, indicated that a range of livelihood pathways had been employed by the resettled 
people based on several factors such as their access to land, household demographics, and access to 
networks. Those factors shaped the resettlement process complex. Furthermore, given the 
significant differentiated assets of different households and resettled groups, the needs and 
interventions should be different. Agricultural intensification and diversification as advocated by 
many resettlement projects led to positive and negative consequences in this Yali case since it 
benefitted the Kinh group, owning larger areas of land and gaining higher education levels and 
skills and made the ethnic minority groups with lower areas of land holding, limited education and 
skills more dependent on the Kinh group. Involvement in a social network is also a defining factor 
for livelihood reconstruction processes and outcomes. Thus, the livelihood reconstruction strategies 
suggested by the framework are too simplified and ignore other important factors.  
Another weakness of this model is that it does not pay attention to power inequality which was 
often embedded in the historical, social and political context of resettlement sites as discussed in 
Section 3.2.1.4. The case study of Yali showed the influence of the Kinh group in the compensation 
and resettlement process compared to the voices of the ethnic minority people, which received less 
attention (Trung, 2013) and the Kinh group tended to get advantages from cash compensation and 
other supports during the resettlement process. In addition, the differentiation in terms of education 
level, skills owned and familiarity with a market economy between the Kinh and the ethnic minority 
groups caused power inequity which disadvantaged the ethnic minority groups. The weakness of 
this framework made the goal of converting risks into development opportunity impossible.      
In general, the IRR framework has its strengths as a predictive tool in resettlement planning. 
Nevertheless, its weaknesses are that it is incomplete in livelihood terms in that it is missing 
financial and cultural capitals and has limitations in taking into account socio-economic context as 
well as a process based on understanding risks. Thus, its functions of reconstructing and improving 
livelihood become limited.            
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6.3.3. Routine and dissonant culture model 
Intangible factors namely social and cultural capitals including kinship, traditional belief, mutual 
help, network membership and trust have been given less attention by researchers and policy 
makers of DIDR. Those capitals play an important part of livelihood resilience of any community. 
Nevertheless, the previous two theories mentioned above did not address psycho-socio-cultural 
disruption caused by displacement. Downing and Garcia-Downing (2009) made a significant 
contribution to the DIDR theory on conceptualising the psycho-socio-cultural impoverishment 
process of displacement by outlining the complex process of changing from routine to dissonant 
culture then to different routine culture. The fundamental changes of resettled people are related to 
space and time (De Wet, 1993). They describe that routine culture is formed by the same people in 
the same place. However, displacement causes the destabilisation of the routine culture through 
threatening and rendering. Consequently, it leads to a chaotic, uncertain and unpredictable life. 
Thus, routine culture is taken over by dissonant culture before a new routine culture is developed.  
This theory clearly explains the continuing trend of the conversion from the traditional religion of 
animism of the Jarai into three religions. This group is the one who most significantly lost their 
natural, social, cultural and psychological capitals with large numbers having debts and living far 
from town and main roads after the resettlement which was illustrated in Figure 4.6. In comparison 
to the Kinh group with strong connection to the government and being active in the social 
organisations and the Bahnar and Ro Ngao who had been Catholic followers since the 1850s 
(discussed in Section 3.2.1.4), the Jarai group with their traditional subsistence lifestyles were 
strongly affected after the resettlement. The animism religion of Jarai was closely associated with 
their farming system including swidden farming, fishing and communal forest and the leadership of 
elders in every village. For instance, they used labour sharing in much of their swidden farming 
during the time of large area swidden availability. The culture of sharing foods among family 
members and relatives during the time between crops used to be commonly applied, but it gradually 
disappeared as the consequence of losing the farming system and the capacity to supply themselves 
with food. In their old routine animism culture, they used to worship a wide range of Gods such as 
Jang, water and fire. In addition, they often organised festivals named puncture buffalo festival, new 
rice harvest, and spring water. However, due to the changes in the farming system and loss of 
access to forest land and river, they could not continue their traditional worships and festivals. As a 
consequence, they lost their traditional cultural identity. A quote from a resettled person from the 
Jarai group clearly reflected this: 
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“We were feeling happy in the old village with many traditional festivals from water spring 
worships, new rice worship, and communal house worship. Several festivals were done 
every year and we really enjoyed. But we are no longer practiced new rice and water spring 
worships anymore. Because we no longer do upland rice and our streams and springs were 
mostly flooded. What a pity!” (A Jarai resettled couple–RJ4)   
To rearrange networks and recover the loss of identity, the Jarai group converted to three religions. 
Being religious members allowed them to attend church services on weekends after returning from 
working in swidden fields or in waged labour far from home. This was convenient in terms of time 
arrangements in the new context of the resettlement sites and daily life. Moreover, as discussed in 
Chapter V, their conversion aimed to avoid the costly traditional worship and to get financial and 
food support as well as job introductions through their religious network. The conversion of the 
Jarai was a way to adapt to the situation of available resources in the resettlement sites and changes 
in space and time after the resettlement. A local government official was talking about the religious 
conversion trend: 
“The local people do not have any place to play now. The communal house is not the same 
as the traditional house. It is clear that they just come back to village during the weekend 
for praying in the church. I think that the number people becoming religious membership 
would be increasing in the coming year”. (A government official of Jarai group–GoJ6)   
In general, this framework clearly reflects the religious conversion of the Jarai groups in this study. 
However, it is not able to explain why the remaining three groups have not converted their religion. 
This weakness is addressed by SLF below.  
6.4. The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) 
The sustainable livelihoods framework (DFID, 2001) was developed based on the key concepts of 
sustainable livelihoods by Chambers and Conway (1992) with the aim of providing a 
comprehensive understanding of rural livelihoods in order to eliminate poverty and improve human 
wellbeing. This framework contains key elements including the livelihood context, livelihood assets 
(natural, human, physical, financial, and social capitals), institutional processes (formal and 
informal) for mediating and influencing livelihood strategies, and livelihood outcomes (Scoones, 
1998). Although this framework is not specifically oriented to DIDR it was employed to develop 
the surveys and interviews in this study. It has several key strengths which are relevant to a study on 
the impacts of resettlement and livelihood reconstruction in a post resettlement environment.      
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One of the strengths of SLF is to provide a comprehensive understanding of the positive and 
negative impacts of large scale investment project on livelihoods (Zoomers and Otsuki, 2017). The 
vulnerable context in this case was caused by the resettlement project which has led to changes in 
livelihood resources due to the resettlement project. This approach has also filled the gap in the IRR 
framework regarding missing capitals by taking into account all five capitals of the households. The 
research results in Chapter IV quantitatively compared the changes of each capital before and after 
the resettlement and the overall changes were qualitatively assessed and are illustrated in Figures 
4.6 and 6.1. They provided good insights into the differentiated impacts on livelihood resources of 
the resettled people. The reduction in social capitals of the ethnic minority groups illustrated in the 
fifth row of Figure 6.1 has significant implications for their adaptive capacity and outcomes.  
An additional strength of SLF is to improve our understanding of the different capabilities to cope 
with shocks and improve people’s livelihoods (Allison and Ellis, 2001, Scoones, 2009). Chapter V 
clearly identified different coping strategies of the resettled people which were taken in a social 
context with factors of differentiated livelihood strategies and outcomes (see Figure 6.1). The 
factors including changes in land rights and land holding, social differentiation and social networks, 
have shaped the livelihood strategies and outcomes. The research results indicated that the resettled 
people with different occupations and networks of religion and social organisations had different 
access to livelihood capitals which could be combined to form different strategies and achieve 
different outcomes. In Section 5.3.2, the findings indicated that the Kinh people were more actively 
involved in social organisations such as farmers’ unions and were able to receive skill training and 
higher access to finance which would be an advantage in intensifying their farming. However, most 
of the ethnic minority people with limited education levels and without active membership of the 
social organisations could find it difficult to intensify their farming. Without understanding the 
factors it would not be possible to understand the uneven distribution of the costs and benefits of 
development. This would be a benefit in adding SLF to IRR.     
Application of SLF would be useful to identify the right interventions for improving post-
displacement community resilience. Leisz and Vien (2006) found that the government policies often 
fail due to seeking to modernise rural sectors without taking local existing capacities into account. 
Price and Singer (2015) emphasised the importance of social and cultural capital in livelihood 
reconstruction and living standard improvement in DIDR. Singer et al. (2015) demonstrated the 
improvement in the process of post-resettlement adaptation in the case of the A Vuong resettlement 
project in the central region of Vietnam which was achieved by respecting cultural traditions by 
assisting in moving burial grounds, supporting construction of village shrines and temples and 
community houses with spiritual and social significance. This study also discovered the importance 
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of taking into account social and cultural capitals of the resettled people. As discussed in Section 
5.2.2 and 6.3.3 the Jarai group was the only group in the current study which had experienced a 
significant loss in terms of network and culture. Therefore, they established a new routine culture in 
the resettlement life. The Bahnar and Ro Ngao groups continued their religious networks after the 
resettlement without changing their religion which enabled them to get different types of support 
and migrate to urban areas through their religious networks. In reality, the social and cultural 
capitals are difficult to incorporate in resettlement policies.       
6.5. Adapted framework for understanding, monitoring and enhancing the livelihood 
resilience of resettled people 
To this point, several strengths and weaknesses of the existing frameworks have been revealed in 
the above Sections 6.3.1, 6.3.2, 6.3.3, 6.4 and different factors defining failure and successful 
outcomes of the resettlement process have been defined and presented in Figure 6.1. Several lessons 
have been drawn from this study: 
- Meaningful participation during compensation and resettlement planning was lacking. The 
Kinh group influenced the compensation and resettlement process and the ethnic minority 
groups had limited participation.  
- Limited understanding of historical context (population, population demography, land use, land 
tenure policy). 
- The resettled population were non-homogenous. They had different cultural and social 
backgrounds which had implications for the resettlement process.  
- A full range of livelihood capitals is essential for livelihoods. But natural, social and cultural 
capitals and psychological capital are often given less attention.  
- Previous studies and frameworks have paid little attention to the informants’ coping strategies. 
Many of the informants’ strategies such as illegal logging, gold panning, waged labour, lending 
and borrowing money, and religious conversions are also present in the livelihoods of many 
resettled people and have implications for resettlement and development policy.  
- This study found driving factors for successful recovery and improvement of livelihoods are 
more active participation from the Kinh group, cultivation land holding, advanced human 
capitals (education level, skills), and medium household size.    
- The key frameworks on DIDR have not been able to capture the complexities involved in the 
resettlement process in terms of understanding local context, a full range of livelihood capitals, 
160 
 
livelihood strategies, and driving factors such as land holding and land tenure, social 
differentiation and social networks.    
Given the ongoing failures of many resettlement projects, it is necessary to develop a framework 
based on the strengths and weaknesses of the existing frameworks on DIDR and lessons from this 
study. 
This adapted framework (Figure 6.2) includes three main functions, specifically understanding the 
compensation and resettlement planning, monitoring the resettlement process and providing 
interventions to improve or enhance the resettlement process. The focus of this framework is 
centred on capitals based on the consideration of social differentiation and using a process based 
approach. Its goals are to avoid impoverishment risks and enable resettled people to experience 
improved wellbeing.  
Understanding the compensation and resettlement planning 
Context: The first consideration before conducting any compensation and resettlement planning is 
to have a good baseline study and EIA reports which need to provide an understanding of the 
context related to the resettlers and their locations. The reports should have historical context 
(population, population demography, land use, land tenure policy and related to government 
programs). Non-homogenous resettled populations must be considered in compensation and 
resettlement planning. All the elements have implications for compensation and resettlement 
planning. For instance, the different lifestyles of the subsistence farming groups of the ethnic 
minorities (Bahnar, Jarai, Ro Ngao) and the commercial farmer group (Kinh) have implications. In 
addition, the change in land tenure provided the advantages of land transferring and elite capture 
which led to impoverishment of the subsistence farmers after the resettlement.     
Capitals based: Resettlement involves changes in livelihood capitals of resettled people. Physical 
and financial capitals are important and often given the most attention in compensation and 
resettlement planning. However, the natural, human, social, cultural capitals also form a part of 
resettled people’s livelihoods and adaptive capacity.   
Definition of livelihood capitals and their importance in local livelihoods varies among 
communities. SLF with its capital pentagon has received critiques by scholars (Smyth and Vanclay, 
2017, McLean, 2015) that it is too complex, uses alienating language and is restrictive in its 
“pentagon prison”. But the general terms of capitals are basic and useful for researchers, 
practitioners and planners to start with. They should consult with resettled people about their 
definition, specific items, and roles in their livelihoods in local and simple language. Based on that, 
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appropriate compensation and planning can be developed. For example, community forest land and 
grazing land are important to many rural communities. However, they have never been 
compensated or considered in resettlement plans. Therefore, allocation of forest land or grazing 
land must be prioritised and conducted in resettlement projects. Another example is that social 
capital in terms of religious membership is crucial for some social groups but not all groups even 
within a resettlement project. Moreover, cattle are considered as financial capital in this case and 
some rural communities in Africa but it is not the case for every society.  
Livelihood strategies: Both formal and informal coping strategies are employed by resettled people 
to respond to the changes in their livelihood capitals in resettlement sites. The findings from this 
study and this framework emphasise the need to consider both types of strategies during 
resettlement processes. Conventional approaches such as SLF and other studies often focus on the 
formal development strategies such as migration and agricultural intensification and fail to 
understand informants’ coping strategies such as religious conversion, illegal logging, returning to 
live and work in previous swidden fields near the reservoir, gold panning, waged labour etc. 
Therefore, the vulnerable and marginalised groups are often neglected in resettlement processes and 
development projects due to the focus. 
Livelihood outcomes of the resettlement process: This study and other studies reveal the two 
contrasting outcomes of resettlement projects due to changes in livelihood capitals and different 
employment of livelihood strategies. The impoverishment risks from Cernea’s framework (IRR) 
and additional risks found in this case are added to this framework. It is important for resettled 
people, practitioners and policy makers to be aware of the risks as a result of failure in resettlement 
projects where resettled people experience a decline in capitals and employ unsustainable coping 
strategies. By contrast, some resettled people such as the Kinh group in this case experience 
increases in their livelihood capitals and employ development strategies which tend to achieve 
improved wellbeing. 
Monitoring the compensation and resettlement planning 
Long term monitoring and evaluation of cost and benefits of dams during their project life with 
focuses on outstanding social issues is one of the strategic priorities of the World Commission on 
Dam’s report. However, it is rarely conducted and followed up in Vietnam. Therefore, this 
framework offers a practical way of monitoring and diagnosing resettlement related issues.  
A monitoring system with a focus on the livelihood capital changes of resettled households and 
groups must be set up. Based on the facilitation of practitioners and discussion with resettled 
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people, items for each capital can be identified. These findings can then be used as indicators for 
measuring changes due to the resettlement.  
There are two different ways to measure the changes in livelihood capitals. The first simple way is 
that resettled people and project staff can work together to do ranking changes of items and 
livelihood capitals before and after the resettlement by giving a score for each item and capital for 
the two times. Ideally, giving a score for each item and capital should be done before the 
resettlement and followed up during the project cycle. The second way is for project officers to 
conduct surveys and do statistical analysis of the changes for items and capitals. Any significant 
decline of a single item or capital may be caused by inappropriate compensation, issues related to 
the resettlement process such as elite capture, issues of spending cash compensation etc. For 
instance, resettled households losing most of their cultivation land or indebt after the resettlement 
would be prioritised in resettlement projects. Interventions should be given to this group first. 
Another example, a project officer can discuss social and cultural capitals in term of cultural 
inventory and network membership changes with resettled people after the resettlement. The 
significant reduction in practising traditional festivals and being less actively involved in a network 
membership requires more attention from the resettlement project. Besides the decline in capital, 
any significant increase and decrease leading to considerable difference in owning capitals among 
resettled households needs further research. 
This framework also suggests the need to monitor livelihood strategies of resettled people. Project 
staff should identify and list all livelihood strategies and activities which resettled people apply in 
the resettlement site. The more development and sustainable strategies, the more possible it will be 
to achieve successful and improved livelihood outcomes. Nevertheless, if resettled households 
apply informal and unsustainable coping strategies in the resettlement sites it is likely to have 
resulted from the failure of compensation and resettlement planning and the significant declines of 
livelihood capitals and their adaptive capacity.  
Livelihood outcomes of the resettled people can be monitored and used to assess the success of a 
resettlement project. The impoverishment risks identified in Cernea’s IRR framework (landlessness, 
homelessness, joblessness, food insecurity, loss of access to common property, increased morbidity, 
marginalisation and social disarticulation) and additional risks from this research (financial risk, 
power inequity risk among the resettled people, education disruption) are indicators for failure of a 
resettlement project. Moreover, the livelihood outcomes in terms of income, debt, saving, poverty 
reduction and levels of food security are indicators for measuring the success or failure of a 
resettlement project. 
163 
 
Suggesting interventions for improving and enhancing resettlement outcomes 
The common problem of many resettlement projects is that they lack meaningful participation. 
Therefore, several international and national regulations have been developed to deal with the 
problem. The World Commission on Dam’s report has one of its principles about encouraging 
community participation in planning and implementing resettlement. The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (2007) and IFC’s Performance Standards (2012) 
has guidance notes No 7 on Indigenous people which has the objective of ensuring that the 
development process fosters full respect for the human rights, dignity, aspirations, culture, and 
natural resource-based livelihoods of indigenous peoples and ensuring the free, prior, and informed 
consent (FPIC) of the affected communities and indigenous peoples. The government of Vietnam 
issued its EIA which mentioned the involvement of affected people in any development project and 
there is a Vietnamese regulation on Democracy at Grassroots Level (QD 04/2015/ND-CP). The 
regulations are fundamental for having a meaningful participation of stakeholders, especially 
indigenous and ethnic groups taking part in resettlement processes.  
Based on the lessons from this study, social differentiation is a main thread in the whole process of 
resettlement. Failure and ignorance in capturing the social differentiation would lead to 
consequences of the resettlement as in the case of Yali Falls Dam. Therefore, it should be given 
attention in the baseline study, EIA reports and in any step in the compensation and resettlement 
process. The diversity of resettled communities implies the need to have discussions with different 
social groups during the resettlement process. Non-homogenous resettled communities require 
different compensation and resettlement strategies. 
The lessons from the Yali Falls Dam resettlement project and other cases highlighted that physical 
and financial investment is not enough for recovering and improving livelihoods. Section 4.2.7 and 
Figure 6.1 obviously show the importance of natural, social and human capitals in the resettled 
people’s livelihoods. The compensation and interventions from resettlement projects should move 
beyond the conventional approach focusing on the two main capitals, physical and financial. For 
example, improving social capitals for the ethnic minority groups in the Yali Falls Dam by 
supporting their activities and providing technical support through their religious networks could be 
effective. In addition, improving human capitals such as education and skills and designing an 
appropriate small credit program for the ethnic minority people would play a role in the long-term 
livelihoods of the ethnic minority groups. A good example of maintaining and strengthening social 
and cultural capitals is in the A Vuong resettlement project in the central region of Vietnam by 
Singer et al. (2015) where good results were achieved through respecting cultural traditions by 
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assisting in moving burial grounds, supporting construction of village shrines and temples and 
community houses with spiritual and social significance.        
This framework emphasises a process based approach to understand the resettlement process. The 
resettlement project would not be a success without an understanding of the livelihood activities of 
the resettled people. Based on the identified list of both formal and informal livelihood strategies 
project officers and developers would be able to recognise the successes and failures of the 
resettlement process. If households were applying mainly unsustainable coping strategies it would 
be necessary to examine declined livelihood capitals and to provide interventions for the 
households. For example, borrowing money with high interest rates from the black market was a 
strategy used by many of the resettled households from the ethnic minority groups in the Yali Falls 
Dam resettlement site. This would require solutions for improving access to small credit programs 
and bank loans for the poorer groups and minimising the influence of the Kinh group. Other activity 
such as returning to live and work in the previous swidden fields, panning for gold and illegal 
logging suggest to planners and developers that several interventions are needed.  
Context and situation related to resettlement vary from case to case. Therefore, this framework 
offers a practical way to deal with the complexities. 
Linkages between relevant laws, policies and this framework 
The review of resettlement experiences and relevant policies in Vietnam over the decades in Section 
2.5 found that resettlement policy in Vietnam has been evolving over recent decades. However, the 
policies have been compensation and short-term oriented and lacking livelihood restoration and 
improvement components post-resettlement. Furthermore, there has been a gap between policy and 
implementation. The main challenge of resettlement in Vietnam and over the world is how to 
implement resettlement with development. The research findings confirmed the conclusions of the 
review but it further provided several underlying causes, policy implications and offered the 
adapted framework to improve resettlement practices and enable resettlement with development 
more realistic.  
The first structured problem related to un-success resettlement process and poor outcomes is land 
ownership. According to Ty et al. (2013), the Government holds supreme authority over 
compulsory land acquisition and has close relations with investors, the vested groups, but ignores 
the benefits of resettled people. Moreover, lack of production lands and livelihood alternatives in 
the compensation policies and measures have led to the negative impacts on the resettled people. 
The historical review in Central Highlands (Section 3.2.1.3) and the research findings in this 
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research also found that the trends of losing land and forest of the ethnic minority people along with 
the process of migration of the Kinh and country development and large area of land and forest 
have been under management of the state forest and agriculture enterprises. The root cause of that is 
the change in land ownership from the community into individual households. Therefore, ensuring 
enough production land and forest for the resettled people must be a priority in any resettlement 
project. The adapted framework in Figure 6.2 with the importance of context in term of land 
ownership and the changes in livelihood capitals, especially land and forest resources would suggest 
different ways to improve resettlement project when discussing with the resettled people. One of the 
solutions is to share a part of land under the state enterprises with the resettled people. This option 
is in line with the current policies of reforming the state enterprises over the country in the 
government decree 118/2017/ND-CP with regards to reconstruction, reforms and improving 
performance of the state forest and agricultural enterprises in the country.  
The second significant issue which this research highlighted is that several legislations on 
compensation and supports through benefit sharing mechanisms such as PES but the problem is 
largely implementation. The main reason is the limited understanding of the social context with 
ethnic diversity. McElwee (2012) found that PES models show uneven outcomes in promoting 
privatization and capitalization of commodities and unlikely to be successful in tacking underlying 
cause for forest degradation due to limited participation from the local communities and uneven 
land tenure. This study discovered that although PES is a good mechanism for sharing benefits from 
hydropower development to the resettled people, limited access to forest resources and a lack of 
entitlement definition are barriers for them to benefit from this mechanism. Thus, it would not be 
solved by addressing the land ownership issue and giving entitlement to the resettled people who 
deserves for the benefits of hydropower development.    
Capacity of implementing resettlement is also an issue for many projects in Vietnam and over the 
world. In the case of Three Gorges Dam in China (Section 2.4.3), no department or agency is 
responsible for post-resettlement issues and the local authorities’ staff were seeing relocation as an 
administrative task, without the responsibility of rehabilitation which is a complex process 
(Padovani, 2009). This study found that livelihood recovery in the long-term for the resettled people 
has not been paid attention. In addition, the lack of participation from the provincial and district 
levels which also led to the poor outcomes of resettlement. This is clearly reflected through the 
opinions of the two government officials below.  
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“There is no difference between the recent resettlement project of Se San 3 A hydropower 
with the resettlement project of Yali. Similar problems have been repeated in the Se San 2 A 
resettlement project because the same planners and implementers….. 
Actually, if the investment in resettlement were given to the commune and district people 
committee they would have done much better. The hydropower company has never reported 
to the district people committee. They just do what they want without taking consideration 
on us and not involving us in decision making process. Thus, we do not know anything. 
The main problem is that there is no follow up actions by the government and hydropower 
dam after the relocation of the resettled people. No boby care! Just only us, the local 
authority, who have to be responsible for our people”.  (A government official from the 
district people’s committee – GoK7). 
“I have been also disappointed with the government program which provided rubber and 
Litsea trees to our villagers to plant. But they have not owned land or enough land, what 
can they do. Again, the World Bank funded project on poverty reduction in Central 
Highland is going to invest in hybrid rice field model which about 190 million VND. In fact, 
it is also not our priority”. (A chairman of a resettled commune – GoB3). 
 
In sum, three key issues such as land ownership, benefit sharing and implementation capacity play 
important roles in defining resettlement process and outcomes. To address the issues it is necessary 
to change relevant policies and enhance implementation capacity of related stakeholders. The 
research findings and the adapted framework provides policy implication and suggestion for 
capacity building to enable resettlement with development.        
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Figure 6.2: An adapted framework for understanding, monitoring and enhancing the livelihood resilience of resettled people
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6.6. Chapter conclusion 
This chapter used the lenses of current DIDR frameworks to examine the resettlement process and 
outcomes of the Yali project and other studies in Vietnam in order to understand the strengths and 
weaknesses of the frameworks. It has shown that each framework has its strengths and weaknesses 
but there is no single approach which can capture the complexity of the resettlement process in 
different local contexts. As such, this chapter has proposed an adapted framework to more 
comprehensively understand, monitor and improve the resettlement process and outcomes for 
affected livelihoods. In doing so it has resolved the third research question.  
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CHAPTER VII. 
CONCLUSION 
7.1. Research overview 
Although many international and national policies have been developed, resettlement projects 
throughout the world have shown a continuing negative trend leading to declining livelihoods of the 
resettled people. In reality, the current limited understanding of the livelihood reconstruction 
process, especially in the non-homogenous communities, is an obstacle for improving the situation. 
This study therefore aimed to identify the socio-cultural and economic implications of the 
resettlement of four ethnic groups due to the construction of the Yali Hydropower Dam and provide 
recommendations to improve current resettlement situations in Vietnam.  
The sustainable livelihoods framework was employed to design interviews and surveys to 
understand the resettlement process and outcomes of the resettled groups. Two fieldwork trips were 
conducted to undertake 19 key informant interviews and 397 household surveys in the resettlement 
sites of Yali Hydropower Dam in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. Empirical evidence from other 
studies in Vietnam was also used for analysis. The findings of this research were also examined 
through the key DIDR frameworks in order to understand their relevance to the Vietnamese context 
and explore the strengths and weaknesses of the frameworks. Based on the findings of strengths and 
weaknesses of the frameworks, an adapted framework for understanding, monitoring and enhancing 
livelihood resilience of resettled people is proposed.  
The thesis proposed in organising this study (Chapter I) “The impact of large dams on human 
communities could be positive if the investment mix associated with the dams included investments 
beyond infrastructure and finance to human, social and natural capital so that resettled populations 
experienced enhanced well-being and an increased economic contribution to the national economy.” 
has been established by the resolution the three derived research questions. 
1. How has the Yali Falls Dam resettlement project affected the resettled ethnic groups’ 
livelihoods? (Chapter IV);  
2. How and why do the subsequent livelihood strategies and outcomes differ among the ethnic 
groups? (Chapter V) and;  
3. What are the key modifications to the existing DIDR frameworks that could improve resettlement 
program planning and implementation? (Chapter VI). 
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7.2. Resolution of thesis, research questions and findings 
Chapter IV presented findings to address the first research question with regard to the impacts of the 
resettlement project on the four ethnic groups. The findings related to this research question are 
summarised as follows: 
The resettlement project has made both positive and negative impacts on the resettled people’s 
livelihoods. But this study highlighted the differentiated impacts of the resettlement project on all 
livelihood capitals of the subsistence farmers from the ethnic minority groups of Bahnar, Jarai and 
Ro Ngao and commercial farmers from the Kinh group (ethnic Vietnamese).  
▪ The resettled people from all four ethnic groups experienced improvement in infrastructure 
including access to electricity, roads, clinics, and schools after the resettlement. However, 
the irrigation system had not been as good as the resettled people expected.  
▪ The resettled ethnic minority groups of Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao lost significant areas of 
swidden fields and rice fields, access to common property including grazing land, forest and 
the river. However, the Vietnamese (Kinh) group had achieved an increase in their 
cultivation land holding. Therefore, large numbers of the resettled households from the 
ethnic minority groups (about 70%) faced food insecurity after the resettlement whereas 
more than 70% of the Kinh resettled households ensured their food security. On the other 
hand, more than 38% of the Jarai resettled households and about 60% of the Jarai and Ro 
Ngao resettled households were living under the national poverty line. Only 6% of the 
resettled households of Kinh were living under the national poverty line.  
▪ The resettlement project also led to financial crisis for many resettled households of the 
ethnic minority groups. A significant rate of the resettled households (27% of Bahnar, 62% 
of Jarai, and 50% of Ro Ngao resettled households) had got into debt with high interest 
rates, but only 7% of the resettled households of Kinh were in debt with high interest rates.      
▪ The resettlement project caused long-term consequences to the resettled people from the 
ethnic minority groups of Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao, especially the young people who 
faced education disruption, landlessness, unemployment and poverty.  
▪ Overall assessment of livelihood capital changes of the resettled households (Figure 4.6) 
clearly revealed that the adaptive capacity of the Kinh household group increased in terms of 
access to all five capitals. But the ethnic minority groups of Bahnar, Jarai and Ro Ngao had 
diminished adaptive capacity after the resettlement since the improvement in physical 
capitals was traded off with the significant decrease in other natural, social, psychological 
and financial capitals and no change in human capital.   
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Chapter V answered the second research question concerning livelihood coping strategies and 
outcomes of the resettled groups and factors defining and influencing the differences. That chapter 
provided an in-depth analysis and good insights in to a range of livelihood coping strategies applied 
by the resettlers to the situation of the resettlement sites and different factors influencing the 
livelihood reconstruction process. The key findings are presented as follows:  
▪ Both formal and informal coping strategies were applied by the resettled people. 
Nevertheless, the Kinh resettled households and rich households from the ethnic minority 
groups had a tendency to apply development strategies such as agricultural intensification, 
trade and services, commercial fishing and urban migration with skills. In contrast, the 
ethnic minority groups of Bahnar, Jarai, Ro Ngao used unsustainable coping strategies such 
as waged labour, cultivation in drawdown areas, selling land, illegal logging, gold panning, 
collecting left-over agricultural products and urban migration. 
▪ The study discovered key points with regard to the factors defining the differentiated 
impacts and responses of the resettled people. The first important factor was the land 
holding of each household which differentiated the development and coping strategies of the 
Kinh and rich households from those of the ethnic minority groups of Bahnar, Jarai and Ro 
Ngao. The second important range of factors such as ethnicity, education levels, skills of 
household heads, age, household size, religion, socio-economic class and occupation played 
a role in influencing the coping strategies and outcomes. The third critical factor was social 
networks including religious membership and social organisation memberships which also 
defined the coping strategies and outcomes.  
▪ The study emphasised the factors for successful recovering and improving livelihoods of the 
Kinh households and rich households of the ethnic minority groups comprising land 
holding, financial supports, education and skills and membership in social networks. It 
would provide useful implications for compensation and resettlement of resettled people. 
Limited understanding of those factors would constrain the effectiveness of resettlement 
projects.  
▪ There was a gap between the government policies and the social context of the resettlement 
sites. The gap led to unsuccessful outcomes of the resettlement process and even 
exacerbated the gaps between the Kinh group and the ethnic minority groups. The focus on 
the government policies on agricultural intensification (outlined in Section 5.2.1 and 5.3.2) 
caused an increase in the gaps between the rich and the poor and put the small subsistence 
farmers and poor households in a more difficult situation. The benefit sharing policies such 
as PES were not able to channel the benefit from the hydropower development into the 
 172 
 
resettlement sites where the resettled people often had no entitlement or limited access to 
forest land. The government policies were inactive and out of context and contributed to 
causing the problems with such actions as the plan to move the resettled people again. The 
distance between policies and people could be narrowed and removed with improved 
understanding of the local context. 
▪ The study found the religions, institutions which are a source of information, played an 
important role in supporting its members in coping with the hardships in the resettlement 
sites. The trend of converting religions in the Jarai group was a way of coping with the 
situation in the resettlement sites.    
Chapter VI discussed the third research question pertaining to a new framework for understanding, 
monitoring and enhancing livelihood resilience of the resettled people. By examining the strengths 
and weaknesses of the current DIDR frameworks and the sustainable livelihoods framework (SLF) 
and identifying the key elements for making the Yali project different, this study proposed an 
adapted framework. 
▪ The case study of Yali emphasised the complexity involved in the resettlement process and 
outcomes in the context of different ethnic groups. The four stage framework was not able to 
capture the events and factors in the resettlement process of the resettled people with its 
assumption of behaviour-related sequential stages of resettlement (as discussed in Section 
6.3.1). Section 6.3.2 discussed the strengths of the impoverishment risks and reconstruction 
framework in warning the impoverishment risks but showed its limitation in understanding 
differentiated adaptive capacity. It also highlighted the limitations of IRR in suggesting local 
context-friendly livelihood strategies to deal with the challenges of displacement. Section 
6.3.3 on the routine and dissonant culture framework confirmed the strength of this 
framework concerning the conceptualisation of the cultural changes of displaced 
communities during the resettlement process. In general, there is no single approach which 
can capture complexity of the resettlement process in different local contexts.  
▪ SLF with livelihood capitals has its strengths in capturing the changes in livelihood capitals 
and livelihood strategies. However, more attention is needed to informal coping strategies 
which are also important to local livelihoods.   
▪ This study proposed an adapted framework for understanding, monitoring and enhancing 
long-term livelihood resilience of the resettled people by emphasising the key elements 
including the importance of local context, meaningful participation, livelihood capitals, and 
social differentiation (Section 6.5 and Figure 6.1).       
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7.3. Contributions of the thesis 
7.3.1. Theoretical contributions 
The most significant contribution of this study is offering an adapted framework for understanding, 
monitoring and enhancing livelihood resilience of resettled people (Figure 6.2 in Chapter VI) to 
avoid impoverishment risks and enhance livelihood outcomes of resettlement projects. It is not only 
a conceptual framework for understanding the resettlement and livelihood reconstruction process 
but also a planning tool for monitoring and diagnosing related problems of the resettlement process 
and suggesting appropriate interventions. The proposed framework is useful for planners, 
developers and resettled people to understand different aspects of livelihood resources and discuss 
them together in a participatory manner in order to develop long term sustainable livelihoods for the 
resettled people. Moreover, it helps the stakeholders to avoid the risks of the differences and power 
inequity among different groups in resettlement sites in order to meet their different needs and 
reduce the gaps among different social groups which are important to sustainable development.  
This study makes an important contribution to the ongoing debate between the two approaches in 
DIDR including the reformist management approach and the radical movementist approach 
(mentioned in Section 2.3.3 of Chapter II). It clearly stresses the negative sides of development in 
the form of uneven distribution of cost and benefit. The resettled people from the ethnic minority 
groups have received little benefit from the dam development in term of access to infrastructure. 
However, they have faced relatively large costs such as losing land for cultivation, common 
resources and social bonds (Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.3). The dam development project not only 
caused strongly negative impacts on the ethnic minority people but also put them in a complicated 
situation of development with the influence of more advantaged groups of Kinh and it was hard 
from them to escape. Thus, the assumption of increasing financial inputs and development 
resettlement policies following the reformist approach would not be enough if the structural causes 
of uneven distribution of cost and benefits were not clearly identified.  
Another key contribution of this study is that it offers a comprehensive approach to assess impacts 
of the resettlement project on resettled people’s adaptive capacity. Recently, Zoomers and Otsuki 
(2017) urged the revision of SLF and more reengaging with livelihood research to understand the 
impacts of large scale land investment projects on local livelihoods. From the methodological 
perspective, this research, with the employment of modified SLF with a focus on livelihood 
resource changes and outcomes is useful to measure overall changes of all livelihood capitals which 
are clearly implicated in the increased or declined adaptive capacity of the resettled households (See 
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Figure 4.6 in Chapter IV). The more assets the resettled people have access to, the more resilience 
they have to cope with shocks and stress and vice versa.  
Borras Jr and Franco (2013) criticised the previous livelihoods related studies which tended to treat 
local communities as homogenous to conceal rather than reveal the differentiated and uneven 
impacts on people. This study is one of a few studies on DIDR employing mixed methods to 
discover the complexity involved in the resettlement process. The key contribution of this study is 
to highlight the changes in land rights and land holding, social differentiation and networks which 
should be taken into consideration in DIDR and livelihood related studies. It identified the change 
in land rights from communal into individual providing favourable conditions for elite capture and 
affecting the ethnic minority people’s livelihoods. It discovered a differentiation process taking 
place in the resettlement process due to local context, compensation planning and impacts of the 
resettlement project. Besides the land holding, factors such as ethnicity, age, occupation, education 
level, household size, and social network have driven livelihood reconstruction processes and 
outcomes which have often received less attention from previous studies, planners and policy 
makers. Those factors can help in understanding the differentiated impacts of development project 
on heterogeneous communities. 
Some scholars recommended that conducting hybrid research on livelihoods should move beyond 
livelihood capitals, the “Pentagon Prison”, to a livelihood trajectory approach which supports 
quantitative assessment of livelihood capitals with narratives of livelihoods (Sallu et al., 2010, 
McLean, 2015). This study confirms that the mixed methods combining quantitative assessment of 
livelihood capitals and livelihood trajectory are powerful and provides good insights into 
understanding of the livelihood reconstruction of the resettled people. Chapter V shows a 
comprehensive understanding of livelihood strategies and outcomes with key driving factors by 
using both quantitative data and qualitative data. The mixed method, focusing on understanding the 
context of resettlement impacts on local livelihoods and livelihood strategies employed in this study 
is a useful way to provide a comprehensive understanding of the livelihood reconstruction process 
of the resettled ethnic groups. 
7.3.2. Policy implications 
Findings from this study would have a number of policy implications on development-induced 
displacement and resettlement.  
The resettlement policies in the Yali Falls Dam and other resettlement projects over the last 20 
years (2.5.3) have evolved. However, the policies have been compensation and short-term oriented 
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with much focus on the physical and financial capitals rather than other capitals. For example, the 
compensation policies have not provided enough cultivation land and inappropriate irrigation 
systems. The government also often provides a passive response to the difficulty of resettlement 
sites by developing another program to move the resettled people again. Thus, it has led to 
difficulties and hardships for resettled people in recovering their livelihoods in the long term. The 
slogan “resettled people’s life in the new place must be equal to or better than in the previous place” 
has been difficult to put into practice. Moreover, it has been far from meeting expectations to 
implement resettlement with development since the policies have not considered natural, human, 
social and cultural capitals and the long-term timeframe. Thus, it needs to shift from a 
compensation oriented policy into a resettlement with development policy.  
It is necessary to have a benefit sharing mechanism to channel the benefits of hydropower to the 
resettled people. Out of more than 90 million Vietnamese people, about 200,000 resettled people 
being affected by hydropower dam development have been facing hardships in the resettlement 
sites. The recent urgent message from the Vietnamese Prime Minister urged the development of 
benefit sharing mechanisms for the affected people by hydropower development14. However, this 
study has shown that there are constraints which make it difficult for the resettled people to benefit 
from the hydropower development. The resettled people have no entitlement definition for 
benefitting from the payment for environmental service (PES) policy since they have limited access 
to forest land which is a criterion for being involved. Therefore, it requires that the resettled people 
must be the first groups considered in benefiting from hydropower development.  
The government tends to impose “one size fit all” policies which do not consider diversity among 
populations, farming communities, natural conditions and are more suited to communities with 
market traditions than to traditional hamlets (Van Thanh, 2017, Jamieson et al., 1998). The 
compensation and resettlement policies in the case of Yali are not exceptional. The imposition of 
the same compensation policy in favour of the Kinh lifestyle has led to differentiation of the 
resettlement process elsewhere. In addition, the agricultural intensification policy by the 
government has led to additional displacement for the ethnic minority people and accelerated the 
gaps between the Kinh and the ethnic minority people. Therefore, policies should be sensitive to 
social diversity and the needs of different groups.  
From this study, developing a long-term monitoring system is needed to examine the success and 
failure of the resettlement projects and provide timely and appropriate interventions. The capitals 
                                               
14http://vietnamnet.vn/vn/thoi-su/chinh-tri/331715/thu-tuong-nghien-cuu-chia-se-phan-loi-nhuan-tu-thuy-dien-cho-dan.html 
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based approach with social differentiation consideration proposed by this study can be useful for 
developing the monitoring system. A monitoring system can help to align resettlement with the 
development of policy in the long term.   
7.4. Limitations of the research 
One of the limitations of this study is the application of non-longitudinal studies by surveying 
resettled households on pre and post resettlement periods. Therefore, it may be biased and rely too 
much on the resettled people’s memories. However, the use of in-depth interview methods and the 
previous experience of the researcher could overcome the bias from the survey and provide in-depth 
contents and analysis. In addition, the qualitative data from the in-depth interviews and observations 
were also used to triangulate quantitative data. The condition of the data collected and the 
methodology used could allow this study to become longitudinal if time and resources become 
available. 
Another limitation is that this research should select non-resettled ethnic groups as control groups to 
compare with the four resettled ethnic groups in order to show impacts of resettlement. In fact, 
besides time and financial resource constraints, it was too difficult to select appropriate control 
groups of the four ethnic groups with similar conditions. Again the study provides a basis for doing 
such a study in the future.  
This research has additional limitations since it was mainly based on the Yali hydropower 
resettlement project case study. However, this study focused on in-depth understanding by 
surveying a large number of households. Thus, the findings can be generalised. Moreover, the 
analysis of this study used evidence from other studies on resettlement projects in Vietnam to show 
the common patterns and gaps in the area of DIDR in the country.   
7.5. Future research 
This research was mainly based on the case study of the Yali Falls Dam in the Central Highlands. 
Therefore, it is necessary to conduct further study on social differentiation in resettlement projects 
in the northern mountain and central region with different natural, historical, cultural, and social 
settings compared to the Central Highlands in order to understand the significance of social 
differentiation during the resettlement process in different contexts of resettlement.  
This research developed an adapted framework to understand, monitor and enhance livelihood 
resilience of resettled people (capitals based considering social differentiation). Therefore, future 
study should test this framework in order to identify appropriate interventions to restore the 
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livelihoods of resettlement affected households in line with the International Financial 
Corporation’s Performance Standard 5: Livelihoods and standard of living must be restored to the 
same or better than prior to resettlement. 
7.6. Concluding remarks 
The thesis has provided an in-depth analysis of the impacts of the resettlement project of Yali 
hydropower on ethnically diverse groups and the inherent complexities involved in the livelihood 
reconstruction process. It discovered the uneven distribution of impacts of the resettlement project 
on ethnic groups’ livelihood capitals and outcomes and several factors involved in the resettlement 
process. The thesis has proposed an adapted framework to avoid impoverishment risks and achieve 
improved wellbeing based on the following key elements: understanding the historical context; 
improving meaningful participation; and using a capital-based approach with social differentiation 
consideration.    
The thesis has made several important contributions to the current body of literature on DIDR and 
livelihood studies. It confirmed the usefulness of a mixed methods approach to providing good 
insights into the resettlement process. It also confirmed that no single framework can deal with the 
complexities of the resettlement processes and confirmed the conclusion of De Wet (2006) that it 
requires a more comprehensive, locally-based and open-ended approach to deal with such 
complexities. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 - The structured household interview 
Research project: Understanding long-term livelihood resilience of resettled ethnic groups in 
the Yali Falls Dam basin, Central Highlands of Vietnam 
 
HOUSEHOLD QUESTIONNAIRE 
General information 
Is the respondent the head of household? ____2 No  ____1 Yes.   
Gender of respondent: _____1 Male ______2 Female; Age of respondent: ______Ethnicity:______ 
Place of birth: _____________When did your family move here?_____Month________Year 
Distance to the old place:_____km; Village name: _____________; Commune name: __________ 
District name: ___________________; Province___________________________ 
 
Section 1: Household livelihood assets before and after the move  
1.1. Human capital 
Demographic characteristics for everyone living in the house 
Person Gender 
1=Male 
2=Female 
Age or 
Year 
of 
birth 
Religion 
0=Non 
religion 
1=Catholic 
2=Protestant 
3=Buddhist 
4=Non 
Formal education 
level 
0=No formal 
education 
1=Primary school 
2=Secondary 
school 
3=High school 
4=Vocational 
school 
5=University 
degree 
Specific Skills –  
0=No skills 
1=Rubber 
harvesting 
2=Litsea 
harvesting 
3=Cultivation 
technique 
4=Livestock 
breeding 
5=Construction 
6=IPM 
Occupation 
0=Unemployment 
1=Government 
official 
2=Farmer 
3=Fisherman 
4=Teacher 
5=Trader, Services 
6=Army, Police 
7=Retired 
8=Hired labour 
9=Student 
10=Other (specify) 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
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1.2. Social capital 
1.2.1. Network membership 
 Before the move (2=No; 
1=Yes) 
After the move (2=No; 1=Yes) 
1. Farmer Union   
2. Women Union   
3. Veteran Union   
4. Youth Union   
5. Elders Union   
6. Other (Specify)   
 
What is your role in the network: 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
What have you benefited from being a member of the network: 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Have there been any changes compared to the situation before the move? 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
Why___________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.2.2. Have you done any types of mutual help? _______2 No  ______1 Yes  
What types of mutual helps?_________1. Labour exchange_________2. Production mean 
exchange 
_________3. Shared livestock raising_________4. Tonetine_________5. Other (Specify) 
Have been any changes compared to the situation before the move? ____2 No  ____1 Yes 
What are changes?_______________________________________________________________ 
_____________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.2.3. How has access to education been changed after the move? ____ 5 Great increase_____4 
Some increase ____3 No change______2 Some decrease____1 Great decrease 
Why___________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.2.4. Do your children currently go to school? ____2 No  ____1 Yes. If No.  
Why___________________________________________________________________________ 
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1.2.5. Have you received any skill trainings since you resettled? 
Trainings In the first years after the move  
(The resettlement program) 2=No; 1=Yes 
In the last 5 years 
2=No; 1=Yes 
Rubber plantation   
Litsea plantation   
Cultivation techniques   
Livestock breeding   
Construction   
IPM    
Other (Specify)   
 
If ‘No’, Why not?________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.2.6. Have your family taken part in any government program in the last 5 years? 
Government programs 2=No 1=Yes 
1. Small rubber plantation according Decision No. 14 in 2009 of the province   
2. Support land to the poor ethnic minority according to Decision No. 755 in 2013   
3. Support for production development Program 135 in 2014    
4. Direct support to poor households in the difficult area Decision 102/2009 in 2014    
5. Other (Specify)   
 
1.2.7. Gender participation indecision making in your family 
 Before the move 
(1=Wife,2=Husband,3=Both) 
After the move  
(1=Wife,2=Husband, 3=Both) 
Land purchasing   
Building and buying house   
Buy valuable family assets   
Children marriage    
Borrowing money   
Children education   
Investment on agriculture   
Financial management   
Other (Specify)   
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1.2.8. What is your religious membership? ___4 Non__1 Catholic,___2 Protestant,___3 Buddhist  
When did you become the religion member?__________________________________________ 
Have you changed from one religion to another? ____2 No  ____1 Yes . 
Why___________________________________________________________________________ 
Why are reasons to be membership?__________________________________________________ 
Who did introduce you and in what context? What kinds of support when you are 
membership?_____________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
1.2.9. What do you think about the access to the road after resettlement? ____ 5 Great 
increase_____4 Some increase ____3 No change______2 Some decrease____1 Great decrease 
What benefits have you got when having more access to the road?_____1 Selling agricultural 
products______2 Selling forest products______ Others_______ 
 
1.3. Natural capital 1.3.1. Land  
1.3.1.1. Land holding 
No Land category Before the move 5 years after the move Now 
No Yes Area (ha) No Ye
s 
Area (ha) No Yes Area (ha) 
1 Wet rice          
- 1 crop          
- 2 crops          
2 Coffee          
3 Drawdown areas          
4 Sugar cane          
5 Upland rice          
6 Maize          
7 Cassava          
8 Home garden          
9 Rubber          
10 Fish pond          
11 Forest land          
12 Grazing land          
13 Litsea          
 
1.3.1.2. Do you own the land you live on?_______2 No_______1 Yes 
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1.3.1.3. If Yes, what is situation of your household’s land ownership? ____ 5 Great increase_____4 
Some increase ____3 No change______2 Some decrease____1 Great decrease. 
Why___________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.3.1.4. Do you own better or worse land in the new place compared to before resettlement? 
_____5 Much better _____4 Better______3 The same________2 Worse________1 Much worse 
Why___________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.3.1.5. Have you sold any land since you came to the new village?______2 No; _______1 Yes. If 
‘Yes’ 
When? 
Year 
Types of land (1=Wet rice; 
2=Swidden field; 3=Rubber 
plantation land; 4=Home 
garden land =Other 
(specific) 
Area (m2 
or ha) 
Amount of 
money you 
got (VND) 
Who did you sell to? (1=Kinh 
people in the local area; 2=Kinh 
people from other provinces; 
3=Bahnar; 4=Jarai; 5=Ro Ngao; 
6=Other (specific) 
     
     
 
Reasons_________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.3.1.6. Have you bought any land since you came to the new village? ______2 No; _______1 Yes. 
If ‘Yes’  
When? 
Year 
Types of land (1=Wet rice; 
2=Swidden field; 3=Rubber 
plantation land; 4=Home 
garden land =Other 
(specific) 
Area (m2 
or ha) 
Amount of 
money you 
paid (VND) 
Who did you sell to? (1=Kinh 
people in the local area; 2=Kinh 
people from other provinces; 
3=Bahnar; 4=Jarai; 5=Ro Ngao; 
6=Other (specific) 
     
     
 
Reasons_________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
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1.3.1.7. Have you leased land since you came to new village? ______2 No; _______1 Yes. If ‘Yes’  
When? 
Year 
Types of land (1=Wet 
rice; 2=Swidden field; 
3=Rubber plantation 
land; 4=Home garden 
land =Other (specific) 
Area (m2 
or ha) 
Amount of 
money you 
got (VND) 
Who did you sell to? (1=Kinh 
people in the local area; 2=Kinh 
people from other provinces; 
3=Bahnar; 4=Jarai; 5=Ro Ngao; 
6=Other (specific) 
     
     
 
Reasons_________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
1.3.1.8. Have you rented any land since you came to new village? ______2 No; _______1 Yes. If 
‘Yes’  
When? 
Year 
Types of land (1=Wet 
rice; 2=Swidden field; 
3=Rubber plantation 
land; 4=Home garden 
land =Other (specific) 
Area (m2 
or ha) 
Amount of 
money you 
paid (VND) 
Who did you sell to? (1=Kinh 
people in the local area; 
2=Kinh people from other 
provinces; 3=Bahnar; 4=Jarai; 
5=Ro Ngao; 6=Other (specific) 
     
     
 
Reasons_________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
1.3.2. Forest  
What kinds of forest products did you collect from the forest before the move?  
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
What kinds of forest products have you collected since the move? 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
What do you think about the forest product availability? ____ 5 Great increase_____4 Some 
increase ____3 No change______2 Some decrease____1 Great decrease. 
Why?__________________________________ 
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1.3.3. River 
1.3.3.1. Did you do fishing in the old place? ____2 No  ____1 Yes  
How much did you catch each time?_________kg/time____________kg/week________kg/month  
 
1.3.3.2. Have you done fishing in the new place? __________2 No  _______1 Yes  
How much did you catch each time?_________kg/time_____________kg/week________kg/month  
 
1.3.3.3. What do you think about the changes in access to fishery resource compared to before 
resettlement?  
____ 5 Great increase_____4 Some increase ____3 No change______2 Some decrease____1 Great 
decrease 
 
Why___________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.3.3.4. Do you have to buy fish from market? ____2 No  ____1 Yes. 
Why___________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
1.3.4. Drinking water 
1.3.4.1. What is situation of drinking water availability compared to before the move? 
____ 5 Great increase_____4 Some increase ____3 No change______ 
2 Some decrease____1 Great decrease 
 
Why___________________________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
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1.4. Physical capital 
1.4.1. Household assets 
Assets Quantity 
Before the move After the move 
Motor (no.)   
Tractor (no.)   
Ox cart (no.)   
TV (no.)   
Water pump (no.)   
Rice mill (no.)   
Fishnets (no.)   
Boats (no.)   
Mobile phone (no.)   
 
1.4.2. Access to infrastructure compared to before the move 
Access to 1=Great increase, 2=Some increase, 3=No change, 
4=Some decrease, 5=Great decrease 
Near market  
Road  
Clinics  
School  
Irrigation   
Electricity  
Forestry and agricultural extensions  
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1.5. Financial capital 
1.5.1. Financial asset 
Financial assets Situation 
Before the move After the move 
Cattle kept (no.)   
Cash shortage (no. of months)   
Credit (no. of loans)   
Sources of credit: - From Kinh shop (amount, no. of 
loans) 
- From the relative (amount, no. of loans) 
- Government sector (amount, no. of loans) 
  
Remittance (yes or no)    
Savings (yes or no)   
Debts (yes or no)   
 
1.5.2. What do you think about your family’s financial capacity compared to before the move? 
____ 5 Great increase_____4 Some increase ____3 No change______2 Some decrease____1 Great 
decrease 
Why___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.5.3. How has access to credit been changed compared to before the move?  
____ 5 Great increase_____4 Some increase ____3 No change______2 Some decrease____1 Great 
decrease 
Why___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
1.5.4. How has your family’s ability to generate income been changed? 
____ 5 Great increase_____4 Some increase ____3 No change______2 Some decrease____1 Great 
decrease 
Why___________________________________________________________________________ 
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Section 2: Household livelihood strategies before and after the move 
2.1. What are changes in your occupation over the last years? 
Occupations Before the move  5 year after the move Now 
0=Unemployment    
1=Government official    
2=Farmer    
3=Teacher    
4=Fisherman    
5=Traders and services    
6=Army, police    
7=Retired    
8=Hired labour    
9=Student    
10=Other (Specify)    
 
2.2. What strategies does your family apply in the resettlement sites? 
Strategies Application (2=No, 1= Yes) 
Selling land  
Buying land  
Leasing land  
Clearing forest  
Work as hired labour in the local area  
Borrowing money from the bank  
Work in city or other province far from home  
Intensifying agriculture  
Diversifying crops and livestock  
Timber logging and timber transportation  
Religious conversion to get supports  
2.3. How did you decide to engage in these activities after moving? 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2.4. What challenges have you faced in employing the strategies? 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 206 
 
2.5. What are your main sources of income in different periods?  
Main sources of livelihoods Before the move 5 year after the move Now 
1=Fishing    
2=Cultivating    
3=Livestock husbandry    
4=Services    
5=Wage labour    
6=Remittance from member of family     
7=Government salary    
8=Other (specify)    
 
Section 3: Livelihood outcomes 
3.1. Do you think your family having enough rice to eat? ____2 No  ____1 Yes  
Food security Before the move 5 year after the move Now 
Enough rice for family consumption for 
12 months = 1    
9 months = 2    
6 months = 3    
3 months = 4    
1 month = 5    
 
3.2. Nutrition status 
What do you think about your family’s nutrition status compared to before the move? 
____5 Much better________4 Better_________3 No change_______2 Worse______1 Much worse 
Why____________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
What are situation of your children’s nutrition status compared to before the move? 
____5 Much better________4 Better_________3 No change_______2 Worse______1 Much worse 
Why____________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
3.3. Health status 
What do you think about your family members’ health status compared to before the move? 
____5 Much better________4 Better_________3 No change_______2 Worse______1 Much worse 
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Why____________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
3.4. Job situation of family member  
Member in 
family 
Engaged in 
government 
Engaged in 
farming activities 
Engaged in 
fishing 
Engaged in 
timber logging 
Engaged in 
trading&services 
Member in 
family (No.) 
     
 
How have job opportunities been changes compared to before the move? 
 ____ 5 Great increase_____4 Some increase ____3 No change______2 Some decrease____1 Great 
decrease 
Why____________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
3.5. What did your family earn in the last 12 months? 
Activities Vietnam Dong (VND) 
Field crops (Rice, Cassava, Maize)  
Tree crops (Coffee, Rubber, Sugarcane)  
Livestock  
Fishing  
Farm labour  
Non-farm labour  
Other (Specify)  
 
3.6. Compare to the income before the move. Do they increase or decrease? 
Activities 1=Great increase; 2=Some increase; 3=No change; 4=Some 
decrease; 5=Great decrease 
Field crops (Rice, Cassava, Maize)  
Tree crops (Coffee, Rubber, Sugarcane)  
Livestock  
Fish  
Farm labour  
Non-farm labour  
Non-farm employment  
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3.7. What do you think about your family income stability?  
____5 Extremely stable____4 Stable____3 No change ______2 Unstable___1 Extremely Unstable.  
 
Why____________________________________________________________________________
3.8. How is situation of housing compared to before the move?  
____5 Much better________4 Better_________3 No change_______2 Worse______1 Much worse 
 
Why____________________________________________________________________________
3.10. What was your household expenditure in 2014? 
Items VND 
Foods  
Education  
Electricity  
Agriculture  
Other (Specify)  
 
3.11. What was your household’s expenditure on agriculture? 
 Before the move After the move 
Fertilizers (million/ha)   
Pesticides (million/ha)   
Other (Specify)   
 
3.12. What was your annual household agricultural productivity before the move and in 2014? 
Crop Productivity (kg) 
Before the move 2014 
Paddy rice   
Upland rice   
Corn   
Cassava   
Litsea   
Sugarcane   
Rubber   
Fish   
Others   
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3.13. What was the situation of your family’s food production compared to before the move? 
____ 5 Great increase_____4 Some increase ____3 No change______2 Some decrease____1 Great 
decrease 
 
3.14. What was your family economic status before and after the move? 
Before:____Well-off______Middle_____Poor 
After:____Well-off______Middle_____Poor 
 
Section 4: Perception about the life in resettlement area 
 
4.1. What are the remarkable changes between the old and new places?  
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
4.2. What does the change of living location means to you and affect your life? Why 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
4.3. Please rate how well-off of you felt you were before and after the resettlement on a scale of 10 
points (whereby one equals the worst and ten equals the best life).  
Resettlement 
site 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Old village 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
Please explain why?______________________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.4. What are your worries in the resettlement site? 
___ 1 Job _______2 Land_________3 Education for children___________4 Drinking water 
________5  Irrigation water for agriculture_______6 Public hygine_____7 Public security____8 
Others. 
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4.5. What are your wishes in the coming years? 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
4.6. Do you have any suggestions for strengthening and improving the situation in the resettlement 
sites? 
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
THANK YOU SO MUCH! 
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Appendix 2 – Sources, nodes and codes in NVivo 
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